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Foreword
The dissertation is just the infant of a woman called research. It is not its masterwork, but it
is as special as the first child. During research, you somehow know there is a road ahead, but
a road that is so dark that it is very hard to see ahead with anything else than intuition. In
many ways, research is like creating songs and music. Only the artist’s intuition makes him an
appreciated artist. Doing research is like writing the lyrics, and writing the dissertation is like
singing the lyrics to a music that seduces the reader. In this regard, I compare a dissertation to
an artist’s very first album.
It requires mastering all the musical instruments of course, the scientist’s tools, the
communication, presentation and writing techniques, the scientific method. Still, making good
music most of all requires listening to all kinds of music, songs and inspirations. Let all that boil
into the artist’s head, drop a good pinch of innovation, creativity and instinct into it, use a great
deal of faith and conviction to do mix, and that will somehow make a dissertation. One cannot
write a dissertation from scratch, and it is most often not an radical innovation, it is part of a
continuum of human creativity.
All you do is sit down at a typewriter and bleed.
- Ernest Hemingway.
Writing is easy, all you do is sit staring at a sheet of paper until the drops of blood form on
your forehead.
- Gene Fowler.
A Dissertation writing process is chaotic and unordered. I believe that the old adage "failing
to plan is planning to fail" does not apply to thesis dissertation writing. Every principle, even
the most broadly accepted, has its exceptions. The process of dissertation writing is more like
daring to stare at the remaining top 15% of a mountain that it took years to prepare to climb.
The difference is that the high altitude leaves you with almost no oxygen and you can barely
stay on your feet. A blizzard just decides to make things harder and temperature freezes while
you get hit by big chunks of snow.
But you can’t stop, not now, not after all that you have been through. All the hurdles,
detours, challenges along the way, all the comrades that you lost, all those people that look up
to you, there has got to be a reason for all of this. Deep inside, you know, it is now or never,
your body and mind won’t take it for long anymore, there is just nothing left, you are emptied
of your last drops of illusion and all that is left is the energy of despair. If you back down, it is
over. If you look ahead it is over. But at that one point where you reach the climax of despair,
this sudden and strong thought comes right at your face: "WALK!".
So somehow, although you heard it zillions of times from other people and did nothing about
it, you keep your head down and walk in humility, because you know it, this time it’s different.
It is that feeling of utter respect for the haunting task ahead that you feel it deep down inside
of you, this true and absolute modesty that now words can in any common measure describe
accurately.
That is how it feels. Now it is over, and you are at the top of your mountain.
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Abstract
Regulatory Compliance Management (RCM) is widely recognized as one of the main
challenges still to be efficiently dealt with in Enterprise Models (EMs). In the discipline of
Business Process Management (BPM) in particular, which plays a central role in modern
management of enterprises, compliance is considered as an important driver of the efficiency,
reliability and market value of companies. It consists of ensuring that enterprise systems behave
according to some guidance provided in the form of regulations.
Existing approaches to RCM tackle this issue from two different perspectives: methodological
and formal. The first category of a pproaches is widely used in the industry and the practitioner
community and proposes several processes based on controls for compliance audit and governance.
The second category of approaches seeks to construct complex formal languages and reasoning
engines for automatically deciding on the state of compliance of a business process, but remains
hardly accessible to practitioners who are not trained in formal methods. The goal of this thesis
is to provide an approach for modeling and checking of regulatory compliance that profits from
the power of complex formal languages and is specifically targeted at practitioners.
In this thesis, we first give a working definition of the RCM research problem, and define the
scope covered in our research. Then, we analyze the RCM challenge for business process-centered
enterprise models by describing the challenges that compose RCM. Based on the latter we
propose a conceptual framework for RCM.
In order to answer the research challenges identified, we show why we expect a formal
policy-based and model-driven approach to provide significant advantages in allowing enterprises
to flexibly manage decision-making related to regulatory compliance.
For this purpose, we contribute CoReL, a visual domain-specific modeling language for
representing compliance requirements. The main objective of CoReL is to bring the task of
compliance modeling to the business user level where it belongs. CoReL allows to leverage
business process compliance modeling and checking, enhancing it with regard to, user-friendliness
and coverage of various enterprise artifacts, as well as various types of regulatory constraints.
Both informal and formal semantics of CoReL are introduced and its use for modeling and
checking compliance regulations is shown on a set of examples using a specifically developed tool.
Keywords Regulatory Compliance, Business Processes, Policies, Model-Driven Engineering,
Verification, Enforcement, Alloy.
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Part I
Domain Analysis

Chapter 1
Introduction
Brick Walls are there for a reason; they let us know how badly we want things.
Randy Pausch.
Compliance management has received considerable attention in recent years. It was shown to
be a very challenging multi-disciplinary problem. This is especially the case in the context of
business processes and more generally, process-centered enterprise information systems. Business
Processes (BPs) count as one of the most important assets of companies. BPs describe the
behavior of the enterprise, and represent its dynamics (e.g., how resources are moved around
and to which purpose). Ensuring the compliance of processes to legal regulations, governance
guidelines, and strategic business requirements is a sine qua non condition to controlling what
happens both inside and on the outside interfaces of the enterprise. Implementing business
process compliance requires means for modeling and enforcing compliance measures. In this
work, we will provide a broad definition and an analysis of the problem of enterprise regulatory
compliance. We introduce business policies as a fundamental concept for holistic management of
enterprise compliance. We explain the usefulness of automation in compliance management and
present the dissertation thesis.
This thesis states that it is feasible and advantageous to use business policies to
achieve the vision of:
• Business user-friendly modeling of compliance regulations using visual-textual
compliance decision-making modeling.
• Enabling automated checking of certain sub-classes of these regulations on
business process-centered enterprise models.
We present a holistic framework for managing business policies and assisting business users in
using them. We describe a theoretical framework for formally modeling Compliance Requiremens
(CRs) and study properties of the compliance problem. We then show how two different types
of compliance checking may be conducted using business policies. We illustrate the feasibility
of our approach on a case study. We eventually proceed to a discussion of the soundness and
practicability of our approach.
1.1
Context
Compliance management has received considerable attention in recent years in both industry and
in research [Kha12]. In the industry, awareness grew dramatically after several scandals starting in
2001 and the ENRON fraud which was directly correlated with the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOx, 2002) [EKP09]. Markets now shifted towards a tighter regulatory control of economic
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activities, through a wide variety of regulations to be implemented by organizations (e.g., drugs
and food, healthcare, finance, privacy). This fact has become more evident after the last economic
crisis of 2008. The cost of achieving regulatory security compliance for example is on average
3.5$ million each year per company in the U.S.A., according to a survey of 160 individuals lead-
ing the IT, privacy and audit efforts at 46 multinational organizations carried out in 2011 [Wor11].
A research conducted by the Ponemon Institute1 showed that the average cost for
organizations that experience non-compliance is even higher at 9.4$ million. Costs originate for
a variety of reasons such as ’business disruption, reduced productivity, fees, penalties and other
legal settlement costs’ [Wor11].
Compliance is especially important in the context of business processes (BPs) [KMKP11a].
After analyzing industrial solutions to the management of regulatory compliance, we distinguish
two main approaches: (i) compliance audits, and (ii) software implementations. While both
solution categories suffer from high costs related to the external expertise that must be acquired
by the enterprise, they present different disadvantages and advantages, analyzed in [EKP09].
Compliance audits are hard to automate since they require human intervention. Moreover,
audits are error-prone and do not cover the whole enterprise model as they are conducted on
samples of process logs or on selected parts of the information system. Software approaches are
inflexible and are not generic, meaning they are usually specifically targeted at one compliance
problem and hard to be reused for other types of problems.
Additionally, both approaches are so-called reactive approaches, since they do not enable
early discovery and handling of situations eventually leading to violations before the latter
happen [SG10]. Finally, it is a challenge to find adequate solutions supporting the full regulatory
compliance lifecycle shown in Figure 1.1 (see the right side), as the mechanisms needed for each
phase of the lifecycle are different. For instance, many approaches only tackle verification (i.e.,
static checking of compliance models) and do not tackle monitoring (i.e., dynamic checking of
compliance models). On Figure 1.1, the dashed lines show that some phases of the BPM and
RCM life-cycles must be aligned.
Regulatory Compliance Management LifecycleBusiness Process Management Lifecycle
Elicitation1
Validation
VerificationEnforcement
Audit
Specification2
5
6
4
3
Design1
 Configuration2Analysis & Controlling4
   Execution & 
Monitoring3
Figure 1.1: The lifecycle of regulatory compliance management
1http://www.ponemon.org/
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1.2
Compliance in the Context of Business Process Management
Business Process Management (BPM) is the discipline of capturing, modeling, implementing,
and controlling all activities taking place in an environment defining the enterprise, and this, in
an integrated manner [Sch00a, Sch99]. BPM is an incredibly rich discipline and is the meeting
point of several communities: information systems, computer science, business management.
Several definitions, methodologies, languages, frameworks, and tools that support one or many
of the listed aspects have been proposed [AH02, MW09, Wes07, zM04].
Business processes support and realize value-adding activities inside companies. These BPs
may span several functional silos (e.g., departments, branches) in the enterprise’s organization.
As the enterprise as a whole is subject to various types of regulations, it becomes thus necessary
to provide means of ensuring that a whole process is compliant with a given regulation.
Compliance management is the term referring to the methods and frameworks used to document
compliance requirements and ensure that the enterprise conducts its activities accordingly. It is
worthwhile emphasizing the meaning of regulation here, which is not limited to legislation (i.e.,
laws) but covers instead any authoritative set of rules or preferences dealing with a procedures,
guidelines or obligations. Non-compliance with a regulation diminishes the added-value that a
business process provides for the organization. The reason for this may be non-optimal alignment
with (i) regulatory obligations (ii) quality standards, (iii) partner (i.e., client, supplier, channel)
service agreements. Non-identified security flaws may cause harm by threatening the availability
or integrity of business processes.
Based on our current understanding of the term compliance, we give a high-level definition of
Regulatory Compliance Management2(RCM) as follows.
Definition 1.2.1 (Regulatory Compliance Management (RCM)).
RCM is the term referring to the use of means such as artifacts (e.g., rules, controls) and
procedures (e.g., policy handbooks, processes, audits) to avoid or adequately react to undesired
states of the enterprise or to undesired events occurring within the enterprise. RCM covers
all business domains (e.g. health, finance, telecom), functional domains (e.g., security, quality,
privacy) and regulatory domains (legislation, contracts, norms, standards).
Compliance management is the discipline of ensuring that enterprises behave according
to a given set of prescriptions specified in a regulation. Usually, when speaking of regulatory
compliance, these constraints on enterprise behavior are expressed as regulations, i.e., documents
such as laws (SOx Act [otUS02]), contracts between companies, norms and standards (ISO
27000x3) or any other form of internal or external guidance (e.g., internal risk management
directive documents).
Non-compliance to regulations can also be the cause of judiciary pursuits as many financial
scandals in recent years have shown. Another repercussion to violating a regulation may be
a loss in terms of image or loss of business opportunities. This has happened in the US
and in Europe as the examples from various industries such as the telecom, consumer goods,
banking, or automotive have shown (e.g., Enron [Lev02], Barclays4, Worldcom, Societe Generale,
2from this point onwards, we may simply refer to it as compliance management or RCM
3http://www.27000.org/
4http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-03/the-libor-scandal-claims-its-first-ceo
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Roche, Siemens, Volkswagen or Parmalat5). It is partly due to these scandals that laws and
legal guidelines have been designed in order to protect companies and their stakeholders from
violations such as manipulations of financial reporting data [RCJL06]. Two major examples are
the Sarbanes-Oxley act6 and Basel III7.
The Sarbanes-Oxley act 8 [otUS02] was passed in 2002 after the Enron financial scandal 9. SOx
is one of the legislations that generated most reactions in the form of numerous publications on
compliance [AIS09]. This is because companies doing business in the US are obliged to implement
it and because of SOx’s high implementation costs [TFL07]. Sections 302 (Certification of
Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports) and 404 (Definition of Internal Controls
over Financial Reporting) of SOX are IT-related and thus explain the interest of the computer
science community in both sections [RCJL06]. The European resp. Japanese equivalent to
SOx is called EuroSOx10 resp. JSOx and was passed by the European commission in 2006.
BASEL-III11 is a proposal by the Basel committee on banking supervision12 that seeks to align
regulatory capital requirements with operational and credit risk [CCHP04]. As an example of
a paramount regulation in a different domain, ISO/IEC 2700x [Org12] is the internationally
recognized standard for IT information security and may be used as a reference when defining
enterprise security guidelines.
By extension, RCM also refers to standards, frameworks, and software used to ensure the
company’s observance of regulatory texts. In the context of BPM, compliance management
applies to business processes and related resources like data and systems. As we said earlier,
strong regulatory compliance management has both short-term advantages such as cost savings,
reduced governance complexity, as well as long-term consequences like avoiding judiciary pursuits,
image protection or enhanced market trust. The main challenge in dealing with compliance is
that of achieving automation. The benefits of automation are numerous, and are best highlighted
when observing how compliance initiatives are conducted. We can distinguish between two major
types of compliance initiatives: (i) compliance audits and (ii) software implementations, which
we briefly overview in the next section.
1.2.1 Shortcomings of Regulatory Compliance Management Methods
For many regulations, looking for means of automating the compliance audit process, as well
as increasing its coverage of the organization and processes represents a real opportunity for
substantial enhancement of its governance while decreasing costs. We look at the two major types
of implementing RCM in enterprises, which are manual audits and software implementations.
1.2.1.1 Compliance Audits
Compliance audits are conducted by analysts who combine expertise in the regulation of
interest and in the organization and business processes of the enterprise. Alternatively
compliance audit teams are formed out of experts in both aspects. Typically, auditors
look at a sample of the enterprise’s activities for a limited amount of time, from a day
to several weeks, or check past activities (e.g., process logs). The auditors then have to
ensure that the requirements and guidelines specified by the regulation are kept to and
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmalat
6http://www.soxlaw.com/
7http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
8The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act is also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley act
9SOx is the usual abbreviation for this act.
10http://www.eurosox.dk/template.php?tid=304
11http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
12http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm
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implemented as specified. Based on their observations the auditors produce a report assessing
and justifying the degree of compliance of the enterprise to the regulation. The auditors
often provide recommendations to guide the enterprise’s efforts in reaching a higher degree
of compliance for the next audit. Such audits are expensive and are usually conducted once a year.
This method of compliance checking has some advantages for the enterprise, but also some
inconveniences. First of all, the advice given by experts is surely to be expected to be very
valuable, since these experts accumulate years of experience with the regulation and understand
its implications for the enterprise’s processes. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that
their advice is to be very accurate and to pin-point the critical areas of high risk and highest
optimization potential. However, these experts are humans and because only a sample of an
enterprise’s processes is looked at (for obvious size reasons), experts are likely to overlook both
violations as well as areas of the enterprise which are non-compliant. Audits also require manual
labor and are expensive both financially and in terms of time. Additionally, enterprises trust the
auditors based on their oath, but deep knowledge about the regulation and the opportunities
for accelerating the pace of strengthening its adherence to the regulation stays outside of the
enterprise. This may slow down the enterprise in its acquisition of regulatory knowledge which
constitutes a competitive advantage.
Compliance audits present the advantage of relying on intangible human knowledge in the
form of the experience of the auditors. This experience allows to combine knowledge of a number
of different regulations and in a great number of contexts. This experience may allow more
adequate selection of processes and efficient testing of the processes against specific elements of a
given regulation. Recommendations may even be given based on best practices and knowledge of
previous handling of the uncovered problems.
However, uncovering the root causes of the violations will most of the time be left up to the
owners of the business processes. This method also does not scale with the number of the business
processes and the relevance of the audit results may be regarded by compliance stakeholders as
decreasing if the processes covered are a tiny percentage of all business processes.
1.2.1.2 Compliance Software
Another approach which has appeared in recent years is custom software for supporting
compliance tasks. This software typically tackles a specific regulation or heavily recurring
compliance principles such as segregation of duty (SoD). Segregation of duty specifies the set
of (or constraints on the set of) roles or rights that an individual may cumulate depending on
the activities concerned. For instance, a department head may decide on budget allocation for
company gifts but may not validate this budget; only his superior may do that. A symmetrical
way of viewing SoD is to define what roles are jointly required in order for an individual to carry
on a process or a task. Such principles must often be instantiated on a large scale and must
be instantiated for a huge number of individuals, roles and activities. This makes software
implementation an imperative to assist with this task.
While software offers great support for automating the checking or enforcement of often large
scale recurring rules, this approach suffers from some drawbacks. These systems cost money and
require the heavy involvement of the IT department in the interpretation and implementation of
compliance requirements. The integration of each system with the business processes also induces
additional costs. Moreover, these systems work each for a specific set of rules of regulation,
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making using a unified software for treating all kinds of regulations the enterprise needs to comply
to a challenging task. This task is even more complicated for the controlling department which
must report on the compliance to each regulation using various reports from various systems.
With genericity being hard to fulfill, a holistic (covering all of the enterprise’s processes) and
unified (usable for all kinds of regulations) system may seem out of reach of most companies.
Table 1.1: Examples for Types of Regulatory Compliance Requirements
Domain Abstract Example of a Regulatory Compliance Requirement
Banking Rules managing the conditions under which financial transactions may be executed.
Banking Documents that may be accessed by transactions.
Healthcare Drug administration rules.
Healthcare Patient form fill-up obligations.
Security Identity protection constraints.
E-Commerce Commitments to service level agreements between provider and contractor of a service.
The methods based on software may scale better with a greater number of business processes in
terms of execution speed. Nevertheless, greater efforts are needed to deal with several regulations
different in nature and covering distinct domains as shown in Table 1.1. Software implementations
are not very flexible as separate sections of a regulation that require different checking methods
may complicate the software and hinder efficient execution. Moreover, every change made to the
regulation or to the business processes will require extensive testing to ensure the compliance
software is efficient. We also observe that this leads to a high degree of specialization in existing
compliance software.
1.2.1.3 Coarse Evaluation of Audit- and Software-Based Solutions to RCM
Table 1.2 summarizes our coarse evaluation of the main challenges facing enterprises in enhancing
the practice of enterprise regulatory compliance management. We distinguish four main
challenges: unification, holism, expressiveness, automation. The meaning of each of these criteria
is explained in the table. These four criteria are applied to the two main application techniques
of compliance (audits and software-based). The check resp. cross symbol means that the
criterion is satisfied resp. not satisfied by the technique.
Table 1.2: Coarse Evaluation of Compliance Management Strategies
Criterion Meaning Audit Software Ideally
Unification coverage of multiple regulations domains (e.g., financial,
drugs, health, security, etc.)
" % "
Expressiveness coverage of multiple types of constraints in a regulation % % "
Holistic coverage of multiple types of enterprise artifacts % % "
Automatic coverage of multiple regulations % " "
Unification means to be able to deal in the same manner (i.e., using the same language or
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framework) with several regulations different in nature. Difference among regulation manifests in
the domain they cover, the type of constraints they place on the enterprise, and their impact on
the enterprise model. This criterion is related to expressiveness, by which we mean the support
for multiple types of constraints placed on enterprise artifacts (including processes). Constraints
are different depending on whether they place structural, temporal, contractual or other kinds
of constraints on the enterprise model [KMKP11b]. Usually, logics which are more and more
powerful and expressive must be designed to deal with this criterion.
Holism refers the ability to consider any type of enterprise artifacts (sometimes referred to in
the thesis as enterprise elements) for the checking of compliance. Some approaches to compliance
deal with sets of business roles and authorizations, others with certain types of resource usage
or only process tasks. However, proposing a generic approach to model compliance imposes
to consider them indiscriminately. Automation is in our biased opinion the main criterion of
interest for companies. If a company can automate checking of compliance requirements over
large parts of its enterprise model (e.g., large numbers of its business processes), then it can
certainly achieve a considerable win in terms of money and time saved, as well as lowered risk
linked to possible faults or undesirable behavior in the processes.
1.3
Thesis Design
In this section we describe the scope and objectives of this research work. This thesis is placed in
the context of business process-centered enterprise modeling, in which business processes are the
central component. We bluntly say that business processes are the dynamic part of the enterprise
model, connecting various elements of its architecture to achieve business goals. We concentrate
on a setting where the motivations of the users of a solution to RCM is to model an organization
and its activities, while making sure regulatory constraints are indeed taken into account.
1.3.1 Thesis Scope
In Figure 1.1, both the BPM (left part of the figure) and the RCM lifecycles (right part
of the figure) as well as their interdependencies are shown. The simplified BPM lifecycle
[Wes07, AH02, zM04] is divided into four phases of design (modeling of business processes),
configuration (parameterization, data and service bindings, etc.), execution and monitoring
and finally analysis (e.g., performance, quality, etc.) and controlling of business processes after
execution.
In the right part of Figure 1.1, the general RCM lifecycle consists of six phases. After a
first phase of elicitation where (i) the sourcing and scoping of the applicable regulations and
then (ii) the regulations which have to be processed by experts and interpreted adequately
for the organization, the compliance requirements included in the regulation are specified
in a second phase called specification, for example as models. These specifications of
compliance requirements must refer to BP models they are defined for. This is usually
needed for documentation and analysis (e.g., traceability, impact analysis, etc.). This is repre-
sented by the dashed line between the step 2 of the RCM lifecycle and step 1 one the BPM lifecycle.
The third phase covers the validation of these compliance requirements, for removing and
resolving inconsistencies or incompleteness. The fourth phase tackles the static checking of the
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specification of the compliance requirements on the concerned enterprise models such as business
process models. There is a dependency between this phase and phase 1 of the BPM lifecycle
since verification must be realized on BP models.
Many compliance requirements can only be checked during execution of business processes
as much information required for checking is only available at runtime. This is covered
by another step which is the enforcement of compliance requirements during execution of
enterprise models, which has a dependency to phase 3 of the BPM lifecycle as it must be
integrated with the mechanisms for executing and monitoring business processes. The last step
consists of auditing the logs of executed business processes for conformance to compliance re-
quirements. As for previous phases, the Audit phase is dependent on phase 4 of the BPM lifecycle.
In conclusion, our work is designed to support RCM in interfacing with the BPM lifecycle.
The research conducted in this thesis must consider the research questions and research results
from a business process-centered enterprise modeling perspective. We must also evaluate the
implications of our research on these process-centered enterprise models.
1.3.2 Thesis Objectives
Many attempts have been made in research at providing both usable and tractable, as well as
powerful and expressive solutions for supporting compliance initiatives in BPs. However, most of
these solutions focus on the challenge of formally describing constraints contained in compliance
requirements in order to automatically verify them [Kha12]. The focus is not put on real end
users of compliance frameworks, who are business-users and not computer scientists, making for
low acceptance of novel solutions from research.
We aim first at analyzing the requirements for a framework that provides support for all the
identified phases of the RCM lifecycle. This analysis is also based on the research realized in
other works tackling RCM. Our second objective is to tackle this issue and provide an adequate
paradigm for regulatory compliance management (RCM) that is suitable to business users.
Moreover, compliance requirements do not only place constraints on enterprise models, they
describe decision-making preferred, allowed or compulsory behaviors. This decision-making takes
into account the context and other properties of the current state of business. Implementing
these compliance requirements requires means to model these alternative behaviors and the
decision-making associated with them.
In order to do that, we study the semantic gap between the conceptual domain in which
business users think about compliance and the ones needed for a formal representation of
compliance. A new modeling language is needed for creating reusable, lower-complexity and
business-user friendlier compliance models. One very important criterion for this is that the
language semantics support both automatic verification as well as enforcement of compliance
requirements at the push of a button. An additional objective in this thesis is to study how
model-driven engineering can be leveraged to support RCM.
1.3.3 Research Questions
We reckon through analyses of compliance management scenarios and existing research on
the topic that automation, pro-active compliance management as well as support of the
full BPM/RCM lifecycle are valuable capabilities that an RCM framework should provide
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[SASI10, Kha12]. Hence, our research seeks to achieve some of the previous three capabilities by
answering the research questions listed in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Research Questions
ID Research Question
Modeling
RQ 1 How to make RCM Modeling more amenable to Business Users?
RQ 2 How to exploit the power of logical formalisms for compliance management?
RQ 3 How to cover several types of enterprise business artifacts?
RQ 4 How to decouple compliance modeling from EM/BPM notations?
Checking
RQ 5 How to realize ’verification’ using compliance models?
RQ 6 How to realize ’enforcement’ using compliance models?
RCM Language Engineering
RQ 7 How far can the Model-Driven Engineering discipline support our endeavour?
1.3.4 Results
In this thesis, we develop the ASE (Action, Subject, Entity) paradigm for formalizing
behavior in enterprise models and link this behavior to enterprise artifacts. We also propose
another approach for modeling the decision-making elements of compliance require-
ments. This approach is based on separating the decision making layer from the constraint/rule
(decision implementation) layer. Following the identification of a useful modeling paradigm, we
derive the core components of the framework: (i) a method, (ii) a language, a (iii) semantics,
and (iv) tool support. The contributions of this thesis are listed according to the research
question they contribute to solving in Table 1.4.
In order to achieve this vision, we define a visual Domain-Specific Language (DSL)
for decision-making as a core contribution. This language is named the Compliance
Representation Language (CoReL). The rest of the thesis is about integrating this DSL
into enterprise modeling and using this DSL for compliance analysis.
CoReL is based on the core concept of business policy, which we propose to fill the
semantic gap between business users and formal methods. Business policies allow to model
decision-making by breaking it into reusable parts [KMKP11a]. They allow to reason about all
possible violation types and how to adequately react to each of them depending on a number of
factors such as the situation. We then define formal operational semantics for CoReL [KMKP11a].
Most importantly, the semantics of CoReL proposed here are integrated with a formal exe-
cution semantics of a sub-class of business process models. Also, we usemodel-driven
engineering and in particular formalmetamodeling andmodel transformations in order to
show how CoReL may be integrated into a concrete business process modeling notation.
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This thesis goes several steps towards supporting an integrated BPM and RCM lifecycle.
The following table gives a summary of contributions:
Table 1.4: Contributions Answering the Research Questions from Table 1.3
Research Question Contribution
Modeling
RQ 1 CoReL: Visual DSL. Chapter 5
RQ 2 CoReL decoupling of decision-making
(policies) and constraints/rules.
Chapter 5
RQ 3 ASE paradigm. Chapter 4
RQ 4 ASE paradigm and its integration into
CoReL.
Chapter 6
Checking
RQ 5 Formal operational semantics of CoReL. Chapter 6
RQ 6 Formal operational semantics of CoReL. Chapter 6
RCM Language Engineering
RQ 7 Use of metamodeling, model composition,
and state-of-the art MDE technologies in
building tool support.
Chapter 5
1.3.5 What This Thesis Is Not
In this thesis, we do not develop a new (business) rule modeling language, nor do we contribute
anything related to the logics required to accurately represent and reason on constraints/rules.
1.3.6 What This Thesis Is
This thesis is a work on language engineering in the RCM domain for the purpose of modeling
and verification.
1.4
Structure Of The Thesis
The remaining of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background required
to understand the contributions of this thesis. We give a concise background on business process
management (BPM), model-driven engineering (MDE) and on the formal modeling language
and tool Alloy. Chapter 3 introduces the state of the art on compliance management as well as
the most relevant related work, leading up to a framework to classify and compare compliance
management approaches.
We propose a minimal formal model for representing behavioral descriptions of enterprise
models we call system models in Chapter 4. Then, Chapters 5 and 6 introduce the CoReL
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Figure 1.2: Thesis Structure
language and its semantic foundations. This is followed by Chapter 7, which describes the
concrete syntax and the diagrams developed as part of the framework.
Consequently, Chapter 8 presents the verification approach we use to realize compliance
checking, while this is examplified in Chapter 9 using several example-based case studies. Finally,
the last Chapter 10 builds on the previous and provides perspectives and a discussion of the
contributions and the results of the research.
1.5
Summary
Compliance to regulations is a critical issue in the governance of enterprise architectures and
consequently of business process management. In practice, current solutions for compliance
implementation rely heavily on expensive manpower or on large, rigid software implementations.
On the other hand, logics and formal verification languages offer a powerful, potentially highly
exhaustive and precise alternative to existing solutions.
However, using these formal languages to offer automated support to the full compliance
lifecycle presents several challenges. The most important one is, next to enabling fully automated
checking of compliance, making the formal foundations of the framework suitable for business
users who do not have the required skills to directly deal with these formal foundations. The
research realized in this thesis studies the use of business policies as fundamental decision-making
elements to provide a small, yet expressive visual language for compliance modeling. Combined
with the application of model-driven engineering techniques of composition and transformation,
it shows the feasbility and advantages of applying model-driven engineering to the RCM problem.

Chapter 2
Background
The design of computing systems can only properly succeed if it is well-grounded
in theory, and...the important concepts in a theory can only emerge through
protracted exposure to application.
Robert Milner.
In this chapter, we will provide general background information and definitions, which are
required to fully grasp the context and the contribution of this thesis. We do this for the topics
of Model-Driven Engineering (MDE), Business Process Management (BPM) and for the Alloy
formal method.
2.1
Business Process Management
2.1.1 Business Processes
According to Hammer in [HC03], a Business Process (BP) is a “group of tasks that together
create a result of value to a customer”. Davenport [Dav93] sees BPs very similarly as “a set of
logically related tasks performed to achieve a defined business outcome for a particular customer
or market”. These two definitions come from management science.
In Weske’s book [Wes07], another more technical view of BPs is taken. A BP is defined
as: “consisting of a set of activities that are performed in coordination in an organizational
and technical environment [...] Each process is enacted by a different organization, but it may
interact with processes performed by other organizations”.
In another reference document, the workflow management coalition’s (WfMC) terminology
and glossary [Wor99], another definition is given. It is the “set of one or more linked
procedures or activities, which collectively realise a business objective or policy goal, nor-
mally within the context of an organisational structure defining functional roles and relationships”.
The last two definitions are closer to the use of BPs in this thesis. We view BPs as central
enactment elements of any enterprise. BPs are its machinery, its muscle, the element of an
enterprise that carries out change and transformation. Many of today’s mainstream perspectives
on BPM and its relevance in the industry come from the seminal book by Smith & Fingar [SF04]:
"The Third Wave". The first wave of BPM was rooted in Taylor’s theory of management [Tay11].
At this stage business processes were considered as immaterial and carried out manually by the
workforce. In the 1990s during the BP re-engineering wave, BPs began to be supported and
managed by information systems, particularly Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software.
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The third wave however, began to see BPs as the central automation component of enterprises,
destined to be implemented and governed for best performance.
We understand from the three different definitions that BPM is a complex topic tightly
linked to the existence and operations of an enterprise. Business Process Management (BPM)
[Sch99, Sch00a] is the discipline that deals with Business Processes (BPs). In [Sch99, Sch00a],
BPM is defined as "the discipline of capturing, modeling, implementing, and controlling all
activities taking place in an environment defining the enterprise, and this, in an integrated
manner".
2.1.2 Business Process Lifecycle
The BPM lifecycle describes the steps or phases linked to managing BPs. Figure 2.1 shows
a slighltly modified version of the BPM lifecycle from a management perspective proposed in
[zM04]. This lifecycle is quite complete in that in not only includes the steps of the lifecycle, but
also the artifacts which are exchanged among steps.
Analysis The lifecycle starts with the analysis activity. The analysis is based on the process
context (environment), which spans from strategic concerns (business goals, directives,
etc.) to organizational structure. The output of this phase is a set of requirements for
business process design, which include process objectives, key performance indicators,
process owners, etc.
Design Based on the set of requirements from the previous activity, this activity is concerned
with capturing either an existing (as-is) or desired (to-be) state of a process. Based on
information originating from various sources, an abstract representation in a graphical
notation is used to cover knowledge about business processes at hand[Wes07]. This includes
defining process activities, specifying their order and constraints, assigning process roles
and resources, etc. The output of this phase is a conceptual process model which integrates
these different design perspectives.
Enactment Process enactment is the phase where the business process management system
is actually deployed and executed. The BPMS infrastructure supports the execution of
individual cases (process instances). During execution, different case data is recorded such
as execution time, process branching decisions, resource access, etc. This data is used as
input for the following two management activities.
Monitoring This activity is performed continuously for each case based on the assigned process
metrics, such as maximum delay time. If a metrics threshold is reached, appropriate
program logic is triggered in order to deal with the situation. This activity is essential in
assuring the correctness of individual process executions.
Evaluation The evaluation activity is concerned with the aggregated view on individual process
executions. Here, the process execution data is compared to the original design requirements
of the process. The goal is to assess further potential process improvements and thus
identify new requirements for process design. These new requirements are taken as input
for the process redesign in the next iteration of the lifecycle.
Implementation This activity uses the conceptual process model as input. Implementation
means the selection and configuration of IT artifacts which implement process activities,
according to process control- and data-flow. During implementation, it may be discovered
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that the process can not be implemented as depicted by the process model. This provides
a feedback loop to the design activity in order to perform required modifications.
The BPM lifecyle in Figure 2.1 has been extended with three steps, distinguishable from the
BPM steps by using oval shapes, belonging to the RCM lifecycle. We do not show the full RCM
here, as only some steps are relevant for this thesis. We explain these additional steps here.
Compliance Modeling is the step where compliance requirements contained in regulations
are modelled in a specific language. This is to allow reusing these compliance models as
artifacts for tasks such as verification and enforcement.
Compliance Verification is the step where compliance models are checked against business
process designs, i.e., statically.
Compliance Enforcement is the step where compliance models are checked during the enact-
ment step, against business process instances being executed, i.e., dynamically.
2.1.3 (Enterprise) Business Process Modeling
In order to describe a business process, several forms of process concepts need to be integrated in
a business process model. The authors in [CKO92] provide a popular categorization of concepts
that a process model should capture. They argue that information in a business process model
should provide answers to the following questions: what is going to be done, who is going to do
it, when and where it will be done, how and why it will be done, and who is dependent on it
being done [CKO92]. These questions helped to group the commonly used process concepts into
four perspectives: functional, behavioral, organizational, and informational process perspective.
Many enterprise modeling/architecture methods or languages consider additional perspectives to
these last four [vdAtHKB03, ea09b, DH08, Hoo09, BMS10, Mar10].
An example of a widely accepted method to capture different process perspectives is the
so called ARIS House of Business Engineering [Sch99]. ARIS distinguishes between four
perspectives: Organization (who), Data (what), Function (how), Product/Service (output),
centrally connected by a process flow (in which order) [KNS92, DB07]. Recent research on
process perspectives [Wes07] also reinforces the ideas outlined in [KNS92, CKO92] [CKO92],
where control flow, function, data, and organization modeling are seen as the core ingredients of
a business process model.
Control Flow perspective (or process) perspective describes activities (tasks) and their execu-
tion ordering through different constructors, which permit flow of execution control.
Data perspective deals with business and processing data. Business documents and other objects
which flow between tasks, and local variables of the process, qualify in effect pre- and
post-conditions of tasks execution.
Resource perspective provides an organisational structure anchor to the process model in the
form of involved humans and device roles responsible/needed for executing tasks.
Functional/Operational perspective describes the elementary actions executed by tasks, where
the actions map into underlying applications. Typically, (references to) business and
process data are passed into and out of applications such as Web Services, allowing data
manipulation within applications.
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2.1.4 Business Process Modeling Languages
Process modeling languages [LLK09] can be classified into three main categories: informal, semi-
formal, and formal languages [Lin08]. Informal languages are natural languages, mostly textual
descriptions similar to plain english (or any other human written idiom) which may follow certain
conventions, format, templates, and structures. These are the languages mostly used during the
analysis phase where business processes are initially collected and documented. Semi-formal
languages are graphical languages which introduce a set of notations with semantics defined in the
underlying metamodels. Formal languages have rigorous and precise semantics defined in formal
logics or mathematics. The work in [Lin08] compares most widely used process modeling lan-
guages such as Petri nets [Pet62], BPMN [OMG11], EPC [KNS92], which we will shortly describe.
Petri nets were introduced in the 1960s as a formal, graphical language for modeling
distributed systems [Pet62]. Due to their well defined mathematical properties, they are widely
used in workflow management and software design in practice. Petri nets are also still popular
in the BPM research community, where various extensions regarding complementary process
modeling perspectives have been proposed [vDdMV+05, Wes07, vtKB03].
Event-driven process chains (EPC) [KNS92] were created in the 1990s as part of the ARIS
framework. In its basic form, the EPC concepts bear close similarities to Petri nets, as they
support modeling of processes as a chain of events, triggering a function which in turn again
results in events. There are various extensions of the basic EPC concepts, which provide support
for modeling the organizational and informational process perspectives. EPC is a graphical
modeling language which is targeted to be easily understood and used by the business people.
The Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) [OMG11] is a new standard for modeling
business processes. BPMN belongs to the category of semi-formal modeling languages, intended
to support business process management for both business and technical users. BPMN roots
stem from the activity diagrams in UML [Obj11] and it is gaining increasing adoption in industry
and academia. At the time of this writing, BPMN 2.0 version of the standard is being finalized.
This new version includes extensions to the notation (e.g. for expressing collaboration between
process participants), metamodel specification, and interchange format.
If we observe the historical development of the above mentioned modeling languages, it can
be noted that over time they got richer in expressiveness (scope). In the case of EPC, if we
compare the notation in [DB07] with the initial version in [KNS92], we notice that the trend of
notation extensions aims to support a broader business context. For example, the extended EPC
described in [STA05] and [DB07] allows for modeling of business objectives, key performance
indicators, risks, and internal controls in the context of business processes. However, the proposed
extensions i) remain underspecified with respect to their semantics, ii) are not well integrated to
the basic EPC metamodel, and iii) have weak links to other extensions. In the case of BPMN, on
the one hand it has been extended to allow for modeling of B2B collaboration, whereas on the
other hand a formal semantics has been proposed for the behavioral process perspective [OMG11].
Extensions on the business process notation level in general fall short of seeing processes in
the overall business context. For example, one of the major issues in BPM identified by the
authors in [BIS+07] is the “broken link between BPM efforts and organizational strategy” [BIS+07].
Detailed descriptions of different process modeling languages can be found in
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[DvdAtH05, Wes07]. In the next section, we focus on the second aspect important for
our work which will turn instrumental in providing semantics for our modeling languages.
2.2
Model-Driven Engineering
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [Ken02, Sch06, CATK03, FR07] is a novel approach to
Software Development. It elects models as first-class artifacts during all phases of Software
Development. The goal is to improve and maximize the productivity in both short and long term.
In a short term, by increasing the average functionalities a software system is delivered with; in
a long term, by reducing the costs of maintenance and accuracy of the systems by reducing their
sensitivity to change (coming either from technologies, or from stakeholders) [CATK03].
From a methodological point of view, MDE uses models throughout the development of
complex systems to improve the effectiveness of every days tasks, such as documentation of
the system at early stages, specification of the different components of the system, design of
the overall architecture, development itself, versioning, maintenance, etc. From an engineering
point of view, models are used to provide a team involved in the development process the most
accurate level of abstraction to deal with the essential complexity of each task and let all the
machinery behind the tool support deal with (most of) the accidental complexity [Bro86], by
using transformations to manipulate models.
2.2.1 The Need for Abstraction
Since computer scientists have begun to program computers, they faced the need to increase the
level of abstraction in the expression of programs. The history of programming languages, the
first interface for interacting with computers, has consistently offered new paradigms for writing
and designing programs.
The first generation programming languages were operating at the level of the CPU,
directly manipulating the operation codes used by a particular processor; second generation
languages, although specific to a particular architecture, offered a first layer of abstraction by
manipulating mnemonics and macros, allowing programmers to abstract from the internal binary
representation of instructions that was clearly not human-readable and very error-prone; third
generation languages, with their large scale of abstraction levels and programming paradigms,
offered to programmers the possibility to specify what the machine should do rather than how.
The raising of programming abstraction levels has been continuing since then, and today’s
object-orientation is considered to enable programmers to tackle problems that were impossible
a few decades ago. Model-Driven Engineering and / or Development can be seen as the
continuation of this effort to propose to programmers the best level of abstraction they need in
order to specify, develop and maintain a system: instead of describing how a system is built, they
can specify which functionalities are required to build the system. As such, it can be considered
as the natural continuation of Object Orientation, and as a matter of fact, Object Orientation
largely inspired the Model-Driven approaches; but in another way, MDE operates a radical
rupture by trying to propose a dedicated modeling of every aspect of interest, going much deeper
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in the way opened by Object Orientation [Com08].
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) received a large acceptance at its beginning, and
with the dissemination of the technique started the multiplication of approaches and model
frameworks: Model-Driven Development (MDD) [CATK03, BCT05]; Model Engineering
[JB06a]; Model-Based Approach (MBA) [AGERPS08]. One particular approach, Model-Driven
Architecture (MDA) [Obj03, KWB03] is very often used (erroneously) as a synonym of MDE.
Figure 2.2: The OMG MDA Pyramid (from [tow07])
In Figure 2.2 we show the well-known OMG1 pyramid. This pyramid shows four layers of
abstraction, M0 to M3, where software artifacts reside. Artifacts populating the M0-level belongs
to the real-life, i.e., in software engineering terms, objects in the memory of the platform executing
the software. Artifacts in the M1-level are models of reality, e.g., a UML model describing a mobile
phone application [KT08]. Models are widely used across all engineering disciplines and natural
sciences, with different meanings, such as electrotechnical engineering, telecommunications, motors
engineering, construction, mathematics, biology, physics, etc. Artifacts belonging to the M2-level
are metamodels allowing the definition of these models. A metamodel [TK06, AK02, AK03]
defines the set of models it accepts as instances. Metamodels can be used to partly define
languages. Finally the unique artifact in the M3-level is MOF [Obj06, GRS09], the OMG/MDA
language for metametamodeling, meta-circularly defined by itself.
2.2.2 The (Meta-) Modeling Approach
The MDE approach considers models and transformations as first-class entities, in order to
specify and design applications and software systems at the right level of abstraction needed by
the application domain the model is intended for.
In Computer Science, the notion of "model" covers a wide range of realities, depending on
what specialization field one is talking of. For example in model-checking, the term model is
1www.omg.org
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used either to designate the behavioral structure representing the system under study (basically,
an automaton) or, more closely to mathematics, an interpretation of the property of interest
expressed in a logics.
In the context of MDE, models are always language-based in nature and refer to artifacts
formulated in a modeling language (among which UML is one of the most widely used) describing
a system. Typically, a model is graph-based and visually rendered. The leitmotiv of MDE is the
use of the "model" notion everywhere ("everything is a model" [JB06a]).
Models can be used at different purposes, sometimes overlapping: for documentation and /
or communication purposes, where the model provides a more abstract way of explaining how a
software and / or a system works, and to validate with stakeholders what was the intent of the
system; for simulation and/or verification before the actual system is realized, to figure out in
advance what are the issues and what optimizations can be operated, and to check in advance
some properties of interest about the system.
2.2.3 Basic Ingredients for Metamodel-Based Language Engineering
2.2.3.1 Syntax: Abstract & Concrete
The syntax defines the concepts and relations a language or a model manipulates, together
with the constraints concepts and relations are supposed to verify. In the context of traditional
languages, the syntax is generally specified using a formal grammar (cf. for example,
the Compiler Theory [ASU86]).When dealing with models, the syntax generally takes the
form of a metamodel. But this syntax, generally qualified as "abstract", only captures
the fundamental links between the elements described by the language; a more convenient
way of manipulating them is needed and the language always comes with (at least) one
"concrete" syntax, either textual or visual. To relate both syntaxes, a mapping, known as
parsing [ASU86, JRAS97, LGKWNY08, dLV04, CDOP02], is needed to obtain the abstract
representation in which all operations will be performed.
Furthemore, the abstract syntax expresses only structural dependencies between concepts via
relations. There is always a need to constrain all the possible valid instances, either it is a phrase
in a given grammar, or a model that conforms to a metamodel, because not all are structurally
valid items are valid from the modeler point of view. This particular constraints are known as
type-checking rules or static semantics when grammars are used; and simply constraints expressed
in a dedicated language (among which OCL [JWAK03] is the most known). This particular
relationship between instances and models is called constrained conformance [ABJM07].
2.2.3.2 Semantics
Semantics [HRNFN92, AK09, GRS10] captures the meaning of a formal (or natural) language,
which could consist of defining the valid executions of the program. In fact, specifying a
semantics consists in defining a semantic domain, reflecting how the concepts of the language are
interpreted, and then providing a mapping from each concept to its semantic interpretation in
the target semantic domain.
Having fixed a semantic domain, there are traditionally four styles [ZX04] for specifying the
semantic mapping, depending what kind of formalism supports the specification:
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Operational [Hen90] The meaning of the language constructs under definition is described by
means of a state transition system, where the state basically embeds the semantic domain
plus the machinery needed for the execution, and the transitions express rules explaining
how the state evolves when executing a particular construct of the language. An example
are Structured Operational Semantics (SOS)[Hen90].
Denotational [Win93, AFL99] The meaning of the language’s constructs is given using
denotations, i.e purely mathematical objects (like functions, functors and posets) called
domains.
Axiomatic [Win93] The meaning of a language’s constructs is described by means of logics
stating properties (pre- and post-conditions, and invariants)which hold along the execution
of the program.
Translational/Transformational Furthermore, there exists another technique, often called
translational or transformational, where the semantic domain is constituted by another
target language. This approach assumes that the target language acting as the semantic do-
main is well-known and/or well-understood, even if its own semantics is not mathematically
defined. The ideal case is when the target language has formal semantics itself.
2.2.4 The Engineering of Metamodeling
Because in the MDE approach, we use models everywhere it is possible, formally defining a
language through metamodeling uses three (meta-)models: one defining the abstract syntax, as it
is classically done; one defining each concrete syntax, and one defining the semantic domain. In
order to relate each model with the corresponding ones, MDE advocates the use of transformations
[CH03, GLR+02, ES03, MJ02]. Figure 2.3 gives a characterization of these transformations in
MDE.
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Figure 2.3: Model Transformations in Language Engineering (from [Kle08])
As such, a transformation is simply an operation between a source and a target model. If
both source and target metamodels are the same, the transformation is endogenous, otherwise it
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is exogenous [AK09]. From a semantic point of view, using endogenous transformation defines
a simulation of the language defined by the metamodel, while using exogenous transformation
defines a translation to a behaviorally equivalent metamodel.
2.2.4.1 Domain-Specific (Modeling) Languages (DS(M)L)
“A domain-specific language (DSL) is a programming language or executable specification
language that offers, through appropriate notations and abstractions, expressive power focused on,
and usually restricted to, a particular problem domain” [vDKV00].
Domain-Specific Languages [AK09] try to specify a solution to the development of a software
directly at the level of abstraction domain experts deal with, by representing in the language the
very same concepts used in the problem domain, and by achieving a high level of automation in
the daily tasks the models are intended for: testing, validation, verification, simulation, and
finally, production.
If languages provide high-level concepts, the development of the entire software solution for a
given problem is always based on the knowledge of the experts to capture adequately the good
concepts, and the past experience of the company the solution is developed for to reuse existing
libraries and platforms. In this sense, the smaller the domain targeted by the Domain-Specific
Language is, the better the automation can be.
DSLs trade generality for expressiveness in a limited domain. By providing notations
and constructs tailored toward a particular application domain, they offer substantial gains in
expressiveness and ease of use compared with General Programming Languages (GPLs, e.g., Java)
for the domain in question, with corresponding gains in productivity and reduced maintenance
costs. Also, by reducing the amount of domain and programming expertise needed, DSLs open
up their application domain to a larger group of software developers compared to GPLs [MHS05].
2.2.4.2 Roles in Domain-Specific Engineering
In the design of a DSL, several roles involved can be distinguished :
Domain Experts are represented by persons having the knowledge about the problem domain:
they manipulate on a daily basis the concepts that will be used in the DSL, are experts in
the terminology, and are aware of the business rules that must be implemented as part of
the behavior of the DSL. Depending on the domain of expertise the DSL, these experts
can either be business practitionners or technical experts, or both.
Language developers (Metamodelers) specify the modeling language of the DSL. They
work closely with domain experts to determine exactly which concepts and rules must be
embedded inside the DSL, focus specifically on the range of the DSL in order to keep it as
small as possible, and plan the future evolution of the DSL by evaluating new needs and
integrating them. They formalise all the relevant concepts in a metamodel, and provide all
the necessary tools for the models users: editors, documentation, etc.
Model Users (Modelers) use the DSL. Models can serve different purposes and be exploited
by different people, depending on the particular usage a model is needed for: specification,
communication, deployment, testing, documentation, etc.
The above roles are present for every DSL. But there are additional roles which are paramount
to the success of a DSL solution.
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Ergonomists are people who help metamodelers in order to have adequate and usable terminol-
ogy, symbols and notations for concrete syntax, as well as ergonomic designs in the tools
proposed to modelers. These people are not required, especially when using automated
approaches that derive all the necessary tooling from the metamodel definitions, but they
can help when the DSL solution targets a domain where interaction with non-programmer
users is important.
Domain Framework Developers are experienced developers and application architects that
develop the library code or component frameworks, and ensure integration between the
framework and the code derived from the models. It is a crucial part since it contributes
to the scalability and the quality of the DSL solution.
2.2.5 Formal Verification
The semantics of a program formalizes the set of all possible executions of a program in all
possible execution environments. This semantics is usually an infinite mathematical object
which is not computable: it is not possible to write a program able to represent and to compute
all possible executions of any program in all its possible execution environments. Hence, in
general, all non trivial questions about the semantics of a program are undecidable: it is not pos-
sible to write a program able to answer any question about the possible executions of any program.
Questions about a program are called properties and are also formally defined. Generally,
(dynamic) properties belong to one of the two following categories: safety properties stating that
nothing bad happens; and liveness properties stating that something good eventually happens.
Properties can be seen as forbidden zones inside the a space defining the possible executions of
the program [CC77].
If we focus on safety properties, their verification consists in proving that the intersection of
the semantics of the program with the forbidden zone is empty. Since the program semantics is
generally not computable, the verification problem is undecidable: it is not always possible to
answer the safety questions completely automatically, with finite computer resources, without
any uncertainty about the answer and without any human intervention.
Several techniques were developed over the years to overcome the decidability problem.
testing/debugging consists in considering a subset of the possible executions; bounded model-
checking consists in exploring the prefixes of the possible executions.
Static Analysis The abstract semantics is computed automatically thanks to predefined ap-
proximations [CC79, PC81, CC77], possibly manually parameterizable by the user.
Model-Checking The abstract semantics is provided manually by the user in the form of a
finite model of the program execution (for example a finite automaton) [CC00]. In some
cases the model can be computed automatically, by methods relevant to static analysis.
Deductive Methods The abstract semantics is specified by verification conditions and must
be provided by the user in the form of inductive properties (true at each program step,
such as loop invariants) satisfying these verification conditions [Cou02]. The inductive
properties must be found manually by the user and the theorem prover sometimes needs
assistance to prove that they are indeed inductive. To help the user in this discovery task,
some of these inductive properties can be computed automatically, by techniques relevant
to static analysis.
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2.3
Alloy
Alloy is a so-called lightweight formal method. Alloy is a logic, a language and an analysis
tool [Jac12], all at the same time. Alloy’s logic combines the quantifiers of first order logic
with relational calculus. Our introduction to Alloy is completely based on the reference
book ’Software Abstractions’ by Daniel Jackson [Jac12]. Alloy has been widely used for a
formalization of various languages such as UML [SAB10], AspectUML [MV07], MOF [KM08],
JAVA [DY13, Gal13, Rey10], concurrent systems [CRR09], and other systems (e.g., railway
safety, file synchronisation and air-traffic control, healthcare systems [Jac13]).
In this section, a concise introduction to the Alloy approach is presented. A detailed
presentation of the Alloy approach is available in the reference textbook on Alloy [Jac12]. After
an initial introduction to the Alloy approach, we present the syntax and semantics of Alloy in
2.3.2. Then, we learn the function and usage of the Alloy Analyzer in 2.3.3. Finally, we give a
small comparison of Alloy with other formal methods and motivate our choice of Alloy in this
thesis in 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Introduction
The Alloy approach is based on three key elements: a logic (fundamental concepts), a language
and an analysis. A basic knowledge of the Alloy language and the Analyzer is required for
full understanding of this thesis. The logic introduced in the Alloy approach is a relational
logic. It combines the quantifiers of first-order logic with the operators of the relational calculus.
Fundamental concepts of the Alloy language are atoms and relations. Atoms are primitive
entities which are indivisible (can’t be broken into smaller parts) and immutable (their properties
don’t change over time).
Relations define relationships between atoms. They consists of a set of tuples, each tuple
being a sequence of atoms. Relations in Alloy may be of any size and of arity greater or equal to
one. A relation with no tuples is said to be empty. Unary relations with arity one are sets of
atoms. Unary relations with a single tuple are scalars. Relations with arity two resp. three are
said to be binary resp. ternary. A relation with arity of three or more is said to be a multi-relation.
2.3.2 Syntax and Semantics
The abstract syntax of the Alloy language is defined by a BNF grammar in [Jac12] in (p.261).
In the following sub-sections, we introduce the main syntactical elements of Alloy: signatures
and fields, operators and quantifiers, as well as facts, predicates and functions.
2.3.2.1 Signatures and Relational Navigation
A signature declaration defines a type as a set of atoms (i.e., a unary relation over atoms). A
signature also defines a collection of relations called fields. An abstract signature has no atoms,
but those of possible subsignatures (cf. definition of the extends keyword).
 sig T1 {r:R}
 sig T2 {s:R1→R2}
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 abstract sig T3 {}
Fields and Arities
The declaration above defines a type T1 and a binary relation r of range R and domain
T1 (r ∶ T1− > R). The notation a− > b where a and b are types defines an Alloy binary relation.
Similarly, the second signature T2 defines a ternary relation between signatures T2, R1 and
R2 ∶ T2− > R1− > R2. We call ′r′ a field of signature T1. This means that if some atom x has
the type T1 then the expression x.r will have the type R. More on the ′.′ operator notation,
called relational join, later. Multiplicities are assigned to a signature’s fields:
 sig T {r: one R}
 // means that the binary relation relates every atom of T with a single atom of R⋅
 //This is the default arity in Alloy and can therefore be omitted

 sig T {r: lone R}
 // means that the binary relation relates every atom of T with at most one atom of R

 sig T {r: some R}
 // means that the binary relation relates every atom of T with at least one atom of R

 sig T {r: set R}
 // means that the binary relation relates every atom of T with an
 // (unordered and possibly empty) set of atoms of R

 sig T {r: seq R}
 // means that the binary relation relates every atom of T with an
 // (ordered and possibly empty) sequence of atoms of R
Extends
Signatures may be subtyped by using the extends keyword. A signature declared as an extension
is a subsignature and creates only a set constant along with a constraint making it a subset of
each supersignature listed in the extension clause. All fields defined for a supersignature are
automatically defined for the subsignature.
Sets & Set Operators
All signatures and relations in Alloy can be viewed as sets. A set contains several tuples of the
same arity. There are three constant sets: none is the empty unary set, univ is the univer-
sal unary set containing all other sets, while iden is the set of all pairs relating every atom to itself.
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗Set Operators ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
 + // union
 & // intersection
 − // difference
 in // subset
 = / equality
We concisely define the 5 listed set operators. A tuple is in a+b if and only if (iff) it is in a or
in b. A tuple is in a&b iff it is in both a and in b. A tuple is in a-b iff it is in a but not in b. A
set a is in set b iff ever tuple in a is in b too. a = b is true when a and b have the same tuples.
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Relational Join
The most important relational operator in Alloy is called the relational join operator. In Alloy
two tuples can be composed or joined if the last atom of the first tuple matches the first atom of
the second tuple. The resulting tuple consists of the atoms of the first and second tuple, leaving
the matching atom out. When two relations a and b are joined in a.b, the resulting relation
is obtained by taking every combination of a tuple in a and tuple in b and calculating their
relational join. We list the main other relational operators in Alloy:
 → // The product of two relations
 ̃ // The transpose of a relation
 ̂ // The transitive closure of a relation

∗ // The reflexive transitive closure of a relation
Relational Product
The arrow product of two relations a and b is denoted a → b, and is the relation defined as
containing every possible concatenation of a tuple from a and a tuple from b. Consequently,
when a and b are scalars, then a → b is a pair, when a and b are sets, then a → b is a binary
relation.
Transpose & Transitive (Reflexive) Closure
The transpose of a relation r denoted by ˜r is its mirror image, obtained by reversing the order of
atoms in each tuple of r. Therefore a relation r is symmetric if and only if r= ˜r. The transitive
closure of a relation r is denoted ˆr and is the smallest relation that is transitive and contains
r.ˆr is computed by the formula: ˆr = r + r.r + r.r.r + .... A reflexive relation r is a relation that
for every atom a it contains, also contains a− > a. This can be expressed relationally as iden in
r (i.e., the identity relation is contained in r). Therefore the reflexive transitive closure can be
expressed relationally by adding the identity relation to the transitive closure *r as *r =ˆr + iden.
2.3.2.2 Standard Logical Operators and Quantifiers
Logical Operators
Logical operators are used in boolean expressions, and support two notations, a verbose (textual,
on the left) and a short one (on the right).
 not ! // negation
 and && // Conjunction
 or || // disjunction
 implies ⇒ // implication
 iff < ⇒ // bi−implication
Constraint Quantifiers
Alloy supports several first order quantifiers we explain underneath. Let x be a variable, e be an
expression bounding x, and F be a constraint.
 all x:e | F // F holds for every x in e⋅
 some x:e | F // F holds for some x in e⋅
 no x:e | F // F holds for no x in e⋅
 lone x:e | F // F holds for at most one x in e⋅
 one x:e | F // F holds for exactly one x in e⋅
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2.3.2.3 Facts, Predicates and Functions
Facts
There are various ways to express constraints on an Alloy model. Facts express constraints that
must always hold on a model. Some facts are expressed in standalone fashion and some are
directly placed into a special field of a signature which we call signature facts. The following fact
says that all children must have exactly one father in two different ways. The first is expressed
in the third signature Child as a signature fact, the second alternative definition is given as a
separate fact at the end of the code snippet.
 sig Person{}

 sig Father extends Person{
 children: some Person
 }

 sig Child extends Person{}{
 some f:Father | this in f⋅children
 }

 fact{
 all c:Child | one f:Father | c in f⋅children
 }
Predicates & Functions
A predicate is a named constraint (returns a boolean), with one or many arguments. A function
is a named expression returning a result, with one or many arguments. We give here an example
of the definition of a predicate and a function. Predicates and constrains can be used to express
other predicates and constraints, but also defined as assertions that must be checked on the Alloy
models.
 abstract sig Color{}
 one sig Red, Green extends Color{}
 sig Light{}
 sig LightState{
 color: Light →one Color
 }

 pred lightIsRed[s:LightState, l:Light]{
 l⋅color⋅s = Red
 }

 fun redLights[s:LightState] : set Light{
 s⋅color⋅Red
 }
We define two colors (Red and Green), and a signature LightState which contains a relation
color mapping Lights to one Color each. The predicate lightIsRed holds if and only if the Light
l is Red by using a relational join. The function redLights returns a set of Lights, which are
currently Red. It computes this set as the result of a left outer relational join of the LightState
with the color relation then with the Red unary signature.
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2.3.3 The Alloy Analyzer
Alloy [Jac12] is presented as a so-called Lightweight Formal Method [JW96]. The analysis of
Alloy model is a form of constraint solving. First, there is Simulation, which involves finding
instances of executions (e.g., states) that satisfy a given property. On the other hand, Checking
involves finding a counter-example, i.e., a model instance which breaks a given property modelled
as an assertion.
Both types of analysis with Alloy are conducted within a state whose size is specified by the
user in a scope. A scope bounds the number of atoms of each signature which can be instantiated.
The scope by default is always 3. One of the key techniques in using the Alloy analyzer well is to
find a minimal scope required for each signature in order to be able to instantiate satisfiable
models while finding property violations.
Alloy works under the small scope hypothesis, which assumes that most bugs or errors in a
program may be found using very small counter-examples. The state space bounding makes the
usage of Alloy ’lighter’ than exhaustive approaches such as ’pure’ model checking, and the tool is
quicker to construct these (smaller) state spaces and find possible violations. However, due to
this state space bounding, not finding an error in the Alloy model does not imply that the model
is correct, as an error may be found if the state space is grown bigger to take more cases into
account. This is why most of the time, it is reasonable to assume that the higher the scope, the
more confidence we can have in the result of the checking of the Alloy Analyzer. Let us run the
previous example with Lights and LightStates and visualize what the Alloy Analyzer generates.
 pred show{}
 run show for exactly 2 Light, exactly 2 Color, exactly 4 LightState
We define the special predicate show, then run this predicate while giving a scope as a
parameter. In this alternative, we specify the exact number of instances of each signature we
would like to generate. In the third line of the code snippet, we show a simpler way to set a
scope to all signatures at once. The obtained result is shown in Figure 2.4. We can see four
different LightStates, two Lights and two Colors. Each LightState possesses two instances of the
color relation from Light to a Color (i.e., Green or Red).
Figure 2.4: Alloy Analyzer Instance for The LightState Model
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Now let us model a trivial assertion we know is invalid. Let us assert that all Lights are
always Red in all LightStates.
 assert lightsAreAlwaysAllRed{
 all l:Light | all ls:LightState | lightIsRed[ls,l]
 }

 check lightsAreAlwaysAllRed for 4 but 2 Light
We then run the Alloy Analyzer to check this assertion for a maximum of 4 instances per
signature, but 2 instances of Light. Unsurprisingly, we find a counter-example. In Figure 2.5
a state is visualized, where the only Light in the instance has the color Green in the state
LightState0.
Figure 2.5: Alloy Analyzer Counter Example to the lightsAreAlwaysAllRed Assertion
2.3.4 Comparison of Alloy with Other Formal Methods
The semantics of Alloy is given in Boolean Formulas. Alloy transforms a model into a conjunctive
normal form formula and so building the state space defined by an Alloy model reduces to a
SAT problem. Alloy supports several alternative SAT solvers such as SAT4J [UC13], MiniSAT
[ES13] and ZChaff [aP13] which check the satisfiability of propositional logic formulas.
The Alloy analyzer cannot be said to be a classical model checker, and even less a theorem
prover [Jac02]. Model checkers [CK08] such as SPIN [GJH03] or NuSMV [CCG+02] build a finite
but comprehensive state automaton or labelled transition system representation of all possible
executions of the system. They take additionally as an input a temporal formula and use various
means to check the acceptance of this formula by the formal representation of possible system
executions. Model checkers classically suffer from the state explosion problem, but make use of
various optimizations to produce answers more quickly.
On the other hand, theorem provers such as CoQ [INR13] or PVS [PVS13, BK06] are
interactive tools for deduction-based automated reasoning [HR00]. When failing to prove a
theorem it is often difficult to see whether the theorem is invalid, or whether the proof strategy
failed. The augmentation of a theorem proving approach with Alloy has been considered in
[MB02] to mitigate this.
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Depending on the specific domain, the properties that can be analysed using Alloy classically
range from reachability and absence of deadlocks, e.g. in a ring protocol, to application-specific
soundness of systems, e.g. someone in the enterprise is always able to have access to the critical
databases of the company [Jac12].
Chapter 3
State of the Art in Regulatory
Compliance Management
Man cannot remake himself without suffering, for he is both the marble and the
sculptor.
Dr. Alexis Carrel.
3.1
Introduction
Compliance management deals with ensuring that a given enterprise is in accordance with
a set of regulatory guidelines. Being ’in accordance’ refers to a specific state or an interval
between two states in the history of the evolution of enterprise. Regulatory compliance
management (RCM) deals with the modeling, checking, enforcement, and analysis of compliance
requirements (CRs) extracted from regulations of various kinds, such as laws (i.e., legislations),
contracts, internal policies, etc. The RCM community takes influences from various areas such as
information systems, software engineering, artificial intelligence, requirements engineering and law.
Since the year 2000, there has been a surge in interest in RCM from research and practice.
This is due, at least in part, to the new wave of regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley1 and Basel
II2. These laws were defined and enacted in response to the series of financial scandals that
shook the economic sphere3 and signified a change of philosophy from total self-regulation under
the free market paradigm towards different degrees of regulatory control.
As Abdullah et al. [Abd10] put it: "failing to comply is no longer an option [AHK07, BMG08]".
In [JB06b], AMR Research mentions three kinds of compliance companies try to address:
regulatory, commercial and organizational. In the definition of RCM we give in chapter 1,
regulatory compliance is defined as subsuming all other kinds of compliance (e.g., legislative,
contractual). Albeit regulatory compliance in [JB06b] actually means legislative (i.e., to law)
compliance, what is important is that already in the mid 2000s, the RCM market was expected
to grow as a strategic enterprise concern and provide growth opportunities, reduce risk and
enable anticipating new compliance requirements.
Works on RCM have been surveyed and analyzed from various angles. In [Con09] and
[ea09a], a detailed domain analysis for regulatory compliance is given, which is narrower
1www.soxlaw.com european resp. japanese ’variants’ are also known as EURO-SOx and J-SOx
2http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
3Non-exhaustively referred to are often: Enron (USA), Parmalat (Italy), Verizon (USA), Societe Generale
(France), HIH (Australia), etc.
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than in our sense (cf. Section 3.3) but clearly shows the disparity in views on RCM as
well as the great variety in regulations and CRs. Abdullah et al. [ASI10, Abd10, AIS09]
and Cleven et al. [CW09] proceeded to a systematic literature analysis of existing works
from the perspective of information systems. Ly et al. [LGRMD08, LRMGD09] and El
Kharbili et al. [EKAdMSvdA08] give an overview and analysis of RCM from the per-
spective of BPM. Turki et al. [TBO10] give a short summary of research around RCM
from the perspective of service computing while Otto et al. [OA07] survey over 50 years of
efforts in handling legal texts for systems development from a requirement engineering perspective.
In the context of BPM, full coverage of RCM means full coverage of the BPM life-
cycle [EKAdMSvdA08, LRMGD09]. Cleven et al. [CW09] bring additional light in this
matter by proposing a business engineering analysis framework that uses a layered view
on RCM distinguishing the strategy, organizational/process, IT/Business alignment and IT
implementation layers. This is also supported in [EKSMP08]. Related to this is the thorough
review of existing candidates for a compliance modeling language in [Uni08] and [CFPC09], to
which a separate contribution made in [ETvdHP10a] and [OA07] can be added. This work has
been preceded by an extensive overview of candidates for policy languages which could be used
for modeling compliance using business rules in [PAN04].
In the remainder of this chapter, we proceed as follows. Section 3.2 provides the setting for a
common understanding of the RCM domain by stating definitions for the most important domain
concepts. This is followed by the proposal of a conceptual framework for automated RCM in
the context of BPM in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 explains the strategy followed in the survey of
approaches to RCM for BPM we realized. Section 3.5 gives a concise description of the works
in the survey. Section 3.6 shows the result of our evaluation and comparison of the surveyed
approaches. Finally, Section 3.7 discusses our findings and suggests directions for future research
around RCM related to the surveyed solutions. Section 3.8 concludes this chapter.
3.2
Background Definitions
First, in an attempt for us to strictly delimit the relevant RCM concepts and their intended
semantics, we define what a regulation is and, building upon intermediary definitions, define RCM
for BPM. We built the definitions given underneath from the existing definitions in both research
and practice, in an attempt to make the definitions as generic and implementation-independent
as possible. We find similar and complementary definitions in [EKSMP08, LRMGD09]. This
is not surprising since these works tackle RCM in the context of BPM. The definition of RCM
given by AMR Research4 [JB06b] is the closest to ours.
Definition 3.2.1 (Regulation). A regulation is a document written in natural language containing
a set of guidelines specifying constraints and preferences pertaining to the desired structure and
behavior of an enterprise. A regulation specifies the domain elements it applies to. Examples of
regulations are a law (e.g., the health care law HIPAA5), a standardization document, a contract,
etc.
Definition 3.2.2 (Regulatory Guideline). A regulation guideline specifies the expected behavior
and structure on enterprise domain elements. It additionally defines tolerated and non-tolerated
4Now known as Gartner Research after acquisition by the latter.
5Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. http://www.cms.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/
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deviations from the ideal behavior and structure, and also defines the possible exceptional cases.
A regulatory guideline may also specify how the enterprise ought to or may react to deviations
from ideal behavior and structure. Note that in the law domain, regulatory guidelines are referred
to as norms.
The following example 3.2.1 shows a privacy regulation from the healthcare domain. It is
structured so that elementary regulatory guidelines can be separately understood by the regulation
reader. This regulation describes how covered entities must behave regarding disclosure of health
information about individuals.
Example 3.2.1 (HIPAA Regulation).
Excerpt [fMS13, TMA06] from §164.520(c)(2) and (c)(3)]
(a)Standard: The covered entity must provide the individual notice.
(a)(1) A covered entity who has a direct treatment relationship with an individual must:
(a)(1)(A) Provide notice no later than the first service delivery;
(a)(1)(B) If the covered entity maintains a physical delivery site:
i. Have the notice available for individuals to take.
ii. Post the notice in a clear and prominent location.
Regulations are usually decomposed in compliance requirements (CRs), which are text
snippets containing separate guidelines. Therefore CRs are the material (textual) occurrences of
the regulatory guidelines that the regulation expresses. Basically, the two notions are equivalent,
regulatory guidelines are the intention or desire of the regulator, and CRs are the understanding
of the compliance manager. CRs are the work of a compliance manager, who extracts and
organizes them as he wishes from the regulation. The granularity of such CRs is left to the
appreciation of the regulation expert who extracts them.
Definition 3.2.3 (Compliance Requirement (CR)). A compliance requirement (CR) is a piece
of text extracted from a regulation that specifies a given regulatory guideline. It may refer to or
be related to (e.g., through exception relations) other CRs.
CRs must be interpreted by regulation and business experts in order to be transformed into
a form that makes them understandable to and enforceable on the enterprise. This process is
called concretization. It is also sometimes called contextualization or internalization of CRs in
the RCM literature.
Definition 3.2.4 (Concretized CR).
A CR is interpreted and expressed in a form that allows relating it explicitly to an enterprise
model (e.g., business process model).
These concretized CRs can be refined together by regulation experts and business analysts
until they reach a state where they explicitly refer to actions and elements defined in the enterprise
model. In the rest of the thesis, we will asbtract from this distinction and refer to both CRs and
concretized CRs as CRs.
Example 3.2.2 (Concretized CR). For the following compliance requirement:
Medical institutions are not allowed to conduct treatments or examinations on patients if these
constitute any danger to the health or unnecessary convenience to the patient.
We give the corresponding concretized CR:
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In Hospital X, in Service Y, no endoscopic examinations shall take place within one week after
radiological examinations using non-water soluble contrast agents. If that happens, a chief
physician has to look at the case.
If we take into account the previous definitions, we can restate the high-level RCM definition
1.2.1 by restating it into a working definition in the context of an enterprise for the rest of this
thesis:
Definition 3.2.5 (Working Definition of the RCM Problem).
Regulatory Compliance Management (RCM) is the problem of ensuring that enterprises (data,
processes, organization, etc.) are structured and behave in accordance with the regulations that
apply, i.e., with the compliance requirements specified in the regulations. In the opposite case we
say that a company is violating a regulation. RCM is composed of compliance modeling, checking,
analysis and enactment.
We divide the RCM problem (see definition 3.2.6) into two sub-problems.
Definition 3.2.6 (Two RCM sub-problems).
1. Compliance Modeling: The problem of (accurate) representation of CRs.
2. Compliance Checking: The problem of statically (verification) or dynamically (enforce-
ment) verifying whether or not a given enterprise model fulfills the CRs and/or the problem.
3.3
Conceptual Framework for Business Process RCM
RCM involves several tasks, which we elicit according to the conceptual framework given in
this chapter (cf. Figure 3.1). In this framework, an enterprise model describes the enterprise,
while the behavioral part of the enterprise is represented by its business processes (BPs) as the
means describing the behavior of an enterprise. This framework seeks to provide a foundation
for automated RCM starting from RCM modeling, and extending this foundation to fulfill the
objectives of ensuring and maintaining control over compliance.
Figure 3.1: Automated Regulatory Compliance Management - Conceptual Framework
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3.3.1 The Business Process Management Dimension
In Figure 3.1 the conceptual framework used in this chapter for evaluating RCM approaches is
presented. We introduce here the artifacts present in each of the four horizontal BPM layers
from 3.1: (i) Strategy, (ii) Conceptual Design, (iii) Execution and (iv) Event.
Definition 3.3.1 (Strategy Model in the Strategy Layer).
The strategy models describe the intentions and motivations behind the definition of the business
process models. It includes concepts such as business objectives and goals, values and value
chains, risks, business policies and business rules, strategic actors and dependencies between the
latter. There exists a variety of languages following different modeling approaches at the strategy
level (e.g., [FMPT01]).
Definition 3.3.2 (Business Process Model in the Conceptual Design Layer).
A business process (BP) is a collection of tasks that together reach a business goal, such as
creating value, producing a service or a product. A BP model is a representation of a BP that
describes all possible executions as an orchestration (i.e., ordering as a workflow) of BP tasks.
In our definition, a BP model also describes the involved organizational entities and their roles
in achieving business goals, as well as the used data and resources. Alternative definitions are
provided in [Wes07, AH02, Sch99, OMG11].
Definition 3.3.3 (BP Execution Model in the Execution Layer).
Some BP modeling language allow creating BP models which are executable, such as BPEL or
XPDL. A BP execution engine is the software responsible for executing BP instances. Every BP
model has several (possibly concurrently) executing instances.
Definition 3.3.4 (BP (Execution) Trace in the Event Layer).
While being executed, a BP model instance generates a sequence of event logs describing the
events which occurred during execution, such as finishing a BP task or an exception that occurred.
The complete sequence of event logs (i.e., after execution termination) is called an execution trace.
Software exists for extracting these event logs and representing them graphically in notations
similar to that used for BP models [RvdA06].
3.3.2 The Compliance Dimension
We give in the following definitions a high-level introduction to the elements of the conceptual
framework in the vertical dimension, as represented by the eight vertical arrows in Figure 3.1.
3.3.2.1 Compliance Modeling
The foremost task in RCM is the formal representation of compliance requirements in a form that
makes them machine-interpretable. In this task, the input is a structured and refined representa-
tion of compliance requirements extracted from the regulation. Usually, this extraction requires
the intervention of (i) regulatory (e.g. juridical) and (ii) enterprise experts (e.g. business analysts).
The sound legal understanding of statements (e.g., liabilities, responsibilities, duties,
authorities, etc.) contained in the regulation and their correct normative interpretation require
skills that pertain to the domain of a regulation. This is called Legal Interpretation. Take for
example a regulation that is a law (e.g., HIPAA respectively SOx), it requires the intervention of
a law (e.g., healthcare law respectively financial law) expert.
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Additionally, the Enterprise Context also plays a role, as the intervention of an individual
with profound knowledge of the enterprise that is impacted by the regulation is required in order
to relate the regulation to the elements of the enterprise model that are covered by the CRs.
Consequently, the same regulation can, in the context of two different enterprises, or by two
different legal experts, lead to two different interpretations thus yielding two different compliance
models. This procedure is called concretization of the CRs (cf. definition 3.2.4).
The produced CRs are in the form of text snippets. They must be related to each other
in order to determine how the interpretation, respectively the enforcement of the one CR is
dependent on the interpretation, respectively the enforcement of the other regulation CRs. Once
this structured representation is available it must be transposed into some formal representation,
for which there is a wide variety of languages (e.g., logics, XML-based, etc.) available [OA07].
Moreover, the CRs must be interpreted in the relevant Enterprise Context. The obtained
structured, and interpreted representations of CRs are called Concretized Compliance requirements.
Definition 3.3.5 (Compliance Modeling).
The task of (accurate) formal representation of CRs (if necessary, concretized) in the context of
a given enterprise (i.e., for a given enterprise model).
Another element of compliance modeling is compliance validation.
Definition 3.3.6 (Compliance (Requirement) Validation).
Validating the consistency of the formalized compliance requirements.
In definition 3.3.6, by consistency we mean more precisely: non-redundancy and conflict-
freedom. In some approaches, mechanisms may be defined to ensure conflict freedom through
conflict resolution while reasoning on the CR models. The latter approach is dynamic, while in
some approaches, logics allow to find out statically whether a set of CR models is consistent.
Compliance validation seeks to help the user answer the question of whether the CRs are
coherently and consistently modeled. But it does not answer the question of whether the CRs
are adequately modeled, i.e., the CRs were modelled as they were meant to be.
A related task is CR normalization in which a set of CR models is reduced to a new minimal
set of CRs which is equivalent to the first set. But this is usually not a task that a compliance
modeler should do, and is mainly motivated by the search for smaller CR models which can be
more efficiently (quickly) verified. Usually, this task is done at the rule level. In some approaches
normalisation is more than reducing the set of CR the minimal one. For instance, in PCL
[GR10b] the idea behind normalisation is to make explicit all formally implicit requirements and
then remove redundancy. One of the reasons for this is proper and accurate modelling. This
allows the proof system to avoid reporting non-compliance in case of a violation of a rule/norm
that can be compensated.
3.3.2.2 Compliance Checking
With the formally modeled CRs at hand, it is possible using a variety of technologies, which
depend on the formalism of choice for representing the CRs, to conduct automatic checking of
compliance of the enterprise model (e.g., a BP model) to a set of CRs. Compliance checking can
be of four types shown in Figure 3.1: compliance verification, enforcement, monitoring and audit.
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Definition 3.3.7 (Compliance Checking (C2)).
The task of deciding whether or not a given enterprise model fulfills the compliance requirements.
It is the process of conducting either one or both of compliance verification (denoted C2S) and
compliance enforcement (denoted C2D) defined later in this document. This step may include
providing a proof of compliance, and most of the time, a proof of violation (either a
counter-example or a logical argumentation demonstrating that compliance cannot be guaranteed)
is highly desired. It may also include a localization and/or and explanation for the uncovered
violation.
The problem of compliance checking can be modeled as the problem of deciding on the truth
of: EM ⊢ CRs. This formula states that the enterprise model (EM) satisfies a set of CRs.
This ’binary’ view on compliance is an absolutist definition of compliance. Some approaches to
compliance define quantifications of compliance as compliance degrees [GR10a] which allows
to consider several possible states of compliance. The BP model must be represented in a
formalism on which statements of the formalism in which CRs are modeled can be interpreted.
The algorithms to decide on the value of EM ⊢ CRs vary depending on the compliance modeling
formalism. For example, if CRs are represented as temporal formulas written in CTL [CK08],
then the EM must be transformed into a formal model for interpreting the logical CTL formulas
(e.g., Kripke Model) and a model checking algorithm must be used.
In an extended fashion, compliance checking can be seen in its core as a partial function C2CRs
that for a given set of CRs, maps an EM and the state the EM finds itself in, to a set of violations.
Be EM the set of EMs and beCR the set of all CRs: EM⨉StateSpaceEM ⨉ 2CR ↦ 2V iolationSet.
The ViolationSet may be a singleton. This set may be empty, in which case the EM is said to be
fully compliant and against a given set of CRs.
Compliance Verification checks whether an EM (e.g., BP) will always be compliant with the
CRs no matter which instance we look at. It is typically a costly process that requires powerful
formal methods such as theorem proving or model checking.
Definition 3.3.8 (Compliance Verification (C2S)). The problem of statically verifying whether
or not a given business process model fulfills the CRs. It is classified as a pro-active compliance
checking technique [EKSMP08].
Compliance Enforcement checks whether the current EM instance being executed is about
to violate the CRs and to react accordingly by using enforcement mechanisms that will modify
the behavior of the instance in order to avoid the violation (e.g., not authorizing access to a
given resource by a BP task). In the software security community, many works seeking to embed
access control in workflows have been realized (e.g., [BMPS10, WM10]).
Definition 3.3.9 (Compliance Enforcement (C2D)). The problem of dynamically enforcing CRs
on a running business process instance. This step may include providing a proof of compliance. It
may also include a localization and/or and explanation for the uncovered violation. It is classified
as a pro-active compliance checking technique.
Compliance Monitoring is the passive variant of compliance enforcement and uses mechanisms
to observe the current incomplete execution history of the BP model in order to detect violations
that have already occurred. As such, it is different from compliance enforcement in that it is
a detective task and not a preventive (check meaning of pre-emptive) task. An Example of a
formalism used for realizing compliance monitoring is event calculus (interpreted over an event
trace produced by a BP execution).
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Definition 3.3.10 (Compliance Monitoring). The problem of continuously observing the history
of execution of a business process instance while it is still running and deciding whether or not a
compliance violation happened. It is classified as a passive compliance checking technique.
Compliance Audit is the compliance checking of a single (or many) complete (finished) process
execution trace. As such it can be seen as a simplified version of compliance verification where
the BP model to be verified is a single sequence. Linear-time temporal logics (LTL) or event
calculus can be used for this task. It can be very useful when simply auditing enterprise models
and taking samples of EM elements, i.e., terminated BP model instances. Its conclusions about
compliance is however less meaningful that for compliance verification.
Definition 3.3.11 (Compliance Audit). The problem of observing the total execution history
(trace, log) of a business process instance that has terminated and deciding on whether or not
compliance violations occurred. It is classified as a passive compliance checking technique.
3.3.2.3 Compliance Analysis
Compliance Analysis consists of the use of compliance reporting and/or traceability as defined
underneath.
Definition 3.3.12 (Compliance Reporting). The task of generating documentation, traces and
(visual) analytics related to the results of compliance checking.
Definition 3.3.13 (Violation Traceability). We define Violation Traceability as Explanation,
respectively Localization of violations. It seeks to provide the causes (events) that led to the
occurrence of the violation, respectively the elements of the BP model where the violation occurred.
3.3.2.4 Compliance Enactment
Compliance Enactment consists of the use of compliance recovery and/or resolution.
Definition 3.3.14 (Compliance Recovery).
The problem of defining and executing automated mechanisms to dynamically (at run-time)
react to the occurrence of a violation, and re-establish a state of compliance through either a
handling, compensation or reparation action. It is used together with compliance enforcement or
monitoring.
Violation Recovery mechanisms are useful at both design- and run-time in assisting users
in resolving violations using pre-defined recovery specifications, sometimes available from best
practices. Violation Recovery can be extremely useful during enforcement to assist in automating
compliance management without requiring the intervention of humans and resume execution of
business processes. An even higher level of RCM maturity in an enterprise is reached if violation
resolution is supported.
Definition 3.3.15 (Violation Resolution). It is the task of engaging corrective action to remove
the cause(s) of the occurred violation(s) in order to re-establish compliance. It is not automatic
as in violation recovery and is engaged upon failed compliance verification or audit.
We propose to deal with the RCM problem by following a model-driven and policy based
approach. This will allow us to build on existing approaches and languages in order to combine
CR modeling, verification at design-time and enforcement at run-time.
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3.4
Analysis Design
Most existing surveys of RCM approaches for BPM do not contribute a comparative analysis of
the solutions but instead, proceed to an initial study of available research in order to structure
approaches but do not extract a detailed set of functional and non-functional requirements on
RCM for BPM. Our work is complementary to existing RCM surveys, as we specifically focus
on the capabilities of existing solution papers to RCM as well as how they fit into the RCM
conceptual framework given in Section 3.3.
Our survey was realized in order to help achieving a broad understanding of RCM and
provide researchers with various perspectives on RCM with a common ground for discussion.
This can be done by providing a chart of existing works and showing how they tackle RCM,
as well as uncovering the respective limitations. This paper answers the need demonstrated
in [Abd10] for an "elementary study of the components and ’state of the art’ features that
should be incorporated in compliance management tools, i.e., frameworks, guidance and software".
We abstained from conducting a systematic literature review as in [AIS09, CW09] by, for
example, selecting the most visible journals in the area of information systems (IS) and BPM.
Instead, we used a next-to-next strategy starting from related research to ours to find and select
papers that are relevant for our analysis. The criterion for selection is that the paper explicitly
mentions tackling the RCM problem for BPM and proposes a solution for it. Unsurprisingly, the
wide majority of the papers we retained have been published at workshops, conferences and in
PhD theses. We collected a substantial number of approaches, each published in one or many
papers, of which we include 32 approaches in this chapter.
Unlike systematic literature surveys where selected venues and search keywords are specified
before-hand, our approach requires prior knowledge about the papers that are selected. As such,
our selection strategy may not be exhaustive but rather, is very focused on RCM solutions in
the domain of BPM. Also, we did not purposefully consider approaches solving the problem of
compliance requirement extraction and elicitation from regulations as we concentrate on solutions
for the problem of modeling and checking compliance, as well as violation recovery.
We study the perspectives taken on RCM by researchers and build a common taxonomy
of evaluation criteria that RCM solutions attempt to fulfill. Eventually, such a taxonomy of
requirements is to be validated and extended by the community in order to be used as an
initial set of criteria against which to evaluate existing RCM solutions and that can be used for
discussion among researchers on RCM and be possibly extended. Practitioners and researchers
attempting to develop RCM solutions that are generic, flexible and holistic can hence benchmark
the existing solutions against the relevant subset of criteria that is of interest to their concrete
RCM concerns.
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3.5
Overview of Selected Publications
Before showing the result of comparing the various surveyed approaches, we begin by giving a
short summary of the works that have been considered in the comparative analysis contributed
in this thesis. We assign an ID to every RCM solution which will be used in the comparative
analysis tables below to refer to it. A very short description of every work stream is given
underneath.
[1] Awad et al.[Awa10, ASW09, AWW11, AWW09, ADW08, AGTW11] provides a com-
prehensive work on regulatory compliance for BPs in his PhD thesis [Awa10] and related
publications. His approach tackles rule modeling, rule consistency analysis, rule verification,
violation localization and heuristics for violation resolution. The rules are modeled using a
language called BPMN-Q that allows to graphically draw queries to be executed against a BP
model repository. BPMN-Q rules have formal semantics in LTL and CTL. BPMN-Q supports
combining temporal dependency constraints and data constraints to form a particular blend
allowing to express compliance rules on the behavior and structure of an enterprise.
[2] Liu et al. [LMX07] propose a method for BPEL process verification against graphically
modeled rules in a language called BPSL. This language has very interesting properties such as
default compliance conditions, logical and business templates. BPSL rules (called properties)
also support data conditions. The BPEL processes are then transformed into Pi-Calculus for
analysis and further into FSMs for verification against LTL temporal formulae generated from
the BPSL rules.
[3] Ly et al. [LRMGD09, Ly13, LGRMD08] use event traces left resulting from the execution
of business processes and carrying context information to provide a logical semantic model for
the definition of compliance. However, the constraints taken into consideration by this work
only include simple task dependencies, such as mutual exclusion or presence dependency. The
particularity of Ly et al.’s work is that they study in particular adaptive processes, i.e., processes
which can can be changed at the model (process template) or at the instance level. This leads to
a new set of problems related to compliance regarding the propagation and consistency of changes.
[4] Governatori et al. [GMS06, LSG08, SG10, GR10a, LSG07, Gov05, KGS10] rely on the
principle of compliance by design, which consists of ensuring that BP models are compliant
before these are deployed and executed. Governatori et al. use formal logic to provide a logic
inference-based solution to compliance checking. They rely on the definition of internal controls
using the formal contract language. This language has a native operator called the contrary to
duty operator that allows to define violations and chains of violations. Thus, a logical mechanism
for violation resolution is provided. This approach relies on manual annotation of process
activities with effects and thus checking compliance is reduced to the propagation of these effects
through all possible execution paths. A process model is thus compliant if none of the possible
executions leads to effects which are violating the compliance requirements modeled as FCL
rules.
[5] El Kharbili [EKSMP08, EKP09, ES09] propose the use of business rules written in the
WSML-Flight semantic web rule language for checking business rules on BP models created
3.5. Overview of Selected Publications 43
using ontologies for BPM. The authors use the decision point metaphor, where BP models are
semantically aligned to compliance requirements by attaching business rules to decision points in
a BP model.
[6] Weber et al. [Web09, HWG09] use an approach similar to Governatori et al., in that
process tasks are annotated with effects, compliance requirements modeled as conjunctions
of propositions and algorithms designed to check compliance in polynomial time are defined.
However, this approach does not allow full normative reasoning with loops (cycles) even though
the work version in [HWG09] includes heuristics for dealing with loops.
[7] Namiri et al. [Nam08, NS07b, NS07a, SGN07, NS07c] uses a similar approach to El
Kharbili, by following the decision point metaphor, and modeling compliance requirements as
business rules in SWRL, a semantic web rule language. Data about the BP model is extracted
and transformed into facts and stored into a knowledge base external to the BP execution
engine. However, it is not clear how users can create business rules out of regulations using this
approach, since the SWRL rules here are technical. One interesting feature in Namiri’s approach
is that he defines compliance patterns.
[8] Schmidt et al. [RCR07] also propose the use of ontologies to represent enterprise
knowledge, and use logical statements to express constraints. Using ontology-based reasoning,
the authors exploit the fact that if it is possible to create instances of the ontology thus defined
then the model is compliant.
[9] Elgammal [ETvdHP10b, TEvdHP12, OAvdHWM11, ETvdHP10b, Ama12] defines
temporal dependency patterns between process tasks extending the well-known Dwyer property
specification patterns [MGJ98] and gives them semantics in LTL. She then uses root-cause trees
to link the possible violation of a temporal pattern to a possible cause. She thus seeks to assist
business users (BUs) in getting explanations to compliance. However, root-cause analysis requires
the user to manually plan and create these trees. As such, these trees are application-dependent
and must be redefined for each new application needing compliance checking. The trivial
part in root-case analysis is the association of a temporal pattern evaluated to False to a
set of possible terms in the pattern instance that were evaluated to False. Thus, trivial
logical reasoning can somewhat help the BU in narrowing down the possible causes for a violation.
[10] Kokash et Arbab [KKdV10] use the REO coordination languages to define a formal
representation of BP models. REO is a channel based language for defining logical circuits, and
can be used to define execution and, using constraint-base automata, define data operations.
Using REO and the mCRL2 model checker, BPMN models are verified using model checking.
[11] Goedertier & Vanthienen [GV06] introduce PENELOPE, a language for expressing
timing and temporal dependency rules about the obligations and permissions in a business
interaction. They use PENELOPE to declaratively capture the compliance requirements in
regulations and provide an algorithm to generate BPMN process models from PENELOPE
specifications. The use of such a technique is limited to the stage where business users (BUs)
do early requirements elicitation and the generated BP models are not intended for productive use.
[12] Ghose et Koliadis [GK07] abstract from any compliance requirement modeling language
and provide heuristics to resolve compliance violations using the notion of compliance patterns,
thus yielding a semi-automatic way for compliance resolution. The heuristics introduced are
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defined based solely on structural aspects of BP models and are not leveraged to the business level.
[13] The REALM approach by Giblin et al. [GLM+05] introduces a real time object
temporal logic which allows very expressive compliance requirements to be modeled. But no
implementation of an engine for the introduced logic is given. However, the whole approach
behind work on REALM distinguishes itself from other works by focusing on various enterprise
business aspects, and targeting genericity by generating compliance checking artifacts from the
compliance requirements specified in the real-time object temporal logic.
[14] Pesic et al. DecSerFlow [Pes08, MPvdAP08, PSSvdA07] proposes an approach based
on a declarative graphical language with semantics in LTL to model service behavior, and
generate service orchestrations that act as business processes. Such BP models are compliant by
construction.
[15] Yip et al. [FPR07] belong to the group of approaches based on ontologies, and use an
OWL ontology to model the system to be checked for compliance. Compliance requirements are
represented using the SWRL semantic web rule language.
[16] Padmanabhan 2006 [PGS+05] is also a logic-based approach, like Governatori et al.
defining a modal logic based on commitments while Governatori’s FCL is based on deontic logic’s
obligations. Note that Goedertier & Vanthienen’s PENELOPE is also based on commitments
that agents hold towards each other and that must be fulfilled.
[17] Foerster et al. [FESS07, FES05, FESS06] uses quality patterns modeled using a
stereotyped UML activity diagram notation. Process models in UML activity diagrams are
translated into transition systems and the quality patterns that express compliance requirements
are transformed into temporal properties. Compliance checking is done using model checking.
[18] Kumar et Lui [KL08] use role patterns in order to model a specific class of compliance
requirements. The role patterns concern role operations and task allocation, and as such, they
are particularly well-suited to organizational compliance requirements, e.g., role-based access
control or segregation of duty. Semantics of role patterns are given in Prolog in the paper.
[19] Wolter et al. [WSM08] link their work on task-based entailment constraints to the
well-studied workflow patterns. However, they only cover a subset of these patterns. They
provide an elegant graphical notation that can be embedded in a business process modeling
notation, as is illustrated for BPMN. It is shown that ambiguities arise due to the nature of
complex control flow patterns.
[20] Agrawal et al, [RCJL06] propose using database technology for compliance management
in workflows. They explain how available technology can be applied to various compliance
management tasks, and illustrate their ideas using a real-life example for the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulation.
[21] The COMPAS6 research project [Uni08] is a European research project around model
driven compliance for SOA and BPM and was started beginning of 2008, and finished in
beginning of 2011. In Compas, a variety of technologies are used for compliance modeling,
6http://www.compas-ict.eu/
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checking, and monitoring. The works of Schumm [DON+10], ElGammal [ETvdHP10b], and
REO-based compliance [KKdV10] are all outputs of this project.
[22] Schaad et al. [SM02] tackle compliance from the organizational control perspective.
That is, they care about such principles as separation of duty, supervision, review and delegation
among roles. The semantics of an enterprise model are given in terms of states and state
sequences in Alloy, and of organizational control compliance requirements in terms of Alloy
predicates. Alloy is a model checker that uses SAT solvers and relies on the small scope
hypothesis to uncover specification errors.
[23] In [SLS06], Schaad et al. follow a different approach to model and check compliance
requirements, in the case of safety properties of a process. The authors present a model-checking
approach which also supports delegation and revocation of tasks. The approach is implemented
using the SMV model checker using the LTL formal language.
[24] Gahanavati [SAD+10] tackle RCM from a goal-oriented requirements engineering
(GORE) perspective. Their definition of a regulation, generic, and unlike other GORE works,
does not concentrate on security or privacy aspects. The objective here is to integrate law
modeling notations (i*, a GORE notation) with business process modeling notations (Use
Case Maps). Traceability and responsibility links are drawn between the regulation model and
the process model. This approach claims helping assess compliance. We rather see it as a
documentation and traceability analysis approach, which allows to provide a quantification of
compliance once compliance to various parts of a regulation are already evaluated and quantified.
This framework also allows to accompany change in regulation by enabling impact analysis on
BP models.
[25] Desai et al. [DNS08, NAAS05] define and formalize contract correctness criteria based
on the preferences of agents involved in a contract. Through a logical formalization of the
notions of safe and beneficial contracts, partners in a contract can check the consistency
of the contract. Algorithms for checking the safety and benefits of a contract for an agent are given.
[26] Kuester et al. 2007 [JMKH07] consider the (data) objects used as inputs and outputs of
BP tasks. Tasks change the state of the input objects when outputting them. Objects have
their own lifecycles already modeled. The question raised is whether BP models operate on the
objects in conformance to the objects’ lifecycle or not. A technique for answering this ques-
tion is given, and an algorithm for generating a BP model from a set of object lifecycles is provided.
[27] Yu et al. [YMH+06] propose a (temporal) property pattern based specification language,
named PROPOLS, whose semantics are given in Dwyer’s property specification patterns,
which in turn have formal semantics in LTL. PROPOLS is used to verify BPEL service
compositions. PROPOLS is defined using OWL, and an approach for model-checking BPEL pro-
cesses against PROPOLS properties using a transformation into finite state automata is presented.
[28] Weidlich et al. [WPDM10, WPD+11] seek to provide an intuitive set of metrics to
quantify compliance. The approach is based on behavioral profiles. For example, compliance of
logs to BP models can be evaluated.
[29] Schumm et al. & 2011 [DON+10, DDO+11] follow a pattern-based approach to
compliance. Concretely, process fragments already validated as compliant can be brought
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Table 3.1: Evaluation Notation of RCM Solutions
Symbol Meaning
Criterion is highly satisfied
Criterion is satisfied
Criterion is partially Satisfied
Criterion is unsatisfied
Criterion is highly Unsatisfied
Criterion satisfaction could not be evaluated
Evaluation criterion does not apply
together to form a new BP mode. However, it is trivial to see that nothing can guarantee that
the obtained BP model will be compliant. This work is combined with [KKdV10] to model check
the obtained BP models in order to evaluate compliance.
[30] Arsac et al. [ACPP11, ACKP11] employ model checking to validate BP models for
compliance against security compliance requirements. The strength of this approach is that
feedback is shown to the user after compliance checking that gives a concrete trace leading to a
violation. However, as is often the limitation with model checking approaches, there is only a
single trace leading to a violation and it is a state trace, not a task execution trace, so there is
still a gap for the business user to understand the violation.
[31] Van der Aalst et al. [vdAdBvD05, Aal05, ADO+08, vdA06] use their process mining
tool called ProM to collect event traces and reconstitute BP executions. These event traces are
verified against LTL formulas expressing desired properties of the original BP model. This work
is part of compliance audit, since compliance checking is conducted post-execution.
[32] Baldoni et al. [BBB+08] propose a domain specific language for curriculum design
which allows to combine domain knowledge about the learner and pedagogical constraints.
This language has a graphical concrete syntax and has formal semantics in LTL. It is in many
ways similar to the work of Pesic [Pes08]. Verification of curricula is realized using model checking.
3.6
A Comparative Analysis of Solutions to RCM for BPM
This section gives a comparative evaluation of the selected RCM solutions. We use a set of
symbols to score the approaches. The meaning of the symbols is given in Table 3.1. The
approaches that are listed in Table 3.2 are assigned an ID following the pattern ’[W-X]’, where X
is a number from 1 to 32, and accompanied with a single representative paper.
The evaluation criteria are divided into three categories. The first category concerns the
components that are provided by the RCM solutions for assisting the business users: a modeling
language, a methodology, an architecture describing how the solution is built out of existing
software and how to extend it, tool support, and a repository for the CR models. The second cat-
egory covers the eight functional areas of the RCM compliance dimension in the automated RCM
conceptual framework (cf. Figure 3.1 in Section 3.3). Thirdly, we included a set of functional
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and non-functional capabilities as evaluation criteria. In the following, we give a concise defi-
nition to each of the evaluation criteria appearing in the third category, in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.
3.6.1 End-User, Application and Violation Management
The Multi-Formalism (Functional) criterion refers to the ability of the framework to support
several formalisms for expressing rules. Examples of such formalisms are OCL7 for expressing
constraints on metamodels (e.g., MOF8 models), PRR9 (an OMG standard for interchanging
production rules) or temporal logics such as CTL10 or ATL11, etc. We refer the reader to
[OA07, ETvdHP10a, PAN04, KMKP11b] for a discussion on the need to support multiple
formalisms. The reasons for this are three-fold: (i) different styles in formal expression of
constraints, (ii) different levels of tool support and different uses (e.g. model checking, simulation,
etc.), and (iii) various formalisms needed to capture the semantics of CR constraints [KMKP11b].
This has been recognized by the business rules industry which has led for example to the
introduction by the OMG of the PRR standard. Similarly, in the formal verification community
the PSL12 and PSP [MGJ98] languages for specification patterns have been introduced, which
provide semantic mappings to various (e.g., temporal logic, regular expression) formalisms.
The Formal Semantics (Functional) criterion evaluates whether the compliance modeling
language has full formal semantics or not. Business User (BU) Orientation refers to the set of
non-functional criteria that judge whether the compliance framework is easy to use (e.g., easy
specification of rules, easy modeling of CRs, user-friendliness of the language, push-button
verification, conceptual clarity and adequacy, practicality for real-life cases, etc). Moreover, the
modeled CRs should be linked to the impacted enterprise model elements (e.g., business process
tasks, organizational roles) in some manner, and that is captured by the Semantic Alignment
criterion.
Ideally, the approach used for managing RCM compliance could be used for different domains:
business processes (classically referring in service oriented computing to service orchestrations),
process choreographies, goal models, service architectures, etc. We call this capability support
for Multiple Application Domains. The Expressiveness criterion judging the expressiveness of
the language used for modeling CRs (e.g., rule, policy, ontology, logic) and is evaluated with
regard to how much of the CR spectrum, i.e., the range of constraints and rules which might be
expressed in a CR, can be covered using the provided language.
The Weak Compliance column indicates whether the solution distinguishes situations where
the enterprise model is checked as compliant because the applicability condition of the CR is
not fulfilled from the situation where it is really compliant. Additionally, the ability of the
RCM solution to provide the cause(s) (e.g., a sequence of events) of each violation and possibly
a localization of the violation cause(s) in the EM is shown by the Explanation / Localization
criterion (cf. [Awa10]).
7Object Constraint Language
8http://www.omg.org/mof/
9Production Rule Representation
10Computation Tree Logic
11Alternating-time Temporal Logic
12http://www.eda.org/ieee-1850/
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Table 3.2: Comparison of RCM Solutions along RCM Framework Evaluation Criteria
Approach Solution Components RCM Framework Alignment Functional & Non-Functional Capabilities
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[W-1] [Awa10]
[W-2] [LMX07]
[W-3] [LRMGD09]
[W-4] [GM05]
[W-5] [EKP09]
[W-6] [Web09]
[W-7] [Nam08]
[W-8] [RCR07]
[W-9] [ETvdHP10b]
[W-10] [KA09]
[W-11] [GV06]
[W-12] [GK07]
[W-13] [GLM+05]
[W-14] [Pes08]
[W-15] [FPR07]
[W-16] [PGS+05]
[W-17] [FESS07]
[W-18] [KL08]
[W-19] [WSM08]
[W-20] [RCJL06]
[W-21] [Uni08]
[W-22] [SM02]
[W-23] [SLS06]
[W-24] [SAD+10]
[W-25] [DNS08]
[W-26] [JMKH07]
[W-27] [YMH+06]
[W-28] [WPD+11]
[W-29] [SLM+10]
[W-30] [ACPP11]
[W-31] [ADO+08]
[W-32] [BBB+08]
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Generally, some RCM frameworks are not only capable of discovering a violation, but to
automatically undertake Recovery actions. Approaches fulfilling this criterion can allow the user
to define corrective action upon occurrence of a violation such as notifications or changes to
the BP. The first kind of Recovery is Handling, which we define as the ability of some RCM
frameworks to allow to model how to react to violations by triggering actions (cf. Handling
column) that do not alter the BP. An example is the logging of information about the violation.
The other kind of Recovery is Reparation which is the ability of the solution to react to violations
by triggering repairing action that will modify the model so that the violation does not occur
again (e.g., as in [Nam08]). This can be semi-automated so as not to require human inter-
vention each time a violation occurs by for instance, specifying standard changes to process models.
Compensation is another kind of recovery that was not included in our evaluation in Table 3.2.
A Compensation consists of the enforcement of actions that correct the state of the BP so that
the violation effects are eliminated. A typical example is that when a medicine leads to health
damage for the people who use it, the chemical laboratory producing the medicine is liable to
pay a fine to the authorities and to the victims.
3.6.2 Rule Language Expressiveness, Business Aspects and Policy Powers
In the approaches we surveyed, and conforming to [KMKP11b], we distinguish three kinds of
rules that are supported by CR modeling languages. Structural Rules express invariants over the
elements of the BP model (e.g., data objects, task properties, human worker properties). Temporal
Rules express dependencies between individual tasks composing a BP model, while Contractual
Rules Express deontic constraints (e.g., duties, rights) on objects defined in the EM. A CR
modeling language may allow to express CRs in one or several of these kinds of rules. The REALM
framework [GLM+05] for example, combines structural constraints on objects as well as temporal
constraints over moments in time at which the structural constraints must be true. The fol-
lowing constraint is structural and temporal and is adapted from a bank example from [GLM+05]:
∀bank ∈ Bank, acc ∈ Account, retain ∈ Retain ∶∃close ∈ Close /◻tdelete.DoOnF (bank, retain, acc.customer.record)→ (⧫tclose.DoOnF (bank, close, acc)∧tdelete − tclose ⩾ 5[year])
This formal expression of a CR basically says that a customer account record may only be
deleted if the account has been closed for at least 5 years.
The other dimension on which to evaluate the expressiveness of CR modeling languages is the
Business Aspect dimension. It is named like this to distinguish it from the CRs which only concern
the control flow (i.e., the ordering of the tasks in the BP model), without considering the environ-
ment (i.e., the enterprise model) in which the BP model is executed. Several aspects are usually of
interest. Data constraints are expressed on data values, such as data integrity rules or simple data-
based derivation rules. See [PAN04] for a detailed discussion of the different uses of business rules.
Other approaches tackle CRs that express constraints on the usage of resources by the BP or
on the allocation of tasks to humans or applications (agents) responsible for their execution.
That is what the Resource/Task & Human/Role criteria deal with. Usually, access control CRs
belong to this category, and approaches are distinguished by the richness of the (domain-specific)
vocabulary they make available for expressing constraints. Separation of duty is also an exam-
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ple of application of such constraints. We add to the latter criteria the support for Time deadlines.
A separate category of functionalities of RCM frameworks are Policy Powers, which are
policies that act on other policies. Typical examples are Delegation and Revocation of permissions
and obligations. The approaches providing this kind of functionality usually come from the
distributed systems security community where various logics for expressing powers exist, but to
our best knowledge of the literature, apart from some exceptions such as [Gaa10], they have not
been much applied to RCM yet. Under these criteria, and for the purpose of evaluation, we
also included other types of policies such as the delegation of tasks in a BP or the delegation of
role in a BP. The opposite function of delegating is the revocation of a granted (respectively
delegated) permission or obligation.
3.7
Discussion
From the comparative analysis made in Table 3.2, we retained the following solutions as
representative for very promising directions of work, not only in the scope of this thesis, but
for tackling the RCM for BPM problem in general. The list is given here using the ID of each
stream of work, the reader will find the corresponding references in Table 3.2: [W-1] (Awad et
al.), [W-4] (by Governatori et al.), [W-2] (Liu et al.), [W-9] (Elgammal et al.), [W-27] (Yu e
al.), [W13] (by IBM), [W-14] (by Pesic et al.) and [W-19] (by Wolter et al.). Although we did
not build our thesis contribution on these as we pursue a different objective, these works and
all the works surveyed certainly have enriched our understanding of the RCM problem and its
challenges, thus contributing indirectly to this thesis.
The work [W-1] [Awa10] is in our impartial opinion one of the most advanced and contains
several useful ideas for a comprehensive RCM solution. For BPMN modeling, although the
author claims generality of his approach, we think [W-1] work is valuable. For [W-2] [LMX07], a
useful output of this research is the BPSL language, which is a different approach from the PSP
patterns as well as the set of optimizations borrowed from model checking. Adapting these ideas
to more business-oriented BP modeling languages, e.g., including resource usage or role-based
constraints, would certainly be a direction of work with impact.
The work stream [W-4] in [GMS06, LSG08, SG10, GR10a, LSG07, Gov05, KGS10] which
is based on FCL/PCL is interesting from a violation management point of view, where it
seems the most advanced. It allows to reason non-monotonically, which is a major advantage
over many of the other works. Also, this stream of work describes a full-fledged logic
system, including a proof system and mechanisms to check consistency and normalize the
set of rules written in this formalism. FCL deals natively with all kinds of obligations
and a comprehensive ontology of obligation types with different semantics was developed
by this stream of work. For example, it is the only work we know of in the field of BPM
compliance which describes pre-emptive and non-preemptive or achievement and maintenance
obligations [GR10b]. It also defines several measures of compliance depending for example on
whether the compliance is achieved during at least one process execution but not all, or if
compliance is ensured over all possible execution traces. The language would profit from a
concrete syntax more amenable to BUs than the logic-inspired concrete syntax provided by
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SPINdle. Another limitation of the approach is that it relies on (partly manual) annotations of
the process tasks with propositional statements, which requires some effort by the process modeler.
Regarding [W-9] [ETvdHP10b], the pattern-based and graphical concrete syntax compiles
into LTL statements, the introduction of a contrary to duty (CTD) operator for describing
violation compensation actions, the modeling tool are all features that make this work very useful
for leveraging CR specification (modeling) to the level of business users. The CTD operator
(denoted by the ⊗ symbol) is a non-monotonic logical operator on actions defined in the FCL
logic in [W-4] [GM05]. It is used to define a prioritized chain of actions to be enforced upon
the non-fulfillment of an action obligation. In [ETvdHP10b] however, it is used with different
semantics13.
PROPOLS [YMH+06] in [W-27] is in the same line of work as [W-9]; this work goes a
step further into making the specification of temporal CRs easier and abstract away form the
underlying temporal logic semantics. It lacks however, just like [W-9], several of the elements
required for a comprehensive RCM solution (e.g., business aspects, cf. Table 3.2).
In [W-13] [GLM+05], the REALM framework allows the integration of business models in
the specification of CRs as well as the management of regulation as part of RCM. These are two
distinctive aspects of the work which make it highly interesting for a holistic view on RCM that
considers the business environment of a BP.
Although not targeted at the same problem as the main stream of work, the declarative
modeling approach of the solution in [W-14] [Pes08] (graphical concrete syntax and pattern-based
CRs) which regard not only temporal aspects of CRs but also organizational ones (used in
structural CRs) make it very interesting. For the class of RCM problems where a declarative
specification (e.g., for requirements validation, mock-up design purposes) is suitable, we consider
this to be a very inspiring solution. We see much synergy between this work and ours, in what
concerns the specification of temporal constraints.
Finally, we retained [W-29] [DON+10] as this technique employs both the classical divide and
conquer and the abstraction strategies to deal with the complexity of modeling and integrating
CRs in BPs. Compliant BP model fragments can be regarded as templates or building blocks
helping the expert BP modeler build process models which are ’locally compliant’ in a quicker
manner. This approach likely has a high potential in easing the burden of business users
involved in RCM tasks, as business users can direct their attention away from the overall
regulation towards smaller chunks of functionality that is provably compliant as represented
by BP fragments. However, one may express concerns about this approach as no statement
about the compliance status of a BP model built out of BP fragments can be made. In
general, the assertion that if a set of process blocks are each individually compliant then
the whole process which these blocks collectively form (block-based process composition) is
compliant is not true. Ultimately, the complexity of checking compliance of the whole process is
13To our best understanding, in [ETvdHP10b]: CR1 ⊗ CR2 expresses an alternative CR2 to fulfill in case of
a violation of a CR1 (i.e., it is equivalent to: CR1 ∨ (⌝CR1 ∧ CR2)) but is not adequate for non-monotonic
compliance requirements. Compliance requirements require non-monotonicity among other reasons in case of the
need for compensations. For instance, by extending the semantics of the classical boolean ∨ operator with time
sequence semantics the expression CR1 ∨ CR2, is not equivalent to CR2 ∨CR1, since the order of fulfillment of
compliance requirements matters. In other words, the obligation of fulfilling CR2 does not exist until the obligation
of fulfilling CR1 exists and it is violated.
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retained. It is interesting to look for classes of BP compliance problems for which this approach
is fitting, i.e., the complexity linked to checking the block-based process composition is acceptable.
We insist on the fact that the reader may make his own selection of approaches, based on his
appreciation of which evaluation criteria are most important. In our case, for RCM, we consider
that business users are the primary end users of an RCM solution. Therefore, the language
for modeling compliance should have a formal foundation in order to allow for transformations
and checking, but should also allow non-logic experts to use the language easily. We noticed in
several works that attempts using compliance requirement templates and patterns or compliant
BP fragments could be linked to this objective. Another aspect guiding our evaluation is the
fact that in our view, RCM should not only cover control flow, workflow or data flow, but also
additional aspects such as resource usage, organizational entity properties (e.g., roles or location),
goals, risks, policies and rules, etc. This is why approaches with a holistic perspective on RCM
might have better adoption chances.
3.8
Summary
Regulatory compliance management (RCM) is attracting much interest from academia, especially
in recent years. However, grasping RCM is still hard for newcomers to this topic of research.
The chapter contributes a conceptual framework for understanding the problem of RCM in BPM
and navigating through the existing research. We realized a comprehensive survey of existing
solutions to RCM, and extracted a battery of solution evaluation criteria by looking at the
strengths and weaknesses of every solution. This enabled us to do a comparative analysis of the
surveyed solutions along the elicited criteria. We found that some approaches are very advanced
and tackle many of the RCM solution criteria. We also have found that supporting business users
in modeling compliance requirements and a complete integration into business process-centered
enterprise models is not yet satisfactory and needs further research. The goal of this thesis is to
contribute to this line of research.
Part II
CoReL Framework for Regulatory
Compliance

Chapter 4
The System Model
There are two ways of constructing a software design: one way is to make it so
simple there are obviously no deficiencies and the other way is to make it so
complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies.
Tony Hoare.
We refer by system to the abstraction used in this thesis on a business process-centered
enterprise model. This means that a system is a representation of an enterprise information
system which is dynamic, i.e., can execute actions. In this chapter, we will give a definition
of a system as a combination of two elementary concepts: ASE Triples, which are introduced
in Section 4.1, and a special class of block-based business processes we will name SBP (which
stands for Structured Business Processes) introduced in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the
metamodel of SBP and Section 4.4 explains its formal semantics.
4.1
The ASE Model
The ASE model describes the basic interaction entities in a system. It is composed of the triple:
Action, Subject, Entity. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
A:ActionS:Subject E:Entity
does(S,A) on(A,E)
ASE Triple
Figure 4.1: ASE Triple
In the basic ASE model, we consider the following four algebraic sorts. First, we partition
the system into two sorts: Actions and Objects.
• Actions (A): Represents the operations that are supported by the system.
• Objects (O): These operations are executed by and on elements of the Objects sort called
Objects. This sort has two non disjoint sub-sorts Subjects and Entities.
– Subjects (S): it represents the system objects capable of executing actions.
– Entities (E): it contains all system objects on which actions may be executed.
Using these sorts, we define the following predicates:
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• Does(s,a): means that the subject s executes action a. This predicate does not specify on
what entity the action is executed.
• On(a,e): means that action a is being executed on some entity e. The subject is not
specified by this predicate.
• Doing(a,s,e): means that subject s is currently executing action a on entity e. We have the
following equivalence: Doing(a, s, e) ≜Does(s, a) && On(a, e) .
We use these predicates to explain the most elementary constructs on the ASE system model.
In Section 4.2, we show how we use ASE triples to define a basic formal business process language
in Alloy.
ASE Triple in the System Model
In the context of our work, we view system models as behavioral constellations where the
basic interaction entities are ASE triples. If we take the history of events during the lifetime
of a system, we can represent it as a sequence of ASE triple executions. In plain english, this
means that a system’s behavior is simply the (possibly infinite) sequence of events that each
correspond to the execution of an ASE Triple. here, we purposely ignore the time dimension in
the occurence of action events. This idea is illustrated in Figure 4.2
System's task execution order
Action i-1 Action i Action i+1... ...
Subject
Entity
Subject
Entity
Subject
Entity
Figure 4.2: System Execution Model
While Figure 4.2 shows the global event history perspective on our view of a system’s behavior,
we can further refine this view. We do this along the ASE paradigm, which distinguishes between
three atomic states relative to the ASE triple, as shown in Figure 4.3:
• The ASE triple is ready to be executed but no yet executed. The predicate which becomes
true in this state is: Do(ai,si,ei).
• The ASE triple is being currently executed: Doing(ai,si,ei).
• The execution of the ASE triple is finished: Done(ai,si,ei).
The reader may notice that our model suggests that the following causal relation exists:
Done(ai−1, si−1, ei−1)⇒ Do(ai, si, ei). In practice, system models can be of a variety of types.
In this chapter, we will define a business process modeling language, which implements our ASE
paradigm. We first introduce a block-based process modeling language in the next section 4.2,
which we then extend with ASE triples in the following section.
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Do(Action_i, S, E)
Action i-1 Action i Action i+1... ...
Subject_i
Entity_i
Subject_i-1
Entity_i-1
Subject_i+1
Entity_i+1
Doing(Action_i, S, E)
Action i-1 Action i Action i+1... ...
Subject_i
Entity i
Subject_i-1
Entity i-1
Subject_i+1
Entity_i+1
Done(Action_i, S, E)
Action i-1 Action i Action i+1... ...
Subject_i
Entity_i
Subject_i-1
Entity_i-1
Subject_i+1
Entity_i+1
Figure 4.3: Do | Doing | Done Predicates in System Execution
4.2
The SBP Model
We first of all give some background definitions of a small business process modeling language
which is a subset of a comprehensive standard process modeling languages. The definition of
this language was introduced in previous shared work related to a formalization of compliance
management of obligations [CTEKG+13]. Then we show how we can build the definition of SBP
models on top of that. We finish this subsection with a small example of an SBP model.
4.2.1 Background Definitions
In our approach, a process is composed of tasks and control flow rules. Tasks represent the
system actions that are done during the execution of a process. Control flow rules are used to
define the valid routings (or flows) to traverse a process model, thereby defining valid execution
traces of such a process model.
For instance control flow rules can define that a certain task has to be followed by another
one, that two tasks are executed concurrently or are mutually exclusive. Arrows connecting the
elements of a process identify a general process task execution order in which the elements can
be executed.
58 Chapter 4. The System Model
To represent a process we use a fragment of BPMN1, a well-established business process
modeling notation. The fragment considered uses only AND and XOR control flow rule nodes in
addition to the start and end nodes. The AND control flow rule is used to coordinate tasks which
can be executed concurrently. The XOR is used to model exclusive choice in the execution of a set
of tasks. For each of the two control flow rule types we consider, AND and XOR, we distinguish
between split and join node subtypes. Split nodes signal the start of the concurrent/exclusive exe-
cution of the enclosed tasks, while Join nodes signal the end of the execution of the enclosed tasks.
A process is structured if it consists of hierarchically nested blocks as depicted by Definition
4.2.1. Previous works have already considered such structures as in [BKB00] and [PGBD12].
While not all processes are structured, structured processes are a substantial class of real-life
processes. According to [PGBD12] 406 of the 604 (≈ 67%) processes in the SAP reference
models [KT98] are structured. In addition [PGBD12] identifies conditions under which
unstructured processes can be transformed into structured ones, and proposes an algorithm for
the transformation. They report that 78 of the unstructured processes in the SAP reference
model can be converted into behaviorally equivalent structured process models. This raises the
percentage of reference business process models which can be represented as structured processes
to ≈ 80%.
This is obviously an anecdotal argument, but the postulate behind this is that we can
reasonably assume that a significant portion of used business processes can be represented as
structured business processes. We work with this assumption in the rest of this thesis and focus
our research on structured business processes.
Definition 4.2.1 (Process). A structured business process P is a business process generated by
the following grammar given in the format of a graphical extension of BNF (with the vertical
lines indicating alternative for the right hand side):
::= 
::=
……
……
……
t
E
E1
E1
E1
E
Ek
Ek
Ek
P start E end
tE
| SEQ(E1, . . . , Ek)
| AND(E1, . . . , Ek)
| XOR(E1, . . . , Ek)
::= 
::=
P
Task block
SEQ block
AND block
XOR block
Structural business process
Process block
The control flow rule , , ,{ }is called start and the control flow rule, , ,{ }is called end. The control
flow rule, , ,{ }is called AND split in case of multiple outgoing arrows and AND join in case of
1Business Process Model and Notation, Version 2.0, http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0
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multiple incoming arrows. A pair of AND split and AND join control flow rules groups a set of
sub-blocks indicating a logical relationship to activate all the sub-blocks concurrently. Finally,
the control flow rule, , ,{ }is called XOR split in case of multiple outgoing arrows and XOR join in
case of multiple incoming arrows. A pair of XOR split and XOR join control flow rules groups a
set of sub-blocks indicating a logical relationship to activate exactly one of the sub-blocks, chosen
arbitrarily.
We assume that all the tasks in a structured business process carry a distinct identity that
constitutes a key part of the label of a task. Therefore, a task t can directly be referenced by
its label t. Similarly, (process) block identities are also distinct hence a block E can directly
be referenced by its label E. As a consequence, for simplicity, we also allow a textual way to
reference the graphical representation of structured business processes.
Example 4.2.1. In Fig. 4.4 we provide an example of a process containing four tasks labeled
t1, . . . , t4. Within the process is shown an XOR block containing in different branches the tasks
t1 and t2. The XOR block is nested within an AND block, forming one of its branches and task
t3 forming the other one. The AND block is preceded by the start coordinator and followed by
task t4 which in turn is followed by the end coordinator.
t4
t3
t1
t2
Figure 4.4: Process Example
Given a process modeling an activity, an execution of such a process represents one way to
perform it. An execution is a valid serialization of a subset of tasks composing the process. A
serialization is considered valid if it starts from the start coordinator and terminates at the end.
In addition a valid serialization has to comply with the semantics of the coordinators and the
connections between the tasks.
A process is defined as P = start E end. An execution of P is equivalent to executing the
block E within start and end. Thus we will provide the formal semantics for executing blocks
which can be used for process execution as well.
Definition 4.2.2 (Block Execution). A process block E can be serialized into a set of finite
sequences of tasks, written Σ(E), defined by the following structural recursion. We call each
sequence in Σ(E) an execution of E, ranged over by ε.
1. E = t: Σ(E) = {(t)};
2. E = SEQ(E1, . . . ,Ek): Σ(E) = {ε1; . . . ; εk ∣ ε1 ∈ Σ(E1), . . . , εk ∈ Σ(Ek)}, where ; stands for
sequence concatenation.
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3. E =XOR(E1, . . . ,Ek): Σ(E) = Σ(E1) ∪ . . . ∪Σ(Ek);
4. E = AND(E1, . . . ,Ek): Σ(E) = {(t1, . . . , tn)} such that
(a) ∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ k,∃εi ∈ Σ(Ei) such that {t1, . . . , tn} = ⋃1≤i≤k Tasks(εi)
(b) ∀Ei ∈ E = AND(E1, . . . ,Ek), th, tj ∈ Ei∣th < tj → ∀ε ∈ Σ(E), th > tj.
Namely Σ(E) is the set of sequences each of which merges a sequence of Σ(E1), . . . , and of
Σ(Ek). Merging a set of sequences gives rise to a sequence that includes all the elements of
the operand sequences. Moreover, the ordering in the result sequence should be compatible
with the ordering in the operand sequences.
A process conform with Definition 4.2.1 contains only tasks that can be executed. This means
that a process cannot contain a task that does not belong to any of it possible executions.
Example 4.2.2. Take into account the process in Fig. 4.4 as P = start E end. We have that
Σ(E) = {ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4} where ε1 = (t1, t3, t4), ε2 = (t2, t3, t4), ε3 = (t3, t1, t4) and ε4 = (t3, t2, t4).
Σ(E) contains the four possible executions of the process P . An execution not contained in Σ(E),
like ε5 = (t3, t4, t1), is not a valid execution of P . In this particular case one of the reasons why
ε5 is not a valid execution is because after t4 the task t1 is executed, which is not possible because
t1 belongs to an XOR block nested in an AND block that precedes the task t4 in a sequence block.
4.2.2 Example: Printer
We show in this section how to model a simple printer management example. This example
shows how the constructs introduced earlier are combined to model a concrete business process.
The process is shown in Figure 4.5, while the underlying block structure is shown in Figure 4.6.
Start 
Printer
User Network 
Connection
Process
Print File
Reject Print
User Connects 
to printer Send File
Get 
Print
Log 
Failure
Figure 4.5: Simple Printer Example
In Figure 4.6, we see the six blocks making out the process from Figure 4.5. For pure
illustration purposes, the Start node is this time displayed with a green ’play’ button, while the
End node is displayed with a red ’stop’ button. The six interleaved blocks are numbered from
the outermost block B1 to the innermost blocks B4 and B6 by decreasing containment order.
Block B1 is a SEQ (for sequence) block containing task Start Printer and block B2. Block B2 is
an AND block, B3 and B5 are sequence blocks, while B4 and B6 are both XOR blocks.
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Start 
Printer
User Network 
Connection
Process
Print File
Reject Print
User Connects 
to printer Send File
Get 
Print
Log 
Failure
B1
B4B3
B6B5
B2
Figure 4.6: Simple Printer Example - Block Breakdown
4.3
Formalizing the System Abstract Syntax Metamodel
The business domain of application for our framework, which we call here the system, are business
process-centered enterprise models. These are defined as the composition of SBP (block-based
workflows) with ASEs. the basic intuition behind the relationship between SBPs and ASEs is that
SBPs define a set of possible system executions where the atoms are the events corresponding
to the execution of a given ASE. The information required to model a given ASE is usually
available in standard process modeling languages such as BPMN, e.g., by using process pools or
lanes to specify the Subject in an ASE. In this section, we define the Alloy constructs necessary
to model these business processes called SBPs, using a metamodel. SBP stands for Structured
Business Process. Building on this metamodel and its formalization in Alloy, we will later define
the state-based operational semantics of its execution using Alloy.
ASE Triples
The metamodel we base our Alloy description on is given in Figure 4.7. We first create a new
module called ase, which we need to implement the ASE triples in Alloy. We then define the
following signatures: Action, Object, Subject and Entity. Later, when we will use Alloy on real
examples, we will need to turn the Action, Subject and Entity signatures into abstract ones, and
extend them with concrete signatures corresponding, for example, to concrete actions in the
example.
We also add an abstract signature called qualifier, which is used to define relations of objects
to properties. We will detail the use of this construct later in the thesis, and show why it is
useful for verifying richer compliance requirements. We finally define the abstract signature ASE
which is related to at most one action, subject and entity.
 module ase

 sig Action{}
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Figure 4.7: The ASE Metamodel
 {
 some se:ASE| this in se⋅a
 }

 sig Object{
 q: some qualifier
 }

 abstract sig Subject extends Object{} {
 some a:ASE| this in a⋅s
 }

 sig Entity extends Object{} {
 some a:ASE| this in a⋅e
 }

 abstract sig qualifier{}

 abstract sig ASE{
 a: lone Action,
 s: lone Subject,
 e: lone Entity,
 }
Modeling the Business Domain
For the rest of this subsection, we will base our Alloy description on the metamodel given
in Figure 4.8. The Alloy code is informally explained throughout this document, so that it is
sufficient to read the explanation text to understand the formalization. We first define a module
called sbp, for structured business processes. We then import the ase module where ASEs are
defined. Each part of the metamodel’s formalization is explained in a separate paragraph.
ASE Triples in SBPs
In this part we define the abstract signature Node and the signature AseNode. An ASENode is a
Node which acts as as a place holder for an ASE triple (named se in the signature relation).
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗Nodes ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
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Figure 4.8: The SBP Metamodel
 abstract sig Node{}
 sig AseNode extends Node {
 se: ASE
 }
Consistency Constraints on ASE Nodes
We define two constraints on ASES. The noAseSharing fact says that no two ASEs might be
shared by two AseNodes. This constraint is not required in real life business processes since we
might have situations where the same ASE is used several times in the same business process.
We use this Alloy fact because we want to have model instances generated which contain a
given set of ASEs while having a minimal size. If we allow for redundant occurrence of ASEs in
AseNodes we will not have that anymore.
 fact noAseSharing {
 all n1,n2: AseNode| n1⋅se ≠ n2⋅se
 }

 fact noOrphanAse {
 all a:ASE| one n: AseNode| n⋅se = a
 }
The second constraint is modeled by the fact noOrphanAse which expresses the consistency
constraint that we shall not have ASEs not contained in a AseNode (e.g., orphan or floating
ASEs). Thereby, we guarantee that all ASEs are part of the business process workflow.
SBPs as Directed Acyclic Graphs of Nodes
We build an sbp as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are ases. In Alloy this can be
defined elegantly by using the generic graph library and parametrizing it with the ase signature.
 module sbp

 open ase
 open util/graph[Node] as gase

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 abstract one sig SBP{
 flow: Node →Node,
 }{
 // A structured business process (system) is a DAG of ases
 // graph has no self−loops and graph is a dag
 gase/dag[flow]
 }
We import the Graph library which defines classical graph theory constructs such as nodes,
graphs, and directed acyclic graphs. First, the abstract signature sbp is defined. Sbp is a set of
relations between two nodes, called flow. This defines a ternary relation as a binary relation
between an sbp and a binary relation flow.
By setting constraints over this flow relation we obtain the desired structure of sbps. The
constraint is in the line before last (119) of the previous code snippet, and specifies that the flow
relation must comply with the definition of a DAG given in Alloy Graph Library. We copied the
relevant definitions from the Graph and relation libraries in the Alloy code snippet underneath.
 module util/graph[node]
 open util/relation as rel
 [⋅⋅⋅]
 // graph in undirected
 pred undirected [r: node→node] {
 symmetric[r]
 }

 // graph has no self−loops
 pred noSelfLoops[r: node→node] {
 irreflexive[r]
 }

 // graph is a dag
 pred dag [r: node→node] {
 acyclic[r, node]
 }
 [⋅⋅⋅]
 module util/relation
 [⋅⋅⋅]
 // r is acyclic over the set s
 pred acyclic[r: univ→univ, s: set univ] {
 all x: s | x !in x⋅̂r
 }
 [⋅⋅⋅]
Node Helper Functions
The following three Alloy functions are helpful when implementing our formalization. First,
the nodes() function returns all the nodes of a given business process. The preds(Node) resp.
succs(Node) give the predecessors and resp. the successors of a Node in the process.
 fun SBP::nodes: set Node{ // set of nodes in business process
 (this⋅flow)⋅Node + Node⋅(this⋅flow)
 }
 fun SBP::preds[n’: Node]: set Node {
 {n: Node| n→n’ in this⋅flow}
 }
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 fun SBP::succs[n: Node]: set Node {
 {n’: Node| n→n’ in this⋅flow}
 }
Operational Nodes
Next to AseNodes, a number of other Node types are needed in SBPs. We call these the
operational nodes, because they serve the purpose of defining an execution (routing) workflow
along the various AseNodes. There are six types of such Nodes (see Definition 4.2.1). The Start
is the node that starts the execution. The End node ends the execution.
 abstract sig OpNode extends Node {}
 sig AndSplit, AndJoin, XorSplit, XorJoin, Start, End extends OpNode{}
The other four nodes are control flow rules. We have two types of these. The Split nodes
open a block in the SBP, and the Join nodes close a block in the SBP.
The operational nodes can also be divided along another criterion: AND and XOR blocks.
These are the two kinds of LogicBlocks we have. We need two nodes to define an AND block,
AndSplit opens the block, while a AndJoin closes the block. In similar fashion, a XorSplit opens
a block, and a XorJoin closes a block. But we get to blocks a little later in this section in more
detail.
A Consistency Constraint on Start and End Nodes
We know that we have a single Start node and a single End note as well. This is encoded in the
Alloy fact singleStartAndEnd.
 fact singleStartAndEnd {
 one Start && one End
 }
Definition of SBP Blocks
Every Block contains a sequence of blocks (blockSeq) as well as a set of blocks (blockSet). Both
constructs are partly redundant, since the information in the one relation (blockSeq) can be used
to build the second relation (blockSet). However, we need this redundancy for practical reasons
in writing short functions and constraints in the Alloy model.
 abstract sig Block{
 blockSeq: seq Block,
 blockSet: set Block // need this for nodeBlocks function (redundant)

 }{
 lone b: Block| this in b⋅@blockSet
 not blockSeq⋅hasDups // no duplicates
 blockSet = blockSeq⋅elems // set reflects sequence
 }
In the Alloy code snippet above, we further constrain the Block signature as follows. First,
every Block can be contained in at most one other block, otherwise its definition makes little
sense if any. We write an Alloy function called hasDups() to say that the sequence of blocks
does not contain any redundant blocks. Similarly to the constraint modeled above, this is to
avoid trivial instance models where the same blocks are found many times, which is obviously of
little interest to a compliance checking.
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We also make sure that the blockSet and the blockSeq are consistent with regard to each
other by saying that the blockSet is actually made out of all the elements in the sequence of
blocks blockSeq.
Node Block as Atomic Block
We define a special type of blocks called NodeBlocks. NodeBlocks only contain a single (implicit
one quantifier in Alloy relations) AseNode. A NodeBlock also has an empty BlockSeq.
 sig NodeBlock extends Block { // atomic block
 node: AseNode
 }{
 no blockSeq
 }
SBP Composite Blocks
A CompositeBlock inherits from Block and contains strictly more than one Block. In the following,
we will see that we define three kind of CompositeBlocks.
 abstract sig CompositeBlock extends Block {
 } {
 #blockSeq> 1
 }
Sequence Blocks
The first kind of CompositeBlocks are SequenceBlocks, which are sequences of NodeBlocks.
SequenceBlocks do not contain any other SequenceBlocks. We dispose of two useful functions,
first() resp. last() which return the first resp. the last NodeBlock in the sequence. The technique
used is to find the last Block in the sequence of sub-Blocks, and if the last sub-Block is not
a NodeBlock, it means the first (resp. last Node) is either an AndSplit or and XorSplit (resp.
either an AndJoin or an XorJoin). We obtain the desired result by computing the relational join
of two sets, e.g., Block b (the first resp. last sub-block of the Block) and the set of all splits resp.
joins.
 sig SeqBlock extends CompositeBlock {
 }{
 no blockSet & SeqBlock // wlog sequence blocks do not contain sequence blocks
 }
 fun SeqBlock::first: Node {// first node of sequence block
 let b = this⋅blockSeq[0]|
 b in NodeBlock implies b⋅node else b⋅split
 }
 fun SeqBlock::last: Node {// last node of sequence block
 let b = this⋅blockSeq[this⋅blockSeq⋅lastIdx]|
 b in NodeBlock implies b⋅node else b⋅join
 }
Control Flow Rules: AND and XOR Blocks
A special kind of CompositeBlocks are LogicBlocks, which are either AndBlocks or XorBlocks.
Each LogicBlock contains a single Split node which opens the block and a single Join node which
closes the block.
4.3. Formalizing the System Abstract Syntax Metamodel 67
 abstract sig LogicBlock extends CompositeBlock{
 split: OpNode,
 join: OpNode
 }

 sig XorBlock extends LogicBlock {
 }{
 split in XorSplit
 join in XorJoin
 }

 sig AndBlock extends LogicBlock {
 }{
 split in AndSplit
 join in AndJoin
 }
Operational Nodes and Blocks: Consistency Constraints
The noOrphanOps fact specifies that for all nodes which are neither a Start nor an End node,
we must have the following properties:
• Every AseNode is contained in exactly one NodeBlock.
• We have that every LogicBlock has one split field and one join field.
– For every AndSplit resp. every XorSplit there is a single LogicBlock for which the
AndSplit resp. XorSplit is the split field.
– Symmetrically, for every AndJoin resp. every XorJoin there is a single LogicBlock for
which the AndJoin resp. XorJoin is the join field.
 fact noOrphanOps {
 all n: Node−(Start+ End)|{
 n in AseNode implies one b: NodeBlock| n in b⋅node
 n in AndSplit + XorSplit implies one b: LogicBlock | n in b⋅split
 n in AndJoin + XorJoin implies one b: LogicBlock | n in b⋅join
 }
 }
The Root Block
There is a single Root Block in every SBP. The Root Block is a CompositeBlock which is contained
in no other CompositeBlock. Another constraint is that all Blocks of the SBP are contained in
the Root Block. This containment is calculated by the getBlocks function which traverses the
blockSet relation transitively (using Alloy’s reflexive and transitive closure operator) and collects
all the blocks reachable through this relation.
 pred Block::isRoot {
 no b: CompositeBlock| this in b⋅blockSet
 all b: Block| b in this⋅getBlocks// all nodes reachable from root block
 }

 fun Block::getBlocks: set Block{
 this⋅∗blockSet
 }
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Helper Functions for SBP Blocks
The numBlocks returns the number of blocks contained in a Block by returning the cardinality of
the set BlockSet. The functions firstNode resp. lastNode returns the first node resp. last node in
the block. The predicate hasEdge(Node, Node) returns true if both nodes by structural induction
on the block structure. It distinguishes between the case where we have a SeqBlock and the case
where we have a LogicBlock because we do not have any OpNodes (e.g., AndSplit or XorJoin) in
SeqBlocks.
 fun Block::numBlocks: Int {
 #(this⋅blockSet)
 }
 fun Block::firstNode: Node{
 this in NodeBlock implies this⋅node
 else (this in SeqBlock implies this⋅first else this⋅split)
 }
 fun Block::lastNode: Node{
 this in NodeBlock implies this⋅node
 else (this in SeqBlock implies this⋅last else this⋅join)
 }
 pred Block::hasEdge[u,v: Node]{
 (this in SeqBlock
 && some i: this⋅blockSeq⋅inds − this⋅blockSeq⋅lastIdx |
 (this⋅blockSeq[i]⋅lastNode = u &&
 this⋅blockSeq[add[i,1]]⋅firstNode = v)
 )
 ||
 (this in LogicBlock
 && some i:this⋅blockSeq⋅inds |
 (this⋅split =u && this⋅blockSeq[i]⋅firstNode = v)
 ||
 (this⋅join=v && this⋅blockSeq[i]⋅lastNode = u)
 )
 }
Enforcing the Block Structure
This code snippet shows how we further constrain the SBP structure to comply with the block
structure we want for SBPs. It does this by structural induction on blocks. It uses the flow
relation and checks whether for every two nodes we either the following property: these two
nodes are linked by an edge (flow) inside the same block, or else, exactly one of both nodes is
either the start resp. end node and the other node is the first node of the root block resp. the
last node of the root block.
 pred SBP::conformsToBlockStructure{
 all u,v: Node| (u→v in this⋅flow iff
 (some b: Block| b⋅hasEdge[u,v]
 or some b: Block | (
 b⋅isRoot && (
 (u in Start && v = b⋅firstNode) || (v in End && u= b⋅lastNode)
 )
 )
 )
 )
 }
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Consistency Constraints on Blocks: Global Facts
Obviously, we only want a single RootBlock, and set the fact forcing the SBP to comply with the
block structure defined in predicate conformsToBlockStructure.
 fact singleRootBlock{// a single root block represents the business process
 one b: Block| b⋅isRoot
 }

 fact blockConformance{ // the block structure should correctly reflect the business process
 SBP::conformsToBlockStructure
 }
4.3.1 Examples of Defining SBP Models
In fact, a more accurate word that should be used instead of ’Defining’ might be ’Generating’.
The reason might be obvious to the reader, since business processes in our approach are
declaratively defined. In order to model a business process, it is sufficient to declare the elements
(i.e., all kinds of required blocks, since our process language is block-based) in a consistent way
with the formal semantics. In the following, we show how a set of elementary and small business
processes may be defined.
Code 4.3.1.
 sig AseNode extends Node {
 //se: ASE
 }

 fact noOrphanAse {
 all a:ASE | one n: AseNode | n⋅se = a
 }
Note that in order to just generate the workflow, which we call SBP model and not the full
system model which also includes the ASEs, all we need to do is to comment the lines in the
SBP Alloy module which embed ASEs into an SBP model. This is shown in the code snippet
4.3.1. What this causes is that the structural links (Alloy Relations) between AseNodes and
ASEs are removed. Thus the Ally model checker does not include instances of ASEs in the
generated instances. This decoupling between SBP (workflow) and ASEs has been motivated
earlier. It allows us to easily reuse the same workflows with different ASEs to create different
system models.
4.3.1.1 Sequence
Conceptual Model
Here, we model the sequence workflow with two tasks shown in Figure 4.9. The code required
to generate this sbp workflow is given in the code listing 4.3.2. All that is necessary is to declare
two NodeBlocks that correspond to the two workflow tasks and to order these NodeBlocks in
a sequence. This is done in the fact signature of the SeqBlock sb1 by setting the mapping of
the indexes of the blockSeq property of a SeqBlock (e.g., ’0− > nb1’ sets the NodeBlock ’nb1’ to
be the first in the sequence, etc.). Note that the ’@’ is required since the statement is inside a
signature fact and not in a separate Alloy fact. The following examples follow the same pattern.
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T1 T2
B1
Figure 4.9: Sequence Block
Alloy Model
Code 4.3.2 (Sequence Workflow).
 module Examples/sbp1

 open sbp

 one sig nb1, nb2 extends NodeBlock{}

 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb1+ 1→nb2
 }
Running the Alloy Model
The following Alloy code runs the model described above. Adding the predicate show() allows to
configure under which conditions the model is to be run. We just need to specify that we want
no ASEs to be generated since at this stage we only want valid SBP workflows to be generated.
We set a scope of 4 since we know we have at least 4 different nodes: 2 AseNodes, a Start and
an End Node.
Code 4.3.3.
 pred show(){
 no ASE
 }
 run show for 4
The resulting Alloy instance is shown in Figure 4.10. The figure presents a graphical
view on all model instance elements (called atoms) that are shown in yellow coloured squares.
The relations (instances) between these atoms are shown as directed vectors. Each vector
is typed using a different colour, and the types corresponding to the colours are shown in
the block on the upper left part of the diagram (blockSeq, blockSet, flow and node Alloy relations).
Let us start by visualizing the workflow in the model instance. As explained in the Alloy model
for SBP, the workflow is encoded through the flow relation of the signature SBP defined between
nodes. For instance, the sbp/SBP (the prefix sbp/ tells us the Alloy module where SBP is defined)
atom representing the SBP model instance has three outgoing instances of the Flow relation.
Each instance of these relations follows this format: flow[Node1] ∶ SBP → Node2. This is an
equivalent notation for this SBP relation: SBP.flow(Node1,Node2), or the following ternary
relation flow(SBP,Node1,Node2). The same can be said about the node relation represented by
the green vectors linking NodeBlocks (e.g., nb1) with AseNodes (e.g., node(nb1→ sbp/AseNode1).
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Figure 4.10: Result of Running an Alloy Model - sbp1 Example
4.3.1.2 SeqBlock and XorBlock
T1
T2
T3B2
B1
Figure 4.11: Sequence with Xor Block
Similarly to the previous example, we first identify the required blocks. In this case all we
need is an XorBlock embedded into a SeqBlock. Then we declare the required NodeBlocks and
place them in the right blocks. Here we may notice two things. First the ordering of Blocks
(including NodeBlocks) is only important in SeqBlocks.
The other is that setting both the blockSet and blockSeq relations of a block introduces
some redundancy. The reason for this is that in the SBP Alloy module, we define blockSet using
blockSeq, as a flattened non-ordered set of the elements included in a blockSeq. Consequently, it
is a better style to remove the lines in the SeqBlock sb1 and XorBlock xb1 where the blockSet is
defined. We kept these in our example for illustration purposes.
The next examples will not define blockSets explicitly, and it is sufficient to define blockSeqs,
although the ordering of blocks in a blockSeq is not important for execution in neither AndBlocks
nor XorBlocks. For the sake of saving space, we will not show the produced Alloy model instances
for the next SBP examples as these grow bigger and more complex.
Code 4.3.4 (Nested Sequence and Xor Workflow).
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 module Examples/sbp2

 open sbp

 one sig nb1, nb2, nb3 extends NodeBlock{}

 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 //blockSet = nb1+ xb1
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb1+ 1→xb1
 }

 one sig xb1 extends XorBlock{}{
 //blockSet = nb2+ nb3
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb2+ 1→nb3
 }
4.3.1.3 AndBlock of SeqBlock
T1
T3
T2
T4
B1 B2
B3
Figure 4.12: Xor Block of Sequences
This example shows how to generate an AndBlock with two branches which contain each a
SeqBlock. We need to declare four NodeBlocks. We follow by defining the two distinct SeqBlocks
and the containing AndBlock. In Alloy models, the order of declarations is not important.
Code 4.3.5 (Nested Sequence and And Workflow).
 module Examples/sbp3

 open sbp

 one sig nb1, nb2, nb3, nb4 extends NodeBlock{}

 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb1+ 1→nb2
 }

 one sig sb2 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb3+ 1→nb4
 }

 one sig ab1 extends AndBlock{}{
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 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→sb1+ 1→sb2
 }
4.3.1.4 Nested Blocks
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
B1 B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
Figure 4.13: Nested Sequence and And Blocks
As a last example, we consider a slightly more complex workflow than the previous elementary
ones. The complexity might be defined in various ways, but what is intended here is an informal
consideration based on the number of various tasks, the number of blocks, and the intricacy of
nesting of these blocks.
The example contains seven different tasks, and 6 distinct blocks: 2 XorBlocks, 1 AndBlock, 3
SeqBlocks. Once the hierarchy of blocks is identified (the process can always be represented as a
tree of blocks, equivalent to the directed acyclic graph representation), it is quite straightforward
to define the corresponding Alloy model, and an understanding of the previous 3 elementary
examples allows the reader to easily interpret the code in the Snippet 4.3.2.
Code 4.3.6 (Nested Blocks).
 module Examples/sbp4

 open sbp

 one sig nb1, nb2, nb3, nb4, nb5, nb6, nb7 extends NodeBlock{}

 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb1+ 1→ab2
 }

 one sig ab2 extends AndBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→sb3+ 1→sb4
 }

 one sig sb3 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb2+ 1→xb5
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 }

 one sig sb4 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb5+ 1→xb6
 }

 one sig xb6 extends XorBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb6+ 1→nb7
 }

 one sig xb5 extends XorBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb3+ 1→nb4
 }
4.3.2 Example of Defining a System Model
In order to define a system model, we need to bind the previous SBP models with ASEs, so that
the description of the workflow is extended with the actual ASEs which are being executed. We
will show how to do this for the sequence example in 4.3.1.1. The Alloy code in Snippet 4.3.7
shows how to do this.
Code 4.3.7 (Extending SBP with ASEs - 1).
 one sig ase1, ase2 extends ASE{}

 fact{
 (nb1⋅node)⋅se = ase1
 (nb2⋅node)⋅se = ase2
 }

 pred show(){}
 run show for 4
We change the SBP module back to contain the relations linking a NodeBlock AseNode, itself
linked to an ASE, by uncommenting the relation definition se(AseNode,AseNode). We need to
extend the Alloy module in 4.3.1.1 with declarations of the two needed ASEs ase1 and ase2. Then
we need to define a fact linking each NodeBlock to the corresponding ASE. We first access the
AseNode inside a NodeBlock (nb1.node), then we set its AseNode to ase1 ((nb1.node).se = ase1).
Thanks to the code in 4.3.7 we can now visualize in Figure 4.14 a valid generated Alloy
instance of a system model using the show predicate. In this example however, we see the
ASEs (e.g., ase2) and two distinct triples of Action, Subject and Entity: (sbp/ase/Action0,
sbp/ase/Subject, sbp/ase/Entity) and (sbp/ase/Action1, sbp/ase/Subject, sbp/ase/Entity).
Code 4.3.8 (Extending SBP with ASEs - 2).
 one sig a1, a2 extends Action{}
 one sig e1, e2 extends Entity{}
 one sig s1, s2 extends Subject{}
 fact{
 ase1⋅a = a1
 ase1⋅s = s1
 ase1⋅e = e1
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Figure 4.14: Result of Running an Alloy System Model - sbp1 Example
 ase2⋅a = a2
 ase2⋅s = s2
 ase2⋅e = e2
 }
If we want to explicitly specify which actions, subjects, entities make up every ASE, then we
need the additional lines of code shown in Code Snippet 4.3.8. This generates the Alloy instance
shown in Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Result of Running an Alloy System Model with defined ASEs - sbp1 Example
4.4
Formalizing the System Execution Semantics
Definition of Process State
We start this Alloy module by defining the signature for process states. The signature defines a
relation called nstate from every node to exactly one state called ExecState. As its name suggests,
ExecState encodes the current execution state of a node in the process.
 module sbp_exec
 open sbp
 some sig ProcessState{
 nstate: Node →one ExecState
 }
Covered Process States
We distinguish between two execution states for a node: it is either inactive or active, as illustrated
in Figure 4.16. As the focus of our work is on the enforcement of policies, our immediate objective
is to show how the semantics of policies can be formalized and integrated with formal execution
semantics of business processes.
At this stage of research, there is not much added value in our view, in considering complex
state models for processes or process tasks. We argue however, that this could show to be a
valuable direction of future research. The intuition behind this judgement is that more complex
state models for tasks and processes will lead to richer range of policy decisions.
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Figure 4.16: ExecState
 abstract sig ExecState{}
 one sig active, inactive extends ExecState{}
Process State Helper Functions
The following functions are defined for the signature ProcessState used in the formalization of
policy execution semantics: state(Node) returns the current ExecState of a given Node in the
SBP. activeNodes() returns the set of Active nodes in the SBP.
 fun ProcessState::state[n:Node]: ExecState{// state of node n in this process state
 n⋅(nstate[this])
 }
 fun ProcessState::activeNodes: set Node{
 (this⋅nstate)⋅active
 }
Process State Transitions
This part of the Alloy model encodes the state transitions implied by our simple process state
model. According to it, we only have two possible state transitions: either an Inactive node
becomes Active, or an Active node becomes Inactive. In the declarative Alloy model, we encode
these two state transitions as Alloy predicates, named becomesActive and becomesInactive. Both
predicates make use of two ProcessStates, the current and the next state.
 pred becomesActive[n: Node, s,s’: ProcessState]{
 (s⋅state[n] in inactive) and (s’⋅state[n] in active)
 }

 pred becomesInactive[n: Node, s,s’: ProcessState]{
 (s⋅state[n] in active) and (s’⋅state[n] in inactive)
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 }
SBP Execution - State Transitions
The following predicate is the core of the semantics execution, since it defines the existence
condition of a state transition from a process state into the next process state. The basic intuition
is that a node can only be activated if the immediate predecessor node in the SBP definition is
active. However, we must take the control flow rule routing into account (AND and XOR nodes).
We use structural induction on the SBP structure.
 pred stateStep[bp:SBP, s,s’:ProcessState]{
 // a node n’ can only be active in s’ if some predecessor is active in s;
 // in that case the predecessor becomes inactive
 all n: Node| {
 let succs = SBP⋅succs[n]|{
 (s⋅state[n] = active and n in XorSplit)
 implies (becomesInactive[n,s,s’] and one n’: succs| s’⋅state[n’] = active)
 else (s⋅state[n] = active and n in AndSplit)
 implies (becomesInactive[n,s,s’] and all n’: succs| s’⋅state[n’] = active)
 else (s⋅state[n] = active and no AndSplit & succs)
 implies (becomesInactive[n,s,s’] and one n’: succs| s’⋅state[n’] = active)
 else (s⋅state[n] = active and some AndSplit & succs)
 implies (let asplit = succs & AndSplit |
 (all n": SBP⋅preds[asplit] | s⋅state[n"] = active)
 implies (s’⋅state[asplit] = active and all n": SBP⋅preds[asplit]|becomesInactive[n",s,s’]))
 }
 }
 all n’: Node| becomesActive[n’,s,s’] implies some n: SBP⋅preds[n’]| s⋅state[n] = active
 }
Say the process execution is in a given ProcessState s. The predicate implements this decision
by first looking at all the successors of any active node and distinguishes between several cases.
First, if the current active node in the current state is an XorSplit node then exactly one of the
immediate successors of the XorSplit is chosen non-deterministically and becomes active in the
next process state. It is necessary to deactivate the previously active node.
Otherwise, we check if the currently active node is an AndSplit. In this case we deactivate
the currently active node, then move into a new state where the successors of this state are all
active at once. Note that this implementation of the predicate ignores interleaving activations
of successor nodes, i.e., two successors are considered to be active at the same time, and the
situation where one is activated before the other (i.e., interleaved executions) is ignored. Note
that most of the complexity in checking business processes for compliance comes from this
interleaving. This hypothesis is designed as a simplification of the compliance problem tackled in
this work and allows us to focus our research on the design of a formal approach combining
structural and dynamic compliance requirements.
If the currently active node is neither one of those, then we look at whether this node has any
AndSplit among its successors. In this case, we deactivate the node, and activate a single one
of its successor nodes. Otherwise, in the case where some of the successors of the active node
are AndSplits (one or many), we define an intermediary construct called asplit which consists
of the set of successor nodes of the currently active node which are AndSplits and where the
predecessor nodes of these AndSplits are all active. We then deactivate all the predecessor nodes
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of the nodes in asplit and activate all the nodes in asplit.
One last condition for the predicate to work properly and generate valid execution traces
(we will see this in one paragraph further), is that for any node which is activated in the next
process state in the trace (s’), we have that at least one of the predecessors of this node in the
process which is active in the previous state (s).
Process Execution Trace
Equally important is the predicate which allows to generate valid execution traces of process
states. The trace signature carries two fields, one relating it to a sequence of ProcessStates, and
the other, called activeSets relating it to a mapping between an index of Ints and the set of Nodes.
This last field is very useful for easily retrieving the information on what node is currently active.
 one sig Trace {
 states: seq ProcessState,
 activeSets: Int →Node
 }{
 not states⋅hasDups // no duplicates states
 states⋅first in aInitState
 all i: states⋅inds − states⋅lastIdx | stateStep[SBP,states[i], states[add[i,1]]]
 activeSets⋅Node = states⋅inds
 all i: activeSets⋅Node | activeSets[i] = states[i]⋅activeNodes
 }
We define as signature fact the following constraints. We do not allow any duplicate process
states, which allows us to generate more full executions traces with a minimum number of
process states. The first state on the Trace is a special state called aInitState defined further
down in this section. Moreover, all the process states ordered in the sequence states are linked
by the stateStep(SBP, state, state) predicate. This predicate simply says that a process state
transition exists between every two consecutive process states in the Trace.
The set of Ints in the domain of the activeSets field is exactly the same as the set of indices
of the states sequence of ProcessStates. Finally, the last constraint is that the set of nodes for a
given index i in the activeSets field is the same as the set of active nodes for a given ProcessState
in the sequence of states. These two constraints together guarantee that the states and activeSets
fields are always synchronized.
Consistency Constraint on Traces
We do not allow for any free hanging process states, i.e., possible process states which are not
contained in the trace. Such generated process states are useless for the verification of properties
on the process execution since they are not reachable.
 fact noOrphanStates {
 all s: ProcessState| s in Trace⋅states⋅elems
 }
Initial State in the Process Execution Trace
The process execution trace is initialized with a state called aInitState. In this latter state, the
only active node is obviously the start node.
 one sig aInitState extends ProcessState{}{
 // initially start node is active and no other node is active
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 this⋅activeNodes = Start
 }
4.4.1 Example of Executing a Simple System Model
We have seen earlier how to model a system model. We reuse the simple sequence example from
4.3.1.1 with a sequence of two tasks to illustrate an execution trace in Alloy. We create a new
Alloy module which we name sbp1ex (for execution of sbp1). We then import the Alloy module
where the trace-based execution semantics are modelled (SBPExec).
Code 4.4.1 (Snippet).
 module Examples/sbp1ex

 open SBPExec

 one sig nb1, nb2 extends NodeBlock{}
 one sig ase1, ase2 extends ASE{}
 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 this⋅@blockSeq = 0→nb1+ 1→nb2
 }

 fact{
 (nb1⋅node)⋅se = ase1
 (nb2⋅node)⋅se = ase2
 }

 pred show(){
 #Trace⋅states > 3
 }
 run show for 4
Then we declare the same signatures as in 4.3.1.1, without explicit instantiation of ASE
triples. We add one more constraint #Trace.states > 3 which forces the number of states to be
generated to be at least 4 states. The reason for the number 4 is that we know that executing
the SeqBlock will go through 4 states, and we want to force the Alloy engine to generate at least
these 4 states so we can have a complete trace.
In oder to show how to execute the example, we will have to use some advanced functionalities
of the Alloy tool. We obtain an average sized Alloy model which contains 20 atoms and 44
relation instances. This model can be more easily navigated if we use the projection functionality
of the Alloy tool.
Projection on a signature in Alloy allows us to only visualize those atoms which have relations
to an atom of that signature. If we project on the signature ProcessState, we may explore the real
state of execution of the process by looking into the relations that exist inside each ProcessState.
Most importantly, we want to look at the current execution state of every Node in a given
ProcessState. This execution state is encoded into the nstate(ProcessState, Node, ExecState)
relation.
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The following four Figures 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21 show the four projections in the order
of execution that allow us to follow the execution trace of the sequence block example. The
sequence is made up of four states in which a single Node is active and is in the following order:
Start, First Task (AseNode1), Second Task (AseNode 0), End. The order of the process states in
the process execution trace is encoded in the states relation defined in the signature Trace as
a sequence of ProcessStates. This is shown using the Alloy tree view on an instance in Figure 4.17.
Figure 4.17: Process Execution Trace - Tree View
In order to follow the execution of the system using ordered state, the reader can see the
current name of the state in the bottom middle part of each figure. These follow the order
shown in Figure 4.17. In each of the four figures, the currently active Node has a relation to the
NodeState atom SBPExec/Active (in grey in the figures).
For space reasons, we do not show the execution trace for the other system model examples,
as these follow a very similar pattern of modeling. The only difference between the trivial
SeqBlock example and the rest is that in the AndBlock we may have states in which several tasks
are active at the same time, in different branches of the AndBlock. The XorBlock examples do
not allow for this inside the XorBlock itself, unless an AndBlock is nested inside the XorBlock.
Figure 4.18: Process Execution Trace - Projection on ProcessState - First State
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Figure 4.19: Process Execution Trace - Projection on ProcessState - Second State
Figure 4.20: Process Execution Trace - Projection on ProcessState - Third State
4.4. Formalizing the System Execution Semantics 83
Figure 4.21: Process Execution Trace - Projection on ProcessState - Fourth State

Chapter 5
A Policy-Based Approach to
Regulatory Compliance Management
We need a puritanical rejection of the temptations of features and facilities, and
a passionate devotion to the principles of purity, simplicity and elegance.
C.A.R. Hoare.
In our approach to a language support to modeling compliance requirements, we rely on the
concept of business policy. In CoReL, a business policy is a concept encompassing a decision-
making element, as required by a compliance requirement. In this chapter, we introduce the
CoReL language for modeling business policies. We start by underlining the motivation and
the rationale behind the design of the CoReL language. Following the model-driven engineering
paradigm, we then introduce the abstract syntax of the language, and follow by an informal
explanation of the semantics of the language. The formal semantics are elaborated on in Chapter
6, while the concrete syntax is presented in Chapter 7.
5.1
CoReL Rationale
The design of the CoReL language is rooted in our study of RCM and of the required capabilities
for representing and reasoning on compliance requirements.
5.1.1 Another Look at the RCM Lifecycle
The lifecycle in Figure 5.1 shows the different steps involved in compliance management. These
include, among others, the specification (modeling), verification and enforcement of compliance
requirements.
Classical expectations on the language will be the ability to break down regulatory texts into
related and inter-dependent requirements. Reusability as well and meta-constraints on these
regulatory elements is also a concern of high importance, as well as any other strategies used to
deal with complexity and increase the flexibility of creation of compliance models using our
language.
However, this view of compliance is incomplete, without taking into account the source of the
compliance requirements to be managed as well as the systems and models that are impacted by
these compliance requirements.
There are many requirements guiding the design of CoReL. We take an agnostic approach to
the compliance requirement sources. This implies that CoReL must support multiple regulations
(concurrently during a compliance management initiative) and regulation types. Which means
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Figure 5.1: Simplified Regulatory Compliance Management Lifecycle- Interaction with a BPM
Lifecycle
that we do not represent concepts from a specific regulatory domain which, but wish to stay
as independent as possible, and not initiate our research by attempting to model a specific
regulation, as we previously did here [KS09].
CoReL must also support multiple types of rules and constraints, as well as multiple business
domains. In consequence, we cannot rely on a specific rule modeling language or a logic as a start
of the language. Last but not least, the ability to relate regulatory texts to the elements of the
(Enterprise) information system they impact must be considered, hence providing traceability
between the regulation model and the enterprise (or EIS) model. This is why we decided not to
setup our research in the context of a specific business process or enterprise modeling notation or
language.
5.1.2 Business Policies as a Semantic Bridge
In the light of the short discussion delivered above, an intuitive strategy vey often used in
computer science is to break down and isolate compliance requirements into small, simple, and
reusable components. Of course, it is obvious that "small" and "simple" criteria might be
interpreted differently and the assessment thereof depends on the usage scenarios. Nevertheless,
it is a strategy worth pursuing and evaluating in our work. The final chapters of this dissertation
will seek to validate this strategy.
We choose therefore to reify the regulatory compliance requirements by defining a generic
modeling concept that will represent bits of the compliance requirements contained in regulations.
This concept is what we call a Business Policy. This objectification consists of representing
the compliance requirements contained in the regulatory text as separate entities with precise
semantics. We propose business policies as a means for this purpose, hence making business
policies a semantic bridge between the regulation (i.e. compliance requirements) and the
impacted enterprise models.
We also choose to define a set of concepts that will create the interface between the three
conceptual domains involved in compliance management, as shown in Figure 5.2: Regulation,
Business Domain (i.e. Enterprise Model), and Decision-Making. Section 5.4 will introduce these
concepts systematically.
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Figure 5.2: 3 Worlds Divide - Regulation, Enterprise and Decision Domains
5.1.3 Language Engineering
5.1.3.1 On Business Policies
A business policy differs from a constraint or any legislation of any kind. While laws for example
compel or prohibit behavior (e.g., a law requiring stating some conditions before a building can be
constructed), business policies merely guide actions towards desired states (of a system). In more
complex cases, business policies are used to align the institution’s behavior to a desired behavior.
The latter case can be understood as an institution’s desire to achieve or avoid a given state of
things, or, in a more complex case, come as close as possible to a given sequence of states of things.
To enrich our discussion of business policies, we might refer to the OMG’s definition of a
business policy. Here, the OMG defines a business policy by distinguishing it from a business
rule. The following quoted text is extracted from the SBVR1 standard document specification
[Gro08, Gro13]:
Compared to a Business Rule, a Business Policy tends to be less structured, less
discrete, and usually not atomic - that is, not focused on a single aspect of gov-
ernance or guidance. Also compared to a Business Rule, a Business Policy tends
to be less compliant with standard business vocabulary, and less formally artic-
ulated.(...) Business Policies provide broader governance or guidance that is not
directly actionable.
It is important to note the subtle difference to more rigid ways of behavioral control. Business
policies seek to force the organization to come as close as possible to the desired state of things.
Ideally, the organization’s behavior is exactly that which is the policy’s statement. Our view on
business policies is aligned on the distinction from rules given in the SBVR standard. In our
work, we propose in the coming chapters a concrete means for decomposing business policies into
small and semantically precise building blocks which shall allow policy modelers to combine
them in order to define business policies.
Example 5.1.1 (Business Policy I - Purchases Policy).
Many large companies have policies that all purchases above a certain value must be performed
through a purchasing process, or by a set of distinct individuals fulfilling a given number of
conditions (e.g., second set of eyes policies).
1Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Rules
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Business policies may be described at various levels of abstraction, some are more concretely
implementable than others. The policy in Example 5.1.1 is very general so its implementation
will be dependent on the interpretation of the policy modeler or compliance responsible. Business
policies use a mix of preferences, interdictions, obligations, requirements on time, location or any
other variable of the state of things to express this guidance. If anything, business policies might
be best assimilated with guidelines to achieve given business objectives.
Example 5.1.2 (Business Policy II - California Hybrid Cars).
In past years, the numbers of hybrid cars in California has increased dramatically, in part because
of policy changes in Federal law that provided 1500$ in tax credits (since phased out) as well
as the use of high-occupancy vehicle lanes to hybrid owners (no longer available for new hybrid
vehicles). In this case, the organization (state and/or federal government) created an effect
(increased ownership and use of hybrid vehicles) through policy (tax breaks, highway lanes).
The definition of a business policy usually follows some intent, such as some desired
behavioral change. In the previous example, the intent we may infer is that the government
wants to support re-orientation of drivers’ choice of cars towards electrical cars. This may be in
order to diminish the impact on the environment of car gas emissions. However, ensuring that a
business policy indeed leads to such a change in behavior is another, very complex, matter.
Most of the time, policies are instituted to avoid some negative effects (which may have
been observed in the institution) or to seek some positive benefit. Not accessorily, organizations
also use business policies to describe how the organization should react to deviations from the
desired behavior or state of things. Before we define a business policy, we must first define a
more fundamental concept, decision-making :
Definition 5.1.1 (Decision-Making).
By decision-making we mean whether to { allow, force, prohibit, dispense (from)} a given Subject
to undertake an Action on a given (organizational) Entity.
In this dissertation, we will use the following definition of a business policy:
Definition 5.1.2 (Business Policy).
A business policy is the representation of a regulatory compliance requirement in the form of an
enforceable guideline to decision-making.
In Definition 5.1.2, we use the term ’enactable’. By that we mean something which can be
represented in a form that makes it operationally usable, i.e., executable, or enforceable, etc,
either automatically or by a given instrument such as a human or an institution. Let us take the
following example. In China in 2013, the country’s government decided to increase taxes on real
estate possessions of people possessing two homes or more 2. This was one amongst many other
measures to fight the inflation in real estate prices in the county. However, this led to a dramatic
increase of divorces all over the country. The reason was that people used a tiny inconsistency in
the law, allowing divorced couples possessing two homes to sell one of these two without paying
taxes. The money thus spared can reach the tens of thousands of euros. The people were openly
saying they wanted to divorce, sell their real estate, and remarry afterwards. Here the cause for
trouble was at least a combination of two factors: (i) a somewhat uncanny dependency between
different policies (which possibly happens more often than one would think) as well as (ii) an
unconsidered reaction of the policy objects when trying to enforce a given business policy. The
2http://bit.ly/WJY5f1. In French. Retrieved on the 7th of March 2013.
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point here is that in the absolutely general context, managing business policies is certainly a
challenge.
Wrap-Up The previous discussion leads us to assume that here is a semantic divide between
regulations on the one side and rules or any logical and structured representations (e.g. rules,
constraints) of decision-making on the other side. Moreover, business policies naturally exist at
this boundary between the two worlds, but suffer from a number of shortcomings making them
useless for automated compliance management. In this scenario, business policies shall represent
the atomic decision-making elements implementing a regulation, and business rules shall be the
formal means for representing business policies by grounding them in some form of logic. The
objective of CoReL is to provide a formal and engineered language for business policies.
5.2
A Deeper Look at Compliance Requirements
5.2.1 The Semantic Gap in Existing RCM Solutions
In Figure 5.3, we show that classical approaches proceed so that constraints are extracted directly
from regulations and formally modeled in logical formalisms (i.e. compliance requirements are di-
rectly translated into formal constraints). The wide semantic gap between the regulation domain
and the formalism domain, raises at least two issues. First, the abrupt jump from regulation
documents to constraints risks loss of information that mere constraint specification fails to
express. Examples of such information include the applicability conditions of the constraints,
as well as the consequence of violating the constraints. Second, Business Users (BUs) who in
fact play a key role in the context of RCMmodeling, are hardly able to work with formal languages.
Figure 5.3: Semantic Gap Between Compliance and Logic Modeling
In CoReL another approach is followed. Regulation documents are first ’concretized’,
i.e., interpreted by legal experts and formulated into a set of guidelines called Compliance
Requirements (CRs). Concretized CRs are not a proper concept to CoReL and are widely
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mentioned in literature, sometimes referred to as ’internalized’ CRs. Such concretization is
necessary as regulations are kept abstract on purpose, in order to allow wide adoption by a
variety of bodies. Each concretized CR contains (i) the impacted EM elements, (ii) the constraint
placed on these elements, (iii) the associated violations and eventually, (iv) the required
recovery mechanisms in case of violation of these constraints. Then every CR is modeled as a
CoReL policy which is further implemented by CoReL rules. Roughly, CoReL rules represent
the constraints classical approaches produce. A very similar methodology is introduced in
[SGN07]. However, we claim that our approach seeks to encompass compliance requirements into
decision-making elements which can be combined, and directly enforced on executing business
processes. On the other hand, the work in [SGN07] rather seeks to organize the compliance en-
gineering work methodologically and create a link to the strategic aspects of managing compliance.
We do not view RCM as a binary problem, i.e., CoReL supports associating several violations
to the same CR. Concretely, a company may have to accept that a given violation of a CR
happens in case it estimates that preventing this violation will cost too much or hinder a growth
opportunity for the company. But it may in this case define a way to recover from the violation.
This is an example of the aspects of compliance management which rather pertain to risk
management.
Also, a measure of compliance is necessary to allow BUs to judge situations a company finds
itself in. Such measures can be defined generally for BP models [LSG08]. Furthermore, as every
company is different, a custom quantification of compliance is desirable as part of the reporting
component of a RCM solution. The violation models used in CoReL allows to define customized
compliance quantifications.
5.2.2 Coping with Regulation Complexity
For the sake of usability, an RCM solution should also provide features to tackle the inherent
complexity of regulatory compliance modeling which mainly comes from two sources: (i) logical
formalisms used to express constraints are too complex to be used directly by Business Users
(BUs), (ii) the number of CRs one has to handle in RCM is usually overwhelming.
To handle this complexity, CoReL modularizes policies to enable easy reuse. A CoReL policy
consists of the following parts: (i) an ASE triple, which represents the impacted Enterprise
Model (EM) elements, (ii) a context, which models the applicability condition of a policy, (iii) a
control, which models the constraint which is enforced by the policy, and (iv) a set of violations.
For each violation, an optional recovery can also be associated. All these constructs are defined
as building blocks for creating policies. We will see in Section 5.4 how the various reusable
building blocks of a policy definition are defined and used. In addition, CoReL provides a
graphical notation and makes use of a repository to enable reuse of police building blocks.
5.2.3 2D Classification of CRs
Widely studying literature around the topic of RCM, we observe different types of CRs are
tackled using different approaches. We collect and classify the categories of CRs encountered
in literature along two dimensions: the type of logical formalism used and the artifacts of the
enterprise model considered.
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Definition 5.2.1 (CR Categories - Logical Formalism Dimension). We distinguish three types
of CRs along this dimension: structural, temporal and contractual, defined as follows:
1. Structural CRs (SCRs) are constraints which hold over the static (structural) part of
an EM. For example, a certain document’s size must not exceed a certain number of pages. OCL
is an example of language used to model these CRs.
2. Temporal CRs (TCRs) express temporal dependencies between execution states of
a BP. For example, if a customer deposits cash on his bank account, then this amount should
eventually show up on his account balance. CTL and LTL are examples of formalisms used to
model these CRs. Some formalisms extend classical temporal logics with real-time, such as MTL,
to be able to express timing constraints.
3. Contractual CRs (CCRs) express duties, rights and commitments that EM elements
hold over each other. The obligation to pay a fee every month for a user of an online DVD
rental service is an example. Contractual CRs are typically found in contracts and usually require
modal (e.g., deontic, alethic) logics to be modeled, such as FCL [GM05] and SBVR [Gro13].
More complexity is introduced when handling mechanisms for violation exceptions are introduced,
which implies non-monotonicity. Some CCR languages allow to define valuations CCRs and
their violations.
Other works have acknowledged this difference and compared languages belonging to the
three types of logical formalisms. In [ETvdHP10b, ETvdHP10a], the expressiveness of LTL3 and
CTL4 for temporal CRs and of FCL5 (a deontic logic-based language) for contractual ones are
compared. SCRs can be expressed in temporal logics using the AG operator (Always Globally)
of CTL or the OB operator (Obligation) of deontic logic. TCRs extend SCRs with temporal
operators while CCRs extend SCRs with deontic modalities. Languages which can be used for
CCRs are SBVR [Gro08] or FCL [GM05]. Languages which can be used for TCRs are CTL,
LTL, CTL* [CK08] or µ-calculus. Finally, another layer of complexity is added when structural,
temporal and contractual aspects of compliance requirements are combined, as in this example
which mixes all three types into one statement: all purchase orders must be verified by an auditor
after they have been authorised by a purchaser officer, and before the purchase order is acted upon.
Furthermore, another challenge in RCM is the fact that grasping a company through its
EM requires taking several business perspectives into consideration, such as the organizational
structure, the usage of resources, the management of goals and objectives, quality, security, risks,
etc. We refer to these aspects as the Enterprise Business Aspects (EBAs). A framework for RCM
would ideally act as a prism for regulation along the EBAs. Unfortunately, most approaches
for CR modeling either stay at a formal level, i.e., no EBA is considered in particular, or
at best tackle one EBA, sometimes partially [ACPP11, KL08, SM02, OZD08, PHM+09, KKPP10].
Definition 5.2.2 (CR Categories - EBA Dimension). We identify three types of CRs for
illustration purposes along this dimension: informational, resource usage and organizational,
defined as follows:
3Linear-time Temporal Logic
4Computation Tree Logic
5Formal Contract Language
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1. Informational CRs target the attributes describing an EM element. For example, the
size of a document that is transfered between process tasks.
2. Resource Usage CRs express constraints that must hold before, during and after using
a resource. Examples of resources are web services, persons, databases, etc. Examples of usage
are allocating, sending, printing, accessing, etc.
3. Organizational CRs express constraints on the organizational elements such as roles
carrying out BP tasks, or departments where the processing of a BP task is located. The
well-known segregation of duty (SoD) problem is an example.
5.2.4 Coverage of 2D CR Space
One aim of research should therefore be the capbility to cover the two dimensions of CR modeling.
The following Table 5.1 gives a broad qualitative evaluation of the maturity of existing approaches
to RCM projected over the two dimensions elicited above. We see that structural CR modeling
is the most supported by research, while works on contractual CRs modeling seem to concentrate
on the informational type. Generally speaking, RCM solutions would gain at being extended
along the EBA dimension. Moreover, we can observe that merging the expressive capacities of
logical formalisms is a desirable feature. An example of merging structural and temporal CR
languages is the research stream seeking to combine OCL and CTL as in [MO07].
Table 5.1: Distribution of Approaches Along the 2 Dimensions
Structural Temporal Contractual
Informational  IS G# IT G# IC
Resource G# RS G# RT # RC
Organizational G# OS G# OT # OC
Legend: Degree of Satisfaction
 Excellent G#Good #Unsatisfactory
5.3
A Running Example: Printer Usage
5.3.1 The Example Process
The BPMN [OMG11] model in Figure 5.4 shows a simple process defining the usage of a university
printer by university users. The first pool is called "User" and shows a sequence of tasks that the
user needs to execute in order to print a given file. The second pool is called "Printer" and shows
the tasks that the printer will execute in order to fulfill the user’s goal of printing a given file.
The file to be printed is transmitted between the two process actors (Subjects in ASE terms),
as represented by BPMN pools using messages6. The task Connect To Printer sends a message
to the printer with a connection request and the printer replies with a message acknowledging
the connection. In the following step, the task Send File sends the file to be printed to the
6BPMN messages are represented as dashed arrows with triangular empty heads that cross pools.
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Figure 5.4: The printer Example
printer, and the printer replies with a confirmation that the file was indeed fully printed.
The reader who is familiar with established process modeling notations such as BPMN will
recognize many similarities in the concrete syntax used here. The reduced set of modeling
constructs can be found across several notations. The pools (horizontal containers containing
a workflow) are a standard construct in BPMN and used in many tools or modeling eEPCs
[Sch00b]. The shapes looking like files (e.g., Print Ack) are so-called artifacts in BPMN and are
used to represent resources processed and messages sent in the process. The cylinder shape is
called a Datastore and is used to represent data persistence which can be accessed by tasks.
5.3.2 Compliance Rules
In the running example shown in Figure 5.4, we have two concurring business process pools.
One models the process executed by a printer, and the other represents the behavior of a printer
user. The system administrator, after reading the regulation, defines a list of such CRs based on
his knowledge and experience. Table 5.2 lists a purely illustrative set of such CRs, in order to
give the reader an impression of the range of constraints we wish to be able to model.
In order to model the previous CRs, we will show in the rest of this chapter how to use the
CoReL language. We introduce the syntax of the language and give an informal account of its
semantics in the following sections. In the last section of this chapter, we will come back to
the process example introduced here and show how a set of CoReL models can be created to
represent a given set of CRs.
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Table 5.2: Compliance Requirement Examples
CR Definition
CR1 External students cannot print on university printers. Regular and exchange
students can.
CR2 Students are prohibited from printing on the week-end. Faculty members can.
CR3 Students are limited to 400 pages a month, with a bonus of 50 pages if it is their
first month at university. Every student who prints less that 30% of his allocated
print pages over a whole semester can receive a 5 euro waiver ticket to use the
university’s swimming pool.
CR4 Faculty members can print up to 2000 pages a month. Faculty members are
allowed a violation of the max number of pages if it amounts to less than 10%, in
which case they are warned per email. In case they exceed the number of allocated
pages by more than 10% pages, their access to printers is stopped.
CR5 All these policies are active over the academic calendar semester for non-faculty
members, they are not allowed to print outside of these months.
CR6 If it is discovered that a non-faculty member has accessed printers from outside
university computing centers, her account is blocked. If the intruder has no account
on the university’s systems, then the incident must be logged and a notification
email is sent to the system administrator.
CR7 No rewards for low printing faculty.
5.4
Abstract Syntax
5.4.1 Abstract Syntax
This section introduces the abstract syntax of the CoReL modeling language. An abstract syntax
consists of an Abstract Syntax Metamodel (ASM) and associated constraints. The abstract
syntax metamodel of CoReL is given in Figure 5.5. For the sake of understability, we group
the language elements into four blocks shown in Figure 5.5 as dashed boxes. We structure the
introduction of the ASMs concepts along these blocks.
The Policy Block represents concepts related to the elements of the enterprise model for
which the policy is defined, the Decision Block includes concepts that model how the compliance
check is conducted, the Recovery Block models how the compliance decision acts on the enterprise
model. The following paragraphs concisely introduce each element of the three blocks. The core
concept in the metamodel is the Policy. We further refine the definition of Policy in the following
definition:
5.4.1.1 Policy Block
Regulation
A Regulation is used to represent the origin (the
regulatory text) of the CR modeled by the Pol-
icy.
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Figure 5.5: CoReL Metamodel [in ECORE]
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Compliance Requirement
A Compliance Requirement (CR) is the textual sub-element of a regula-
tion chosen by the policy modeler. A CR may be of various granularities.
Typically, a CR is a paragraph of a law, or of a contract. Selecting
a CR from the regulation requires expert knowledge of the regulation as well as the expected
complexity of the modeling effort of this CR. This is why this step is best realized by a CoReL
and a regulation expert together. Every CR is modeled formally as one CoReL Policy.
Policy
A Policy has a deontic modality (Permission, Prohibion, Obligation). A
one-to-one relationship links a CR to a Policy. A Regulation represents
the origin of the CR modeled by the Policy. A CR in always linked to a
single Policy. Various metadata attributes are associated with the policy
and carry information such as the creator identity, the policy manager, date of creation, date of
first instantiation, any specific risks it mitigates or internal controls it implements, etc.
5.4.1.2 ASE Block
ASE Triple
We call (Action,Subject,Entity) an ASE-Triple [MEKEP11]. The
definition of an ASE-Triple maps Action to an enterprise model action,
which in our approach applied to the business process domain, is a business
process task/activity, and maps both Subject and Entity to any element of
the enterprise model capable of executing the Action, resp. on which the Action is executed.
Subject and/or Entity can possibly be defined as empty (nil). Definitions similar to our
ASE-Triple concept exist in research around policy languages [Kag04] but not in literature
around enterprise regulatory compliance management (i.e., compliance defined for enterprise
models).
Definition 5.4.1 (Action). Every element of the system is either an object or an action. An
action can be implemented by any subject on any entity.
Definition 5.4.2 (Subject). Every object can carry the role of a subject if it is capable of
executing an action.
Definition 5.4.3 (Entity). Every object on which an action can be taken is therefore carrying
the role of an entity.
Subject and Entity are subtypes of the abstract class Object. An Object has a set of Qualifiers.
The latter is the concept used to model properties specific to an Object. It is possible to express
that a given Subject has a business role by mapping one of the Subject’s Qualifiers to the business
modeling language specific concept of Role.
For instance, we might assume that the business process modeling notation for which we
model CoReL Policies supports business roles for Subjects. Or else, let us assume a metamodel
extension of CoReL that defines a business model. An example is given in Figure 5.6. In this
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Figure 5.6: Example of a Business Model Extension of ASE
exemplary metamodel it is sufficient to define a relation (i.e., an Ecore eReference in the Figure)
between the Employee and a Role, and another relation from Employee to a class ClearanceLevel.
We thus incept the semantics of an ASE triple as follows:
Semantics of an ASE Triple Be the predicate: Action (Subject,Entity). We define an
ASE triple as: (ASE) ≜ [A (S,E)]. In plain English, we say that Subject S takes Action A on
Entity E.
5.4.1.3 Decision Block
The decision block encapsulates the decision-making elements of the CoReL language. First,
we define the concept of Rule in CoReL, followed by those of Context, Control and Violation,
ViolationDecision, ViolationValue and ViolationTypes.
Rule
The concepts of Context and Control (see below) build upon the Rule concept. Concretely, a
Context and Control can only be evaluated if both the ASE triple and the Rule statement
that refers to Action, Subject and Entity are provided. The Rule formula must be evaluated.
Otherwise, the policy cannot be interpreted and therefore is not enforced.
Definition 5.4.4 (CoReL Rule). A rule in CoReL is a logical statement written in a rule language.
The variables in this statement are enterprise model objects as well as actions (elements). A
variety of rule languages may be used as CoReL rules. For instance, in many rule languages, the
general form of rules is: Antecedent→ Consequence, where Antecedent and Consequence are
logical propositions.
If the antecedent part is set to True, then the rule becomes a simple constraint. Any rule
language that expresses rules following this format is adequate for use within CoReL. In [PAN04],
the reader will find a comprehensive overview of the logics and languages used to define rules. In
many of the examples used throughout this thesis, the language we will use is first order logic to
express rules.
A Rule in CoReL may be written in various formalisms (LTL, CTL, FCL, OCL, etc.) and is
denoted by: R<Name><Formalism>, where < Name > is the name or ID of the Rule and < Formalism > ∈
{’LTL’, ’CTL’, ’FCL’, ’OCL’, ...} tells the formalism used to express the Rule.
Example 5.4.1 (Propositional Rule).
This rule checks whether a variable Date is the current day and is a week-end day, and whether
98 Chapter 5. A Policy-Based Approach to Regulatory Compliance Management
the user is a student. User is defined as a sub-type (set inclusion semantics) of Subject.
Given predicates: Weekend(Date), T oday(Date), Student(Subject).
R1Prop = Weekend(Date) ∧ Today(Date) ∧ Student(User)
Example 5.4.2 (OCL [Obj10] Rule).
We express the constraint on the Student class that each of its instances be limited to a total of
500 pages to print.
context Student
inv max_spare_pages : self⋅pages_to_print < 501
Example 5.4.3 (Temporal (here CTL [BK08]) Rule).
This rule states that the ConnectToPrinter action must always be eventually followed by the
execution of the Print of the Reject Actions (or both) at least once.
R2CTL = AG[ConnectToPrinter → EF(Print or Reject)]
Example 5.4.4 (Contractual (FCL [GM05]) Rule).
This rule states that every student who prints a file has the obligation to have enough credit to
print all pages of the file. Otherwise, if the student still prints this file, he will have to pay for
the number of pages of the file separately.
R3FCL = Print(student, file) → OBstudent Credit(file) ⊗ OBstudent Pay(file).
Context
The Context of a policy formally models the state of the system in which
or the set of elements on which the policy is applicable. A Context is
implemented in our language as a Rule.
The context describes under which conditions a policy becomes active, i.e., under which
conditions it needs to be enforced. Contexts are used to further refine the constraints that must
hold so that the associated policy can be enforced.
For instance, imagine that we want to express a CR on printer users who are students, and
we would like this CR to be only applicable on the weekends. For the ASE-Triple defined as(Action,Subject,Entity)↦ (SendFile,User,F ile), we model a Policy P , with context CPolicyx
defined as:
Example 5.4.5 (Context). Given predicates:
Weekend(Date), T oday(Date), Student(Subject)
We define the Context named CPolicyx as:
R1Prop = Weekend(Date) ∧ Today(Date) ∧ Student(User)
CPolicyx = R1Prop
Control
The Control specifies the constraints that must hold
on the enterprise model. A Control is no differ-
ent from a Context in that it is expressed as a
Rule.
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The following example expresses in the control that faculty members cannot print more than
2000 pages. The context states that the printer used must be in the realm of one of the university
laboratories, as we do not want the quite large printing credit of faculty to also hold for the
printers of the central administration of the university for example.
Example 5.4.6 (Control).
R1Prop = PrinterInLaboratoryRealm(Entity)
CPolicyx = R1Prop
CPolicyt = R
2
Prop
R2Prop ∶ Faculty(Subject)→ PagesLEQ2000(Subject)
Violation
The violation has a rule, which when evaluated to true enforces a policy
recovery. Several Violations can be modeled for a Policy, each of which
maps an evaluation of the Rules in the Policy Control part to a given
violation value.
Violation Value and Violation Type
The violation values are defined in a violation type. A violation type is a set of violation values. For
example, the following enumeration: {Red, Orange, Yellow, Blue, Green, Gray} defines a violation
type called traffic lights7. Each of the enumeration values constitutes a violation value (e.g., Red).
Lights Violation Type
Figure 5.7: Violation Type - Lights - Discrete Set of Violation Values
Violation Decision
The CoReL models do not provide functionality to model complete decision making. The
lacking modeling functionality is the mapping between the different possible valuations of a
policy’s controls and the corresponding violations. Violations are defined directly for a policy.
This decoupling between violations and controls allows to reuse CoReL models for defining
different decision-making tactics by modifying violation decisions for the same policy. We define
Violation Decision here:
Definition 5.4.5 (Violation Decision). A Violation decision is a mapping function between the
set of controls and the set of violations.
V iolationDecision ∶ 2Controls ↦ 2V iolations.
It is made out of two functions ViolationValuation and ViolationMapping:
V iolationV aluation ∶ 2Controls ↦ V iolationV alues.
V iolationMapping ∶ 2V iolationV alues ↦ V iolations.
7This is actually a semantic violation as normally traffic lights define 3 discrete values, not 6.
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A Violation Diagram defines two mappings: (i) from combinations of control valuations
(i.e., truth valuations of the control rule) to a violation value, and (ii) from a (set of) violation
values to a violation. The violation diagram is application specific and is built by CoReL policy
modelers. In the CoReL tool (cf. Chapter 7), we implemented one example of a discrete violation
type, called the traffic light type in Figure 5.7. More complex types of violation types and
corresponding valuation functions can be defined by relying on utility theory from economics (as
used previously in [LAS+06, SL05, LS06]), and this has already been used to define expressive
business policies which use multiple valuation modeling strategies for policies such as continuous
functions and fuzzy logic [EK07].
Violation MappingViolation Valuation
Figure 5.8: Violation Diagram
Le us consider a simple example, shown in Figure 5.8. Take a policy P , let the policy have
two controls. The violation type used with P is defined by the traffic light type. The user may
model a Violation of value Orange if the control PAC3_CT rule returns False, and Y ellow if
the control PAC4_CT rule returns False. If either one of the control rules is evaluated to true,
we compute the Green violation value.
For this example, we decide not to map the Green valuations to any violation (e.g., for
modeling rewards). Note that according to our function-based definition of violation mappings,
we constrain the violation model to map any of the two Green violation values to the same
violation, as these two shapes in the diagram are in fact two occurences of the same violation
value. We may map the Orange violation value to the PAC3_V L violation, and the Y ellow
violation value to the PAC4_V L.
In theory, we would be better off modeling a mapping from all possible control rule truth
valuations to a violation value, but we decided not to force a complete modeling of this mapping
in violation diagrams, in order to quicken the modeling process.
An example of expressing complex valuations is the valuation to a Red violation value in
case each rule in both controls are evaluated to False. Finally, we may map the Red violation
value to a complex violation called PAC_CV L1.
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The reader will have noticed two important aspects of our design choices. First, the choice of
the violation type is crucial. In terms of expressiveness, the smaller this violation type is, the
more limited the number of violation mappings we may express. Second, we could easily make
the violation decision function more expressive by proceeding to two modifications of CoReL:
(i) defining the domain of this function to be the control rules instead of controls, and by (ii)
allowing a control to have several rules. We voluntarily made the choice of limiting a control to
a single rule for the sake of avoiding non-essential complexity in introducing the results of this
work, as such an extension of CoReL is trivial.
5.4.1.4 Recovery Block
After computing a violation value, a function will decide whether to and how to recover from the
Violation. The Policy must also produce an execution decision (e.g., Resume/Stop) to send out
to the business process execution engine.
Before a decision is taken with regard to the process execution, a corrective action can be
taken after the violation has been identified. For each Violation, CoReL allows to specify a
step called Violation Recovery which triggers additional corrective actions. To this purpose, we
distinguish different types of Violation Recoveries: Handling, Compensation and Reparation.
Handling
Every Violation has a (possibly empty) set of Handlings used to
react to the violation. A Handling always triggers some specific
informative action, such as the execution of a function that calcu-
lates penalty points, or an action that sends notification emails. A
violation represents a deviation from ideal behavior, as expressed by the Control in the
policy. The deviation might be regarded as positive and therefore is encouraged, or as
negative and therefore must be discouraged. ’Positive’ Violations are named Reward and
’negative’ violations are named Penalty. In the remainder of the thesis, we may use the word
Sanction to refer to Penalty, the two terms are equivalent. Both Sanctions and Rewards
are special types of Handlings (indicated by inheritance in the metamodel of CoReL in Figure 5.5).
To the policy modeler, Rewards are used to model how to react positively to the Violation,
and Sanctions, on the opposite, are used to model negative reactions. Note that in CoReL,
Rewards and Sanctions are modeled in the same way, the only concrete syntax difference is the
color of the symbol lines: red for Sanctions and blue for Rewards. One could see the sanction
and the reward as two different modalities of violation expressions. This means a violation
can at the same time define a reward and a sanction. This modeling freedom increases the
expressiveness of the framework.
For example, a policy modeler can assign a Reward to a Violation with value Green that
increases some rating given to the user of the printer. Alternatively, the policy modeler can
assign a Sanction to the printer user that decreases his rating if the Policy decides that he
caused a Red Violation. The actions used in the definition of Handling are application-specific,
provided by the business model and are to be selected by the CoReL policy modeler.
A Handling can directly trigger the checking of another policy, thereby bypassing the context-
based activation of a policy. This is the way CoReL models decision propagation.
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Compensation
A Compensation is a corrective action that introduces no change to the
system (i.e., the enterprise or process model). Unlike a Handling, it does
not operate on system entities such as users, user accounts etc. This
is the subtle conceptual difference between handlings and compensations. Concisely put, a
Compensation is a corrective action operating on the outside boundary of the system. It is
neither a Reward nor a Sanction.
A classical example is that of a pharmaceutical company whose drugs have harmed patients.
A Compensation might be a financial subsidy and/or taking in charge the medical treatment of
the damages caused by the drug.
Reparation
Apart from informative reactions which are modeled by a Handling, a
Policy can trigger the execution of an action that will modify the system.
This action is undertaken by a third party (i.e., not the policy engine) and
in effect, modifies the enterprise model, for example modifying a business processes.
Reparations specify a controlled modification of the business process model as already
proposed in similar fashion in Namiri’s work [Nam08]. Reparations are meant to allow the user
to model a modification to the enterprise model that he thinks will make a violation less likely
to occur again. Intuitively, the use of reparations would make more sense at run-time as a
mechanism to define adaptive business processes. Here, one could distinguish (one-time) changes
made to a running instance of a business process from (permanent) changes made to the process
model itself, thereby impacting all future instantiations of the latter. In this work, we consider
the second scenario.
Figure 5.9: Process Compensation Illustration
A Reparation action might be implemented as a process task that can be weaved into the
business process model. Figure 5.9 illustrates the concept of Reparation in process models on a
state chart. The difference to a Violation Handling is that the actions that may be triggered by
the latter are not corrective actions as is the case for Reparations.
5.5. Informal Semantics of CoReL Policy Interpretation 103
The semantics of Reparations are business modeling language specific and undergo some
consistency rules. One of such rules is that the join point where the Reparation action is weaved
into a business process cannot be reachable from the current active task in the execution of a
business process .
5.4.1.5 Wrap-Up
In this section, we gave a first introduction to the CoReL policy modeling language. We listed
the most important concepts from the abstract syntax model, which are necessary to understand
the functionalities supported by the language. We also introduced the semantics of the language
informally, illustrated by a small example.
5.5
Informal Semantics of CoReL Policy Interpretation
5.5.1 Policy Governance
We say that a policy governs the behavior of a system, i.e., of a business process. It does this by
governing an ASE triple instances in the process (see Figure 5.10).
A:Action ......
S:Subject
E:EntityDo(A,S,E) Done(A,S,E)
P: Policy
ASE
Governs
Doing(A,S,E)
Figure 5.10: ASE Triple - Predicates
A CoReL policy uses mechanisms to govern a business process execution. These mechanisms
have been introduced in the previous chapter. The most important ones are the Context, Control
and Violation concepts. We explain how these constructs are used by CoReL. The formal
semantics can be found in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.1.
5.5.1.1 Policy Activation
A context defines when a Policy becomes Active. This is illustrated in Figure 5.11, where S
stands for System (e.g., the business process), and P stands for Policy.
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Waiting Active
[Instantiate(S,P)]
[Kill]
[Decision_Closed(S,P)=True]
[(ASE(S,P) && 
Context(S,P))=True]
[Context(S,P)=False]
Figure 5.11: Policy State Machine - Context Semantics
After being instantiated, a Policy becomes ready for activation. When active, a policy will
make decisions. A Policy will become Active only if the ASE on which it applies is being
executed. Another condition is that the Context of thePolicy must be evaluated to True on the
System and the Policy. The P (Policy) parameter here allows to access all information about the
policy such as the ASE.
When the Policy has taken its decision and the decision has been implemented, we say the
policy decision is closed. In this case, the Policy returns back to its passive Waiting state.
5.5.1.2 Policy Decision
Inactive Activated
Propagating Violated
[Instantiate]
[Context()==True]
[Control()==False]
[Control()==True]
[Decision_Taken()==True]
[Kill]
[Context()==False]
[Decision_Propagated()==True]
Figure 5.12: Policy State Machine - Decision Making & Propagation
In Figure 5.12 we explain what is meant by Policy Decision. Once the Policy is active, it will
decide whether there is a violation or not, depending on the boolean valuation of the Control. In
fact, this definition is only adequate if we have a single Control for a Policy. In the most general
case, we have a Violation function which computes a violation value out of the valuation of all
the Controls.
This step is followed by a decision-making step where all the required actions that must be
taken are computed, as well as whether to resume the execution of the process or interrupt it.
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So the decision is the tuple made of the execution decision, and the recovery actions to be taken.
Once a decision is taken, it must be enforced. We call this propagating the decision. Once the
decision has been propagated, the Policy goes back into an inactive state.
5.5.2 Enforcement of Authorization Policies
After explaining how the policy activation and decision mechanisms work with policy modeling
constructs, this section shows how the enforcement of authorization policies is done.
5.5.2.1 Single Violation Authorization
Authorization policies are either Permission or Prohibition. Authorization policies are
so-called punctual policies, which means that the policy compliance decision is made at
the same time the policy is evaluated. That is why authorization policies are simpler in
nature compared to other types of deontic modalities. The behavior of a permission policy
is explained in Figure 5.13. Note that the behavior of a Permission policy is symmetric
with the behavior of a Prohibition policy since one can be expressed in terms of another:
Permission(Doing(a, s, e)) ≜ (notProhibition(Doing(a, s, e))).
Inactive
Active
RecoveredViolated
Fulfilled
Activated
[ Context()==True ]
∀ (Control_1; ..; Control_k) | Eval(Control_i) ∈ {T}
Abstract
Instance
Defined
Handling_Sequence={∅} && 
Compensation_Sequence={∅} && 
Reparation_Sequence={∅}
Execution_Decision ∈ {T/⊥};
Handling_Sequence={h1; ...; hn};
Compensation_Sequence={c1;...;cm};
Reparation_Sequence={r1;...;rk}
[ instantiate()]
Figure 5.13: CoReL Policy - Permission State Machine - Single Violation
After being activated, the policy is either violated or fulfilled. In case it is violated, it must
be recovered immediately if a recovery is defined. Otherwise, the policy stays in the violated
state and terminates its own execution carrying an appropriate execution decision.
5.5.2.2 Multiple Violation Permissions
The previously introduced state machine is only valid in the case where we assume we consider a
single violation. However, one of the peculiarities of CoReL is to support multiple violations.
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Inactive
Active
Recovered
Fulfilled
Activated
[ Context()==True ]
∀ (Control_1; ..; Control_k) | Eval(Control_i) ∈ {T}
Abstract
Instance
Defined
Execution_Decision ∈ {T/⊥}
Handling_Sequence={h1; ...; hn}
Compensation_Sequence={c1;...;cm}
Reparation_Sequence={r1;...;rk}
Violated V1
Violated V2
Violated Vn
Handling_Sequence={∅} && 
Compensation_Sequence={∅} && 
Reparation_Sequence={∅}
Viol(P,Control,ASE)==v1
Viol(P,Control,ASE)==v2
Viol(P,Control,ASE)==v3
[ instantiate()]
Figure 5.14: CoReL Policy - Permission State Machine - Multiple Violations
Figure 5.14 shows the state machine for this case. The only difference to Figure 5.13 is
that there are multiple state transitions from the active state to a given violation state. These
transitions are decided by the violation function.
5.6
Modeling A Simple Business Process Printer Management Regulation
Table 5.3 gives the CRs defined by the system administrator for controlling the use of the
university printers. The various CoReL elements can be reused (e.g., an ASE-Triple or a
Violation reused by several Policies). We will begin by creating a regulation diagram, and follow
by creating CoReL policy diagrams implementing each of the policies in the regulation diagram.
Table 5.3: Compliance Requirement Examples
CR Definition
CR1 External students cannot print on university printers. Regular and exchange
students can.
CR2 Students are prohibited from printing on the week-end. Faculty members can.
CR3 Students are limited to 400 pages a month, with a bonus of 50 pages if it is their
first month at university. Every student who prints less that 30% of his allocated
print pages over a whole semester can receive a 5 euro waiver ticket to use the
university’s swimming pool.
CR4 faculty members can print up to 2000 pages a month. Faculty members are allowed
a violation of the max number of pages if it amounts to less than 10%, in which
case they are warned per email. In case they exceed the number of allocated pages
by more than 10% pages, their access to printers is stopped.
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Out of this set of compliance requirements extracted from a textual source, we create
the regulation model shown in Figure 5.16. The regulation model simply lists all compliance
requirements linking each one to the policy implementing the CR.
Figure 5.15: CoReL - Printer Example - Regulation Model
In Figure 5.17, we model the first CR. These diagrams are accessible by right-clicking on the
policy in the regulation model and selecting ’Jump To Policy’. This opens the CoReL policy
model assigned to the policy object in the regulation model. Only one policy model can be
assigned at a time, but the tool allows to change the policy model assignments.
Figure 5.16: CoReL - Printer Example - Accessing an Assigned Policy Model
In Figure 5.17, we model the first CR. The diagram describes that in the context where a
printing action is executed by a user who is an internal student, the control is always true and
therefore a permission to execute the action is decided by the policy, The small green symbol on
the policy shape describes the deontic modality of the policy and in this case tells the user that
the decision of the policy is going to make is a permission.
However, another more concise and elegant way of modeling this same policy is given in
Figure 5.18. In this model, the context is absent, which means it does not need to be checked.
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Figure 5.17: CoReL - Printer Example - Modeling CR1
The context is therefore evaluated to be holding all the time. We change the control to express
the constraint that the student must be internal. We keep the same permission deontic modality
for the policy. The ASE will stay the same across all the policy diagrams in this printer example.
Figure 5.18: CoReL - Printer Example - Modeling CR1 - second alternative
We see that the previous policy is just one decision element described in the CR1. We need
to model the other part, which concerns external students, in Figure 5.19. This policy simply
says that in all contexts, when the control part, stating that the subject is currently an external
student, holds, then we must enforce a prohibition to execute the ASE.
Figure 5.19: CoReL - Printer Example - Modeling CR1 - External Students
In order to model CR2, we need to use the same ASE as previous, define a context
holding only on the week-ends, and define as a control the constraint that the subject is
not a faculty member. By setting the deontic modality of the policy PAC2 to be a pro-
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hibition, we guarantee that when the control holds the policy will decide not to resume the process.
Figure 5.20: CoReL - Printer Example - CR2
In fact, this policy is not an accurate implementation of the CR, simply because it uncovers
an implicit assumption made when interpreting the CR, which is that we only have student
and faculty users, and therefore, only allowing faculty means not allowing everyone else. It is
important to notice that we do not define a violation here, which means that the decision of the
policy must be enforced immediately.
This means the process will be aborted if the user currently printing on the week-end is
a faculty member. This is obviously not what we want. What we would like to model is the
following statement: ’when the user currently printing is not a faculty member, then this cannot
be on a week-end day’. If we set the context to hold when the user is not a faculty member, and
the control to hold when the printing happens on a week-end day, we can express the desired
decision-making we want. We model this in Figure 5.21.
Figure 5.21: CoReL - Printer Example - Corrected CR2
The CR3 is more complex than CR1 and CR2 since it specifies violations as well as violation
handlings, see Figure 5.22. In case the control (constraining the number of extra printing pages)
is violated, we must enforce one of the two specified violations each having a handling as a
recovery. Both recoveries in this case are rewards for low printing. One missing violation is when
the user prints more than 400 pages. Since there is no violation defined for this case, it is not
allowed, and the policy will not take the decision to permit the ASE to happen, it will abort the
process.
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Figure 5.22: CoReL - Printer Example - CR3
Finally, CR4 is different in that it defined a single possible violation with two distinct
sanctions (see Figure 5.23). Both sanctions are enforced concurrently and can be implemented
outside the policy engine as system calls.
In this section, we illustrated some of the expressiveness of CoReL using a set of simple
compliance requirements for printer management. However, many questions are still raised as to
the formal semantics which describe policy enforcement using CoReL. The following chapter 6 will
answer open questions regarding the formal semantics for policy interpretation and enforcement.
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Figure 5.23: CoReL - Printer Example - CR4

Chapter 6
Semantic Foundations of CoReL
My very conscious desire to reduce the demands made on reasoning is undoubtedly the result of
my professional experience as a programmer, but the seed has been sown nearly thirty years ago,
when I received from my mother the shortest and wisest lesson in Mathematics. Being asked by
me what "Trigonometry" was all about and whether it was difficult, she answered: "Oh no, it is
not difficult: know the formulae, and whenever you seem to need more than five lines for a
problem, try something else, for in all probability you are on the wrong track.
E. W. Dijkstra. Homo Cogitans - A small study of the art of
thinking. 1975.
In this chapter we introduce a formalization of the metamodel of the CoReL language by
giving the language operational semantics. This formalization is done declaratively using the
Alloy language. For background on the Alloy formalism used please consult Section 2.3.
6.1
Formalizing CoReL
6.1.1 Formalizing the CoReL Abstract Syntax Metamodel
The Rule Module
This very simple module is used to model CoReL policy rules. For a rule, we need to know the
language it is written in, the formula that represents the rule constraint, as well as the target
objects. However, for pure policy evaluation in a declarative formalism, these constructs are not
compulsory.
 module rule

 open ase
 open util/boolean

 sig Rule{
 eval: Bool
 }
 pred Rule::holds{
 this⋅eval⋅isTrue
 }
We can model Rule evaluation using a boolean field called eval. Unless we specify it to behave
otherwise, the Alloy engine will generate a state space where the value of this field can be either
True or False. This can be used in the general state space exploration case. Then, we model a
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predicate holds for Rules which just returns True in case the boolean value of eval is equal to True.
Contrarily to the CoReL metamodel in Chapter 5, in this Alloy module, there is no need to
specify the rule statement as this is application-specific. In concrete policy examples in Alloy, we
will show how to define such application-specific rules. There is also no use in specifying the
formalism used for the rule, as we will use Alloy expressions in first order logic to implement
rules in our formalization. We do not claim that rules written in first order logic are enough
to express the wide range of compliance requirements we consider in this thesis; we will show
that combining rules in first order logic with the semantics defined for CoReL allow to express a
combination of deontic modalities and first order statements.
Policy Constructs
The CoReL module given below requires to import the ase, sbp and rule Alloy modules. Then
the abstract signature for Policy is declared with the following relations: governs which relates
to an ASE, context and control, which both relate to a Constraint (we will explain this signature
in the next paragraph), and a violation field. We follow in this signature the structure given by
the abstract syntax metamodel of CoReL.
 module corel

 open ase
 open sbp
 open rule as fl

 abstract sig Policy{
 governs: ASE,
 context: Constraint,
 control: Constraint,
 violation: Violation
 }
Policy Governance
Here, we will declare some useful Policy predicates which are needed for the state machine
semantics of Policies. The governs(ase) predicate says that a given ASE is governed by the policy.
 pred Policy::governs[a:ASE] {
 a in this⋅governs
 }
 pred Policy::applies[s:SBP] {
 some a:ASE | a in sbp/getAses[s] and this⋅active[a]
 }
The last predicate declaration is called applies(SBP) and tells whether a Policy currently is
applying (i.e., must be evaluated) in a given SBP process. A Policy applies means its Context
and Control parts (the Constraints) must be evaluated. A Policy is said to apply in a business
process whenever it governs an ASE, and this ASE is currently being executed (i.e., is in an
active state).
Policy Evaluation
The Policy evaluation is conducted when evaluating the constraints expressed by policy Rules.
This is needed when evaluating Controls and Contexts. For this we use a signature Constraint
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which embodies a sequence of Rules. We define the holds() predicate that tells when a constraint
is complied with. It simply means that all Rules in the sequence hold (see the holds() predicate
of Rule).
 sig policy_eval{}

 abstract sig Constraint {
 rules: seq Rule
 }
 pred Constraint::holds{
 all r: this⋅rules⋅elems| r⋅holds
 }
Policy Violation
We model the Violation for the simple case of a single violation. We denote dv for default
violation. We have two predicates defined on a Policy: violates_dv(ase) resp. violates_dv(sbp)
which describes the state when a Violation dv is computed for a given ASE resp. a given SBP.
The implementation of violations is application-specific and will be illustrated in Chapter
9 in a case study. However, the definition of a default violation in CoReL is straightforward.
When the ASE is active, and the context holds but the control does not, we have a violation.
The second predicate checks in the SBP for any ASE which is violated and concludes that the
SBP is in a state of default violation too.
 pred Policy::violates_dv[a:ASE]{
 this⋅active[a] and this⋅context⋅holds and not this⋅control⋅holds
 }
 pred Policy::violates_dv[sbp:SBP]{
 some a:ASE | this⋅violates_dv[a]
 }
Policy Decision
We define two basic execution decisions called resume and abort, the names are self-explanatory.
We also model the decision() function which returns the decision on execution by the Policy.
In the following Alloy code snippet, we illustrate the decision function by defining the positive
default decision that the process should resume execution normally no matter whether we have a
violation or not.
 abstract sig PolicyDecision{}
 one sig resume, abort extends PolicyDecision{}

 fun Policy::decision: PolicyDecision{
 resume
 }

 abstract sig ExecutionDecision {}
 one sig Abort, Resume extends ExecutionDecision {}
 }
6.1.2 Formalizing the CoReL Execution Semantics
In this section, we define the semantics of Policy enforcement. We define how the states of a
policy are calculated during the execution of a sbp.
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CoReL Policy States
The first step in the formalization is to define an abstract signature PolicyState. We also define
the following possible concrete policy states: inactive, active, fulfilled, violated, weaklyFulfilled,
recovered.
 module CoReLexec
 open corel
 open SBPexec

 abstract sig PolicyState{}
 one sig inactive, active, fulfilled, violated, weaklyFulfilled, recovered extends PolicyState{}
Policy States
The signature PolState defines a mapping from all Policies to their current PolicyState defined
above. We also define two Alloy functions on PolState: state(Policy) returns the current state of
a given Policy, and policiesInState(PolicyState) returns all Policies which have as a current state
the PolicyState (e.g., active) given in parameter.
 some sig PolState{
 pstate: Policy →one PolicyState
 }
 fun PolState::state[p: Policy]: PolicyState{
 p⋅(this⋅pstate)
 }
 fun PolState::policiesInState[s: PolicyState]: set Policy{
 (this⋅pstate)⋅s
 }
Compliance State
Here we define the overall state of the system, in terms of compliance, which we conveniently
call ComplianceState. The ComplianceState is a composite state of both the ProcessState (the
state of the SBP as defined in sbp_exec in Section 4.4) and the PolState (the state of all Policies).
The system’s (business process’s) execution semantics are defined in terms of a history of
ComplianceStates. We have to initialize the system’s execution with an initial ComplianceState
called cInitState. In this state, all Policies are inactive and the process is in the initial state
aInitState (where the only active node is the Start node).
 some sig ComplianceState{
 processState: ProcessState,
 polState: PolState // states of policies
 }
 one sig cInitState extends ComplianceState{}{
 processState = aInitState
 all p: Policy| policyState[p] = inactive
 }
 fun ComplianceState::policyState[p: Policy]: PolicyState{
 (this⋅polState)⋅state[p]
 }
 fun ComplianceState::activePolicies: set Policy{
 (this⋅polState)⋅policiesInState[active]
 }
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Two functions are defined on the signature ComplianceState. The function policyState(Policy)
returns the state of a given Policy given in parameter. The function activePolicies() returns the
set of all Policies which are active.
Consistency of Compliance States: Process States
We have to guarantee that we have no orphan process states. This means, there exists no
ProcessState which is not in the processState field of the ComplianceState.
 fact noOrphanProcessState{
 ProcessState in ComplianceState⋅processState
 }
State Transitions - Compliance State Transition Machine
For every state transition between the state signatures defined above, we model two predicates
for the Policy signature.
The first predicate’s name follows the pattern condBe-
comes<NameOfState>(ComplianceState). This predicate is used to model the transition guard.
For instance, for the transition guard condBecomesActive, we say the guard becomes True if and
only if the Policy is currently inactive and there exists an ASE which is governed by the Policy
in the SBP which is currently active.
The second predicate’s name follows the pattern becomes<NameOfState>(ComplianceState,
ComplianceState). This predicate models when a Policy actually switches states from a
ComplianceState to another ComplianceState’. For example becomesActive(ComplianceState,
ComplianceState) models the state transition from inactive to active.
The same explanations hold for the guards and transitions:
• From active to fulfilled. The transition is enabled (guard is True) when the Policy is active
and the Context as well as the Control hold.
• From active to violated. The transition is enabled when the Policy is active and the Context
holds but the Control does not hold.
• From active to weaklyFulfilled. The Transition is enabled when the Policy is active and
the Context does not hold.
 pred Policy::condBecomesActive[s: ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = inactive and some a:ASE | (a in s⋅processState⋅activeNodes⋅se and this⋅governs[a])
 }
 pred Policy::becomesActive[s,s’:ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = inactive and s’⋅policyState[this] = active
 }

 pred Policy::condBecomesFulfilled[s: ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and this⋅context⋅holds and this⋅control⋅holds
 }
 pred Policy::becomesFulfilled[s,s’:ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and s’⋅policyState[this] = fulfilled
 }

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 pred Policy::condBecomesViolated[s: ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and this⋅context⋅holds and not this⋅control⋅holds
 }
 pred Policy::becomesViolated[s,s’:ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and s’⋅policyState[this] = violated
 }

 pred Policy::condBecomesWeaklyFulfilled[s: ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and not this⋅context⋅holds
 }
 pred Policy::becomesWeaklyFulfilled[s,s’:ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] = active and s’⋅policyState[this] = weaklyFulfilled
 }
Policy State Transitions
The predicate condTransition(ComplianceState) defined on Policies tells whether a given state
transition is enabled. While the predicate stateUnchanged(ComplianceState, ComplianceState)
also defined over Policies tells whether the state of a Policy remained unchanged between two
different ComplianceStates s and s’.
 // some transition is possible for this policy in state s
 pred Policy::condTransition[s: ComplianceState]{
 this⋅condBecomesActive[s]
 or this⋅condBecomesFulfilled[s]
 or this⋅condBecomesViolated[s]
 or this⋅condBecomesWeaklyFulfilled[s]
 }

 pred Policy::stateUnchanged[s,s’:ComplianceState]{
 s⋅policyState[this] =s’⋅policyState[this]
 }
Compliance State Transitions
The predicate complianceStep(ComplianceStep, ComplianceStep) models the transition from one
ComplianceState to another. ComplianceState transitions work along the following principle:
every time a Policy can enact a policy state transition as part of its decision making process,
it has precedence and no process state transition is executed until all active policies have
reached a locking state where no policy state transition is possible anymore. Once this state
is reached, process state transitions are executed as defined in the sbp model, until a new
Policy state transition becomes possible again, and thus the process execution is halted once more.
The predicate works as follows:
• If there is no Policy state transition that is applicable then we have a state transition in
the process states as defined in the Alloy module sbpexec while all policy states remain
unchanged.
• Or else, there is at least one policy state transition enabled. In this case, we ensure that all
policy state transitions which are enabled are actually executed.
• In order for the model to work properly, we must add the fact that no policy state transition
is executed if and only if no policy state transition is enabled. Without this latter statement,
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we might obtain model instances where we have policy state changes although no policy
state transition was enabled.
 pred complianceStep[s,s’: ComplianceState]{
 (no p:Policy | p⋅condTransition[s])// no policy transition applicable
 implies (stateStep[SBP, s⋅processState, s’⋅processState]
 and all p:Policy| p⋅stateUnchanged[s,s’]
 )
 else // at least one policy transition applicable
 (s⋅processState = s’⋅processState and
 (all p:Policy |
 ((p⋅condBecomesActive[s] iff p⋅becomesActive[s,s’]) and
 (p⋅condBecomesFulfilled[s] iff p⋅becomesFulFilled[s,s’]) and
 (p⋅condBecomesViolated[s] iff p⋅becomesViolated[s,s’]) and
 (p⋅condBecomesWeaklyFulfilled[s] iff p⋅becomesWeaklyFulfilled[s,s’]) and
 (not p⋅condTransition[s] iff p⋅stateUnchanged[s,s’])
 )))
 }
Compliance Trace - System Execution Semantics
As said earlier, we define the execution semantics of a business process as a trace of Compli-
anceStates embedding the process and policy state transitions. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1,
where we have look at one example of a ComplianceTrace made of ComplianceStates. Each
ComplianceState is composed of the ProcessState and the PolState.
ComplianceState m+k+2ComplianceState m+1+kComplianceState m+2ComplianceState m+1ComplianceState m
ProcessState 
PRi
ProcessState 
PRi+1
...
PolState 
POj+1
PolState 
POj+k
ProcessState 
PRi+2
...
PolState 
POj
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POj+k
...
Figure 6.1: Compliance Trace - Illustration
We define the singleton signature of ComplianceTrace as a sequence of ComplianceStates.
We add as signature facts that the first ComplianceState must be the special state named
cInitState. We also add that each two adjacent ComplianceStates must be linked to one another
by compliance steps, as defined in the ComplianceStep predicate above.
 one sig ComplianceTrace {
 states: seq ComplianceState,
 }{
 states⋅first = cInitState
 all i: (states⋅inds − states⋅lastIdx)| complianceStep[states[i], states[add[i,1]]]
 }
 pred ComplianceTrace::valid[i: Int]{// compliance trace valid up to state i
 all j: (this⋅states)⋅inds | lt[j,i] implies complianceStep[this⋅states[j], this⋅states[add[j,1]]]
 }
Finally, we add the predicate which tells whether the ComplianceTrace is valid up to the
index equal to the Int value given as parameter. This predicate simply verifies that for every
two consecutive states in the ComplianceTrace sequence, whose indices are smaller than the Int
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parameter, the ComplianceStep predicate holds. That is, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, these two
consecutive ComplianceStates are linked with an arrow.
Helper Functions - Compliance Trace
Again, we define here some functions useful for writing other parts of the formalization. The
processStates() function returns all the ProcessStates contains in the ComplianceTrace. The
lastState() function returns the currently last ComplianceState in the ComplianceTrace.
 fun ComplianceTrace::processStates: set ProcessState {
 this⋅states⋅elems⋅processState
 }
 fun ComplianceTrace::lastState: ComplianceState {
 this⋅states[this⋅states⋅lastIdx]
 }
Consistency of Compliance Traces
We also define a noOrphanStates fact in order to ensure that all generated ComplianceStates in
the Alloy instance state space are contained in the ComplianceTrace.
 fact noOrphanStates {
 all s: ComplianceState | s in ComplianceTrace⋅states⋅elems
 }
6.2
Applying of the Formalization: Printer Example - Access Control
In this last section of this chapter, we introduce the printer example used earlier in Alloy, and
model a small regulation for it. The code which is defined here must normally be written by
the CoReL and Alloy expert. At a later stage in this thesis (in Chapter 8), we show how the
CoReL framework allows to generate this business domain Alloy code, thereby complying with
the principles of model-driven software language engineering.
We will start by defining the business model including the specification of all ASEs involved
in the compliance modeling. Then we model the system model by defining the SBP. We follow
by defining the compliance model, which corresponds to the policies needed. Once we have these
steps completed, we have all we need to make Alloy generate the state space, so that we can
check its compliance. We do this by defining assertions in the body of the Alloy specification.
First we create a new module for our example:
Module Header
 module printer_ac

 open CoReLexec
 open sbpexec
 open util/integer as integer
The module is called printer_ac and it imports the sbpexec and CoReLexec as well as the
library util/intereger modules.
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6.2.1 The Business Domain Model
In this section, we will define the various actions, subjects, entities needed to model the example
using Alloy. We define four different actions, two subjects, and two different entities. The
properties of the subjects are defined as signature fields. For instance a user subject has a
user_type which is either internal or external.
Defining the ASE Elements of the Business Model
 one sig connect, authenticate, send, print extends Action {
 }

 one sig user extends Subject{
 credit_pages: one Int,
 type : one user_type
 }{
 credit_pages = 3
 type = internal_student
 }


 one sig printer_S extends Subject {
 realm: one String
 }{
 realm = "university"
 }
 one sig printer_E extends Entity {}
 one sig file extends Entity{
 num_pages : one Int
 }{
 num_pages = 2
 }
 abstract sig user_type{}
 one sig internal_student extends user_type{}
 one sig external_student extends user_type{}
Defining the ASEs
Once we have built the separate business domain elements needed, we can combine them in
distinct ASEs. We define four ASEs in this simplified version of the printer example as a fact by
setting the different fields of an ASE to the appropriate action (a), subject (s), entity (e).
 one sig ase_authenticate, ase_send, ase_connect, ase_print extends ASE{}

 fact{
 ase_send⋅a = send
 ase_send⋅e = printer_E
 ase_send⋅s = user
 ase_print⋅a = print
 ase_print⋅e = file
 ase_print⋅s = printer_S
 ase_connect⋅a = connect
 ase_connect⋅e = printer_E
 ase_connect⋅s = user
 ase_authenticate⋅a = authenticate
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 ase_authenticate⋅e = printer_E
 ase_authenticate⋅s = user
 }
6.2.2 The System Model
The last step before moving to the compliance modeling is the modeling of the SBP. We do
this simply by creating all the required NodeBlocks to which we assign ASEs using a specific
Alloy fact. Then we create the Blocks we need. In this simple version of the printer ex-
ample, we only consider a single AndBlock (ab1) containing two different SeqBlocks (sb1 and sb2).
Then we define the sequence blocks by setting the blockSeq field of the SeqBlock. This is done
by setting the mapping between the Ints used to index the blockSeq. For the AndBlock, since
there is no order on the two blocks it contains, we set the blockSet field thereof to be the union
of the two SeqBlocks.
SBP
 one sig printer_bp extends SBP{}
 one sig nb1, nb2, nb3, nb4 extends NodeBlock{}
 fact {
 (nb2⋅node)⋅se = ase_send
 nb4⋅node⋅se = ase_print
 }
 one sig sb1 extends SeqBlock{}{
 blockSeq = (0→nb1)+ (1→nb2)
 }
 one sig sb2 extends SeqBlock{}{
 blockSeq = (0→nb3)+ (1→nb4)
 }
 one sig ab1 extends AndBlock {}{
 blockSet = sb1 + sb2
 }
6.2.3 The Compliance Model
We first define the rules we will use in the Policy definition, then we specify the Policy constructs.
Rules
We have two rules which inherit from the Rule signature. The pac_rule_cx models the rule for a
Context while pac_rule_ct models the rule for a Control. Each has different field set, but both
define how their evaluation is to be computed through a signature fact. For instance the formula
eval.isTrue iff p.realm =′ university′ for pac_rule_cx says that the Context is evaluated to
True if and only if the printer belongs to the university administration realm.
 one sig pac_rule_cx extends Rule{
 p:printer_S
 }{
 eval⋅isTrue iff p⋅realm = "university"
 }

 one sig pac_rule_ct extends Rule{
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 u:user,
 f:file
 }{
 eval⋅isTrue iff not (integer/gte[u⋅credit_pages,f⋅num_pages] and u⋅type in internal_student)
 }
Policy
Finally, we can define a simple Policy, which has a Context and a Control. First, the printer_policy
has one Context called pac_context and one Control called pac_control. Each of these two fields
is defined as a separate singleton signature with one field set which is the rule. For the latter, we
use the Rules defined above.
 one sig printer_policy extends Policy{}{
 pac_context = this⋅@context
 pac_control = this⋅@control
 }
 one sig pac_context extends Constraint{}{
 this⋅@rules = (0→pac_rule_cx)
 }
 one sig pac_control extends Constraint{}{
 this⋅@rules = (0→pac_rule_ct)
 }
 fun printer_policy::decision: PolicyDecision{
 (this⋅@context⋅holds and this⋅control⋅holds) ⇒ resume
 else interrupt
 }

Chapter 7
CoReL Concrete Syntax
This chapter shows how the CoReL framework is supported by a tool suite built using model-
driven technologies. We also show some of the various editors implemented as part of the
framework reported on in this thesis.
7.1
The MaRCo Tool Suite
In order to support our CoReL framework with appropriate tooling, we have built a purely
model-driven tool suite in our lab. The implementation of this tool suite was a collaborative
effort and not solely the work of the author of this thesis1. The tool suite is based on the Eclipse
framework. It is named MaRCo tool suite after the FNR2 funded project in the context of which
this thesis has been written. In Figure 7.1 we see the various components of the modeling layer
of the MaRCo tool suite.
CoReL Toolkit Architecture
CoReL Editors
Enterprise Modeling Editors
Regulatory    Compliance Checking
Policy
xBPMN
Regulation
Alloy
Figure 7.1: The Editor Architecture of the MaRCo Tool
In the MaRCo tool suite, we have three different layers: (i) CoReL policy editors, (ii)
Enterprise Modeling Editor, (iii) Regulatory Compliance Checking layer. There are several CoReL
editors, the first of which is the Regulation editor, which allows to create regulation models.
Then we have the core editor of the MaRCo tool suite, the CoReL policy editor, where policies
1Acknowledgements to Christian Glodt who implemented great parts of the comprehensive tool suite. His
excellent expertise in various MDE and Eclipse technologies in the production of this tool suite made timely
development of the tool possible.
2Fond National de la Recherche du Luxembourg. www.fnr.lu
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declared in the regulation model are defined. Also CoReL policies might be complex and require
to be modeled as a workflow (decision flow editor) or as complex policies using algebraic operators.
We have a second layer of modeling editors, the enterprise modeling editors. We group them
in two categories, the first one is the E3PC business process modeling editor, and the second one
is the set of modeling editors for enterprise business aspects. For instance, one of such editors
is the organizational modeling editor. This editor allow to model organizational entities and
relations among these, which are not included in the business process since not immediately
relevant for process execution. Users have the possibility to create such models separately
from E3PC as these belong to a different domain. The information stored in such enter-
prise business aspect models is relevant for the enforcement of policies on E3PC business processes.
The last layer of the MaRCo tool suite is the compliance checking layer; where we use
verification methods: (i) declarative formal modeling using small-scope hypothesis bounded
model-checking of Alloy, (ii) Algebraic Petri Net model checking using the model-driven Alpina
tool. Finally, in our hypothesis of work, it is possible to use third-party model-checkers provided
the adequate model transformation for feeding them the right input is implemented.
7.2
CoReL Symbols
In this section, we present the concrete syntax of CoReL. We proceed by first introducing a
summary of all the symbols used for concepts and the relations between concepts. Then we
describe the different diagrams used in the language.
7.2.1 Symbols Table
Table 7.1: CoReL Concrete Syntax Elements
Concept Symbol Description
Regulation The regulation symbol. A regulation may
contain or be contained in other regulations.
Compliance Requirement
Compliance requirement symbol. It
contains a description of the compliance
requirement and a name. It also has an
association to a Regulation.
Policy
The policy object (graphical shape) repre-
sents a business policy. It is the conceptual
encapsulation of a decision-making unit. In
order to be enforceable, a policy should
specify a deontic modality.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 7.1 – Continued
Concept Symbol Description
Obligation The obligation shape represents a policy
with an obligation deontic modality.
Permission The permission shape represents a policy
with an permission deontic modality.
Prohibition The prohibition shape represents a policy
with an prohibition deontic modality.
Rule
The rule compartment can be found in
several CoReL shapes and contains a
textual rule statement.
Context
The context shape contains a textual
description of the context definition for
documentation purposes. It also contains
a logical rule statement that allows to
evaluate when the context holds.
Control
The control shape contains a textual
description of the constraint described by
the control for documentation purposes.
It also contains a logical rule statement
that allows to evaluate when the control is
complied with or not.
Violation
A violation shape contains a textual
description of the violation as well as a rule
statement that allows to decide whether
the violation occurs or not. The rationale
behind this is that we may have several
different violations defined for the same
policy. We do not only consider the trivial
violation that does occur when the control
is evaluated to false.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 7.1 – Continued
Concept Symbol Description
Reward
The reward shape contains a textual descrip-
tion of the intention behind the reward as
well as an action statement to be executed
in order to implement the reward. The ac-
tion description is given in a pseudo-action
language for illustration purposes through-
out the examples in this thesis. The reward
shape is always linked to at least a violation.
Penalty
The penalty shape contains a textual
description of the intention behind the
penalty (i.e., sanction) as well as an action
statement to be executed in order to
implement the penalty. As for the other
type of handling (i.e., reward), the action
description is given in a pseudo-action lan-
guage for illustration purposes throughout
the examples in this thesis. The penalty
shape is always linked to at least a violation.
Compensation
As for all other shapes, a first compartment
contains the textual description of the com-
pensation, while the second one contains an
action to be executed. This action is not
relevant for the system model, as it happens
outside its boundaries. In our examples
we do not use a concrete action modeling
language, as it is outside the scope of our
research. Instead we use pseudo-code or
pseudo-predicates for describing actions.
Reparation
A first compartment contains the textual
description of the reparation, while the
second one contains an aspect which can be
weaved into a system model, such as a busi-
ness process model. The aspect represents
the change that has to be conducted in
order to implement the reparation recovery.
In our examples we do not use a concrete
aspect modeling language, as it is outside
the scope of our research. Instead we use
pseudo-code for aspects.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 7.1 – Continued
Concept Symbol Description
Connection
All connections that represent relations
between concepts as defined in the
metamodel are displayed as lines. The
type of the relation is attached to the
graphical connection. In the example
shown to the left, the relation between
the violation and the penalty is shown
as a connection carrying the ’handling’ type.
7.3
CoReL Diagrams
The CoReL modeling language encompasses several types of diagrams: (i) Regulation, (ii) policy
and (iii) violation diagrams. Regulation diagrams are diagrams showing the breaking-down of
regulation in terms of compliance requirements and the link between compliance requirements
and CoReL policies. The definition of a CoReL policy is created using a policy diagram, while a
violation diagram models the violation decision.
Using these three diagrams we can divide the modeling complexity into three steps. The
first step is about allowing the legal expert to proceed to an interpretation of the regulation
and extracting as well as structuring the regulatory text in compliance requirements to be modeled.
7.3.1 Regulation Diagram
The regulation diagram is the simplest of all CoReL diagrams. But it is also the only link between
the decision-making domain and the regulatory domain. It shows the hierarchical structure of a
regulation in terms of compliance requirements as is shown in Figure 7.2. A CR may also contain
other CRs.
Thereby, in the case of a regulation model defining a single regulation, we should obtain a
tree structure. However, in our work, we do not make the assumption that every CR extracted
from a regulatory document is unique, there may be redundancies. One example of such
redundant occurrences of a CR in a regulation, are cross-references that may be found inside a
regulation. That is one of the reasons why, in the CoReL design, CRs may be shared amongst
different regulations (see Figure 7.3).
Another reason for allowing sharing is that we see CRs as the interpretation that an
organization makes of elements of an official regulation that applies to its own business. Thus, an
organization may decide to interpret two slightly varying textual CRs contained in a regulation
as the same in its own context.
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Figure 7.2: Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 - Regulation Model Excerpt
Figure 7.3: CoReL - Multiple Regulations - Compliance Requirement Reuse
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Moreover, each compliance requirement which is a leaf in this structure has a unique Policy
diagram assigned to, which unambiguously defines its semantics. We introduce Policy diagrams
in the next section.
7.3.2 Policy Diagram
The policy expert has knowledge of the CoReL policy language and decision modeling, and
accessorily a fair knowledge of rule languages and/or logic. She joins effort with a business
expert who has good knowledge of the business processes and the organizational structure
of the enterprise. Together they produce CoReL policy diagrams for each compliance requirement.
A Policy diagram is the main diagram of the CoReL language. It gives the definition of
a single policy. It shows its context, control, rules as well as possible violations and applying
recovery(ies). In the following example we show a CoReL policy diagram from Section 5.6:
Figure 7.4: CoReL - Printer Example - Random Permission Policy
7.3.3 Violation Diagram
Violation diagrams contain three types of elements: controls, violation values and violations.
The connections mapping controls to violation values define a violation valuation function.
These connections carry a statement specifying under which condition the targeted violation
value is computed. The connections mapping the violation values to a single violation define the
violation mapping function. It is also possible to define complex violation valuations by either
mapping a set of controls to a violation value, or by mapping a set of violation values to another
violation value.
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Violation MappingViolation Valuation
Figure 7.5: Violation Diagram
7.3.4 Remarks on Diagrams
It is noteworthy to say, that the term ’diagram’ here should not let the reader ignore the
fact that regulation and policy diagrams are in fact formal models. We can consider each
diagram as a partial view of an underlying CoReL model. We use the term ’diagram’ because it
complies with the vocabulary used for the ECLIPSE platform on which our modeling tool is based.
We have now seen two of the CoReL modeling diagrams. These diagrams are the ones linking
the textual interpretation of a regulation document, describing its structure, to the set of policies
required to model this regulation.
Part III
Regulatory Compliance Verification

Chapter 8
CoReL’s Approach to Verification
Long-term commitment to new learning and new philosophy is required of any
management that seeks transformation. The timid and the fainthearted, and the
people that expect quick results, are doomed to disappointment.
William Edwards Deming.
This chapter explains the verification approach followed in the thesis and guides the reader
through the application of MDE principles in the verification of CoReL policies.
8.1
Creating System Models
8.1.1 A DSL for System Models
We need a concrete system modeling language in order to validate the modeling and checking
claims using CoReL. We designed a small language named xBPMN for his purpose. In
order to be able to quickly produce system models, an EMF editor was implemented in
the scope of this research. This editor relies on a slightly different implementation Ecore
metamodel from the conceptual one given in Figure 4.8 in Section 4.3, which can express exactly
the same workflows as those defined by the SBP language. The xBPMN language can also
represent a reduced set of subjects and entities. The metamodel for xBPMN is shown in Figure 8.1.
The models that can be created by this editor are a semantic superset of the SBP language
and show one way of how system models may be designed by business users. We chose a syntax
inspired by the BPMN [OMG11] language for illustrating how the semantic transition from an
established business process modeling notation into our formalization of system models may be
realized.
Note that some of the most important modeling constructs of BPMN, namely its rich
sub-language of events, has been left out as it is not relevant for our purpose. BPMN events are
considered as expert-level constructs and studies have already shown that a very reduced set of
BPMN process modelers are likely to use BPMN events in their process models [ZMR08]. It
constitutes however an interesting extension of the kind of systems we consider and certainly a
challenge for future work.
We chose BPMN because of two main reasons. It offers some possibilities to model operations
on resources such as Datastores (e.g., databases, files) or BPMN Messages (can be used to
represent general resources being exchanged among tasks). Also, the concepts of Pools and Lanes
in BPMN allow to structure the actors involved in carrying tasks and organize the workflow
accordingly.
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Figure 8.1: xBPMN metamodel in ECORE
Figure 8.2: The printer Example
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Pools and Lanes may be loosely used to represent Roles, Actors, Stakeholders, Responsibles,
etc. In xBPMN, we only consider Pools for the sake of simplicity. These latter modeling
constructs, allow us to model a reduced set of Subjects and Entites in a workflow, as prescribed
by the ASE paradigm. Actions are of course, represented by Tasks. See in Figure 8.2 for an
example of how these modeling constructs can be used.
In Section 8.3 on verification of compliance, we show how we use such modeling constructs
for generating internal formal representations of a system (i.e. in this case, an xBPMN model).
8.2
Description of the Approach
As said throughout this document, we follow a purely model-driven engineering approach. This
implies not only that we develop a formal modeling language but also that we provide model
composition and model transformations from this modeling language. In this section, we will
show which model transformations we use and why.
8.2.1 Binding CoReL and System Models
First, we must explain how it is possible to use the system and CoReL models jointly. As
explained in Chapter 5, we propose CoReL as a semantic bridge between the logic and the
business/regulatory domains. In this section, we explain how the concepts of Policy and ASE
help bridge the three semantic domains introduced in Section 5.1. This bridging is done thanks
to the concepts of Rule, Policy and ASE in CoReL, as illustrated in Figure 8.3.
ASEPolicy
Regulation 
Domain
Decision-Making 
Domain
Business 
Domain
Rule
Logic/Formalism 
Domain
Figure 8.3: Semantic Domain Bridging Through CoReL
The policy concept links the regulatory domain and the decision-making domain where
CoReL is based. The ASE concept links the decision-making domain and the business domain,
where he enterprise’s structure and its processes are described. Similarly, the rule concept links
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the decision-making domain and the logic domain.
More specifically, the semantic bridge between the decision-making domain and the business
domain is realized through ASE bindings (see Figure 8.4). In order to allow the policy modeler
to set values of ASE triples which are valid, a binding is required. This binding is realized at
the language (metamodel) level and defines a mapping between ASE triples and elements of a
business model.
Figure 8.4: ASE Binding at metamodel Level - Example
In the example of binding shown in Figure 8.4, we define a simple language level ASE-binding.
We do this simply using inheritance. For the example of xBPMN, we map Process Tasks to
Actions, Pools to both Subjects and Entities, and Artifacts (data objects in message flows) as
well as Data Stores to Entities. This allows the policy modeler to use xBPMN concepts in the
definition of ASEs.
The second step in defining a binding is the definition of Qualifiers. In the example in
Figure 8.4 we do this by defining a concept called QualifierMapping which defines a 1-1 mapping
between System Elements (i.e., Actions and Objects) and Qualifiers. Both are abstract classes as
shown in italic letters in the class name in Ecore.
One example of mapping is the definition of a role for all subjects. Roles are very widely used
to define security policies. There are two ways for defining such a mapping. The first way is by
re-defining the source and target relations defined for the class QualifierMapping for the class
RoleMapping, source pointing to Subject and target pointing to Role. The other way does no
require re-defining the source and target relations. It is implemented by constraining the classes
which the source and target relations of a mapping class (such as RoleMapping) point to in the
metamodel. If we implement this constraint directly in Ecore we might write them in OCL as
in code snippet 8.2.1. The same constraint may be directly implemented in Alloy in case the
formalization of the metamodel is done in Alloy.
Code 8.2.1 (RoleMapping Relation Consraint).
context RoleMapping
inv: self⋅source⋅oclIsKindOf(Subject) and self⋅target⋅oclIsKindOf(Role)
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8.2.2 Alloy-based Verification
CoReL has been equipped with a description of semantics expressed in Alloy, as such Alloy
constitutes the semantic domain for CoReL. This makes Alloy an obvious candidate for
verifying CoReL models on system models. Since we also provided a description of the
semantics of system models, as combinations of ASE and SBP models, in Alloy, it makes
the Alloy semantic domain the common integration formalism for both system and CoReL models.
Figure 8.5 shows the overall verification approach of the models used in the verification
approach. First, we define model transformations to generate Alloy descriptions of each of the
four mentioned types of models: system (i.e., in our case illustrated using xBPMN), regulation,
policy and violation models. This maps the business semantic domain to the Alloy semantic
domain. This generates an application-specific Alloy module.
The bottom part of the figure shows the Alloy module dependencies according to the use of
module imports (i.e., using the open keyword). The generated Alloy module must import the
CoReLexec module and possibly any set of libraries from the util library. In the next section, we
define the described model transformations.
8.3
Model Transformations
8.3.1 SBP to Alloy
In this section, we will introduce the model transformation rules we define for implementing
the SBP to Alloy model transformation. We specify a set of numbered transformation rules
given in Figure 8.7 to implement this model to text transformation. The pseudo-syntax uses two
character fonts, one in regular police (not bold) is used for transformation rule statements. The
other font is bold and in a different police from the transformation rule statements. The second
font is used for generating Alloy code, and such Alloy statements are always between two hypens
("<Alloy Code>"). The other model transformations are presented using the same convention.
Rules follow the definition underneath:
Definition 8.3.1 (Model to Text Transformation Rule).
Rule Number : Matched Pattern (in Model) ↦ Applied Pattern.
Each rule has a matching pattern (on the left side of Figure 8.7) which is what is matched
by the rule engine on the model instance to be transformed. On the right side, we find the
applied pattern, i.e., what is generated by the model transformation. The model transformation
has been defined here in a pseudo transformation language and has been implemented using
the Freemarker1 template language which is based on Java. Template-based transformation
languages are very often used for Model to Text transformations, because they easily support
recursiveness and especially because they use place holders embedded in generated code, which
can then be later filled with new code produced by other function calls. Other alternatives could
be languages such as JET2, Xpand3, Acceleo4. The choice of the language here is purely a
1freemarker.sourceforge.net
2www.eclipse.org/modeling/m2t/?project=jet
3wiki.eclipse.org/Xpand
4www.acceleo.org
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Figure 8.5: CoReL’s Approach to Design-Time Verification Using Alloy
8.3. Model Transformations 141
meter of personal preference of the researchers, so results can be reproduced with other languages.
In the following paragraphs, we will explain how each rule is to be understood. In order to
make sure the syntax of the rules is understood, we advise the reader to carefully revise the
metamodel for xBPMN earlier in the chapter in Figure 8.1. This is necessary to understand (using
class and relation names) the parsing and iterating through metamodel classes and relations.
Symmetrically, the reader may feel necessary to have a look at the Alloy code describing SBP
semantics in Chapter 4. This may be also necessary for the other model transformations we
introduce in this chapter.
Tasks
For every process task Ti we will generate three unary signatures. First, the T_i_nb signature
defines a single NodeBlock, while T_i_ase defines the ASE which will be put inside that
NodeBlock. Then, we finally define the T_i_a Action corresponding to Ti.
In a second phase, we must declare a fact which assigns the right ASE T_i_ase to the
T_i_nb NodeBlock. Following this, the rule may set the Action and Subject of the NodeBlock
T_i_nb. The Subject of T_i_nb is o course the process Pool variable. The right Subject name
will be set when the transformation rule mapping Pools fires (see the rule on the Pool pattern).
Pools
The pools are containers for the tasks executed by different stakehold-
ers. As this information is stored in SBP subjects, we do not need to
keep Pools. The first pattern matches only if we have several pools
and produces an AndBlock containing the respective workflows in
the Pool, each in a respective branch. The semantics of this pattern
are illustrated in Figure 8.6. We generate the same Alloy code we would have generated from
the AndBlock on the right part of the picture. After this rule fires, the $T_i.Pool() variable is
set to the signature P_i.
<…>
<…>
⟼
Figure 8.6: Multiple Pools Rule
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L1:  1. if #Pools > 1 ⟼ "one sig ab extends AndBlock {}{
L2:     this.@blockSeq = 0 -> "Pool[0].StartEndBlock" + … + k -> "Pool[k].StartEndBlock"
L3: }"
L1:  2. ∀ $T_i  in Task  ⟼ "one sig "$T_i.name"_nb extends NodeBlock{}
L2:   one sig "$T_i.name"_ase extends ASE{}
L3:   one sig "$T_i.name" extends Action{}"
L1:  3. ∀ $T_i  in Task ⟼ "fact{
L2:   ("$T_i.name"_nb.node).se = "$T_i.name"_ase
L3:   "$T_i.name"_ase.a = "$T_i.name"_a
L4:   "$T_i.name"_ase.s = "$T_i.Pool().name"
L5:   }"
L1:  4. ∀ $P_i  in Pool   ⟼ "one sig "$P_i.name" extends Subject{}"
L1:  5. ∀ $B_i in BlockElement:
L2:  Switch ($B_i){
L3:  case: $B_i in SequenceBlock ⟼ "one sig "$B_i.name"_sb extends SeqBlock{}
L4:      {blockSet = 0 -> "$B_i.name"_sb.subBlocks[0] + … + "$B_i.name"_sb.subBlocks[k]}"
L5:  case: $B_i in AndSplitJoinBlock ⟼ "one sig "$B_i.name"_ab extends AndBlock{}
L6:      {blockSet = 0 -> "$B_i.name"_ab.branches[0] + … + "$B_i.name"_ab.branches[k]}"
L7:  case: $B_i in XorSplitJoinBlock ⟼ "one sig "$B_i.name"_xb extends XorBlock{}
L8:      {blockSet = 0 -> "$B_i.name"_xb.branches[0] + … + "$B_i.name"_xb.branches[k]}"
L9:  }
L1:  6. ∀ $M_i  in Message  ⟼ "one sig "$M_i.name" extends Entity{}{"
L2:     (∃ $T_k | $M_i.source() == $T_k) ==> "T_k_ase.e = "$M_i.name"_e"
L3:     (∃ $T_j | $M_i.target() == $T_j) ==> "T_j_ase.e = "$M_i.name"_e"
L4:     "}"
L5:  7. ∀ $D_i  in Datastore ⟼ "one sig "$D_i.name" extends Entity{}{"
L6:     (∃ $T_i | $T_i.accessedDatabases().contains($D_i)) 
L7:     ==> $T_i.name"_ase.e = "$D_i.name"
L8:     "}"
Figure 8.7: SBP to Alloy Transformation Pattern Rules
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Blocks
Depending on the type of Block we match in the xBPMN pool, we apply a different pattern.
SequenceBlocks are mapped to SeqBlocks (see SBP semantics in Section 4.4), and the other
two types of blocks similarly. Then we set the blockSeq relation of each block. The only type
of Blocks where this is crucial are SeqBlocks since a SeqBlock actually describes the order of
execution of the ASEs. In the case of the AndBlock and XorBlock, it is sufficient to put all the
branches of each block into the blockSeq sequence in any given order. Moreover, according to the
formal Alloy SBP module, it is sufficient to define SeqBlocks, as setBlocks are directly derived
from SeqBlocks through flattening. Figure 8.8 gives an example for each type of Block.
one sig sb_1 extends SeqBlock{}{
blockSeq = 0 -> T1_nb + 1->T2_nb + 2 -> T3_nb
}
⟼
⟼
one sig xb1 extends XorBlock{}{
blockSeq = 0 -> T1_nb + 1->T2_nb + 2 -> sb_2
}
one sig sb_2 extends SeqBlock{}{
blockSeq = 0 -> T3_nb + 1->T4_nb
}
⟼
one sig ab1 extends AndBlock{}{
blockSeq = 0 -> sb_2 + 1->T3_nb
}
one sig sb_2 extends SeqBlock{}{
blockSeq = 0 -> T1_nb + 1->T2_nb
}
Figure 8.8: Mapping Blocks - Examples
Message
Finally, we get to the two types of En-
tities we can model in xBPMN. First,
messages are sent between tasks in
diferent pools. Messages in xBPMN
are inspired from a special type of
BPMN artifacts called Data Objects
[OMG11].
We can view a message exchange as two different ASEs happening concurrently and sharing
the same entity: the first ASE is about one task sending the message, and the second ASE is
about the second task receiving the message. The trick in defining the right applied pattern is
just to set the message as the Entity in the right ASE. This is done by accessing both the ASEs
where the Action/Task is the source resp. the target of the message.
As illustrated in Figure 8.9, a task sending a message to another, will cause the generation of
two consequent ASEs. The first ASE to execute will be with Action T1_S and Entity Resource
while the second ASE will have Action T2_R and the same Entity Resource. The extensions
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T1_S
T2_R
Resource ⟼
T1_S
T2_R
Resource
Figure 8.9: Mapping Sending/Receiving Messages
_S and _R used stand for Send and Receive respectively. We use an Alloy fact to force the
execution of T1_S then T2_R to follow this order, which we report on in detail in the next
chapter in Section 9.2.
For simplification purposes, we do not define complex messaging, i.e., sending and receiving
done by the same task, as the order in which the sending and reception must be interpreted are
not clear. Therefore, we always assume that a task either sends a message or receives it, but
does not do both at the same time.
Datastore
Similarly to messages, we also transform a matched Database (i.e., same
use as Datastore in BPMN) access pattern to the Alloy statement which
assigns the Database signature as an entity to the right ASE. We do
this by accessing the relation that links tasks to Databases. Note that
we use the existential quantifier in pattern 7 since we know that a
Database can only be accessed by a single task, according to the xBPMN
metamodel.
8.3.2 Regulation to Alloy
In this section, we will show how to transform regulation models into corresponding Alloy
code. This transformation is aligned with the approach described in 8.2. Regulation models are
important in order to know how to map policies and their violations to regulations, or to check
the compliance status of a whole regulation. This may be done by defining Alloy predicates
which check the current state of all policy atoms (in an Alloy instance model) accessible from a
Regulation atom.
The model transformation is shown in Figure 8.10. The transformation is divided in three
numbered rules separated by a line, and for each rule, an example of a matching pattern is shown
on the left side. Also, a full understanding of the pseudo-rule syntax used in the conceptual
presentation of the model transformation can only be achieved by careful understanding of the
metamodel for CoReL (see Figure 5.5), since the corresponding class and relation names are
used throughout the pattern rules.
The transformation tactics are straightforward and go as follows. In the first pattern rule, for
every regulation class in the metamodel we create a unary regulation signature. Additionally,
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every compliance requirement directly included in the regulation through the metamodel
relation containsCR is created as a unary signature and is assigned to this regulation using the
complianceReq relation.
For every compliance requirement which contains no other compliance requirement, called
leafCR in the transformation, and therefore may be linked to a single policy, we create a unary
compliance requirement signature. Then, in case this compliance requirement has a policy
assigned, we use pattern number 2. This leads to the generation of an Alloy code statement
setting the policy relation in the ComplianceRequirement signature.
The third pattern rule creates signatures for all the intermediary compliance requirements
which are not leaves in the Compliance graph structure (Line 4 in the transformation pattern).
The transformation starts by matching all the compliance requirements directly contained
in a regulation. For each one, it creates a list of all the indirectly contained sub-compliance
requirements. It does so by navigating through the relation named crContainsCR in the
metamodel. The transitive closure helper function recursively navigates through a given relation
and collects all the class instances it encounters until it can not navigate this relation anymore.
Such a function is a native operator in Alloy, and has been recently also implemented as part of
the OCL language specification [OMG06].
The transformation as we introduce it here deals with structures where we do not have a tree
of compliance requirements by not allowing for firing the same rule generating a compliance
requirement signature in pattern number 3. We represent this by using the Unique keyword in
line 4 of transformation pattern rule number 3. The statement on line 6 of pattern number 3
sets the subComplianceReq relation in the currently created compliance requirement, in case it
contains any sub-compliance requirements.
Pattern rule number 4 creates a unary policy signature for each policy concept it encounters.
This pattern is an exception in our transformation definition. We do not allow pattern number
4 to be applied. We have included it purely for illustration purposes of how the compliance
requirement implementation as a policy would be transformed. The reason for this is that we
assume that every policy modeled in a regulation model also has a separate CoReL policy model
assigned, and we do not want to declare policy signatures twice in the Alloy code, as this will
corrupt the Alloy module (the resulting set of Alloy modules would not be valid). As we will see,
it is a lot easier to create that policy signature in the transformation of CoReL policies since we
also need to map a policy to its definition elements such as control and context.
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L1:  1. ∀ $r in Regulation ⟼ "one sig "$=r.name" extends Regulation{}{
L2:         ∀ $cr in $r.containsCR  ==> 
L3:             $cr.name" in this.@complianceReq}
L4:  
L5:     one sig "$=cr.name" extends ComplianceRequirement{}"
L1:  2. ∀ $leafCR in ComplianceRequirement | !∃ $cr in ComplianceRequirement | $cr in $leafCR.crContainsCR
L2:  ⟼  "one sig "$cr.name" extends ComplianceRequirement {}{
L3:         ∀ $p in $leafCR.modeledByPol ==> 
L4:           this.@policy = 0 -> "$p.name
L5:     "}"
L1:  3. ∀ $cr in ComplianceRequirement | ∃ $r in Regulation | $cr in $r.containsCR
L2:  ⟼    ∀ $subCR in $cr.transitiveClosure(crContainsCR) && 
L3:                 ∃ $cr2 in $subCR.containsCR ==> 
L4:                     Unique("one sig "$subCR.name" extends ComplianceRequirement{}{"
L5:               ∀ $crx in $subCR.containsCR ==> 
L6:                 $crx.name " in this.@subComplianceReq
L7:           }"
L8:             )
L1:  4. ∀ $p in Policy: ⟼ "one sig "$p.name" extends Policy {}
Figure 8.10: Regulation to Alloy Transformation Pattern Rules
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8.3.3 CoReL to Alloy
The CoReL to Alloy model transformation is simpler to model compared with the model
transformation from xBPMN to SBP (Alloy). Most of the concepts occurring in a CoReL policy
diagram are mapped to a single signature. The rest of the concepts include relation definitions
and require at least pattern matching rules to be executed.
The model transformation has 6 pattern rules. The first one matches all ASEs in the CoReL
policy model and creates a corresponding unary signature. The second and third pattern rules
work similarly in that they match and apply similar patterns. Every matched context (resp.
control) is mapped to a unary signature context (resp. control). As we already know, context and
control are sub-signatures of the same signature constraint. Then, a rule is assigned to each context
(resp. control) carrying the same name as the context (resp. control) in the policy model but has
an appended extension "_rule_cx" (resp. "_rule_ct") to the name (see line L2 of both patterns).
A signature for the rule is also generated in the applied pattern. We implement the truth
valuation of the rule by outputting the statement setting the eval boolean relation of a rule to
be the same as the formula given in the CoReL model. This is shown on line 5 of each of the
second (Context) and third patterns (Control). It is noteworthy to indicate that we assume that
the rule is written in Alloy for the purpose of this transformation. This statement must be a
boolean expression in order for the generated code to be valid. In case the rule statement (i.e.,
formula) is written in another rule formalism, our Alloy transformation does obviously not work
and another kind of semantic domain must be used.
It is not realistic to expect policy modelers to know how to write such statements in the general
case. This is why rules are always part of a control or context and must only be modified by an
expert. In a practical use scenario, we can imagine a role model for accessing CoReL policy
models where only users with an adequate role of logic expert may modify the rules in a Context
or Control. However, the intended practice of CoReL modeling is to be able to find and combine
available building blocks of CoReL policies (e.g., Contexts and Controls) in order to produce
new CoReL policies. This constitutes the main complexity reduction technique used in CoReL
and the main advantage compared to existing compliance modeling and checking approaches.
Nevertheless, additional tools and techniques such as semantic annotations to CoReL building
blocks in order to facilitate retrieval, as well as simulation environments (i.e., for what-if analysis
and test scenarios) might make the task of policy validation more successful and the resulting
policies more accurate.
The pattern rule number 4 matches any violation in the policy model and generates a unary
violation signature. This pattern rule also sets the recovery relation of the violation. Pattern
rule number 5 creates a unary policy signature and sets all the required relations for complete
interpretation of the policy: (i) governsAse relating it to an ASE, (ii) hasContext resp. hasControl
relating the policy to its contexts resp. controls, and (iii) hasViolation relating to its violations.
Finally, the last rule pattern number 6 matches all 4 (there are two types of handling, reward
and penalty) types of recoveries. Depending on the type (i.e., penalty, reward, reparation,
compensation), rule number 6 produces the required signature declaration.
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L1:  1. ∀ $a in ASE ⟼ "one sig "$a.name"_ase extends ASE {}"
L1:  2. ∀ $x in Context: ⟼ "one sig "$x.name" extends Constraint {}{
L2:      this.@rules = 0 -> "$x.name"_rule_cx
L3:     }
L4:     one sig "$x.name"_rule_cx extends Rule{}{
L5:      eval.isTrue iff " $x.rule.formula
L6:     "}" 
L1:  3. ∀ $t in Control: ⟼ "one sig "$t.name" extends Constraint {}{
L2:      this.@rules = 0 -> "$t.name"_rule_ct
L3:     }
L4:     one sig "$t.name"_rule_ct extends Rule{}{
L5:      eval.isTrue iff " $t.rule.formula
L6:     "}" 
L1:  4. ∀ $v in Violation: ⟼ "one sig "$v.name" extends Violation{}{"
L2:       ∀ $r in Recovery  ==>  $r.name" in this.@recovery
L3:         }"
L1:  5. ∀ $p in Policy: ⟼ "one sig "$p.name" extends Policy{}{"
L2:     ∀ $a in $p.governsASE  ==> $a.name" in this.@governs"
L3:     ∀ $x in $p.hasContext    ==> $a.name" in this.@context"
L4:     ∀ $t in $p.hasControl      ==> $a.name" in this.@control"
L5:      ∀ $v in $p.hasViolation   ==> $a.name" in this.@violation"
L1:  6. ∀ $c in Recovery:
L2:  Switch ($r){
L3:  case: $r in Penalty ⟼ "one sig "$r.name" extends Penalty {}"
L4:  
L5:  case: $r in Reward ⟼ "one sig "$r.name" extends Reward {}"
L6:  
L7:  case: $r in Compensation ⟼ "one sig "$r.name" extends Compensation {}"
L8:  
L9:  case: $r in Reparation ⟼ "one sig "$r.name" extends Reparation {}"
L10: }
Figure 8.11: CoReL Policy Model to Alloy Transformation Rules
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8.3.4 Violation Decision to Alloy
Violation Models
The violation model is where the mapping between policy controls and violations is described by
the policy user. It is shown in Figure 8.12. This is what is called decision mapping in CoReL.
The first two pattern rules are straightforward, and create unary control and violation signatures
respectively for each control and violation in the violation model. We need to ensure in the tool
implementation the following modeling constraint: when a control (resp. a violation) used in a
given violation model is also defined in a CoReL policy model (as should be the normal case),
the first two transformation patterns are not needed (and therefore, shall not be applied) and
are given here purely for illustration purposes. If the user does not define (i.e., in a dedicated
CoReL model) the control and violation occurring in a violation model, then no violation model
can be enforced.
ComputeViolation Alloy Function
The pattern rule number 3 is the core part of the model transformation. It creates an Alloy
function which implements the individual mappings modeled by the user. This function is
declared for a policy, which is the policy to which the violation model is assigned. In order to
retrieve this information, we must directly implement code into the Eclipse EMF/GMF tool
as it is not retrievable using the model transformation language. This is what the statement
"$_Model.AssignedTo.Policy().name" is for.
The function is called computeViolation. For simplification purposes, we do not append
a string such as "_$policy.name", in order to uniquely identify the function in case we have
multiple policies in a single Alloy module. We assume that we only apply this transformation to
a single policy at a time. Otherwise, we would need to extend our implementation to support
this. However, this is a practical implementation consideration and it does not reduce the
usefulness of our approach.
We must first introduce a set of helper functions we use in this pattern rule before we can go
further with the explanation. Helper functions are functions implemented in the transformation
language that are to be reused across pattern rules to shorten the pattern rule implementation.
We distinguish helper functions from the rest of rule constructs in the syntax as these are
displayed using an oblique and underlined font (see Figure 8.12).
LogicalAndJoin Function
We start with the helper function LogicalAndJoin used in line 7 of pattern rule number 3.
This helper function takes as input a set of boolean conditions and joins them using a logical
conjunction in case there are several conditions.
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L1:  1.∀ $v  in Violation  ⟼ "one sig "$v.name$" extends Violation{}"
L1:  2.∀ $t  in Control  ⟼ "one sig "$t.name$" extends Control{}"
L1:  3. ⟼ "fun "$_Model.AssignedTo.Policy().name"::computeViolation : set Violation{
L2:   $y = _Model.violationValues.elems 
L3:     
L4:   IfElseJoin(
L5:     ∀ i in _Model.violationValues.elems.size() ==> "(("
L6:               ∃ $cv_i in ControlValuation | $cv_i.value == $y[i] ==> 
L7:                    LogicalAndJoin(
L8:                      $cv_1.completion(EvaluationFormula.serialize()),
L9:                         …,$cv_i.completion(evaluationFormula.serialize())
L10:                         ,…$cv_k.completion(evaluationFormula.serialize())
L11:                    )
L12:                    " implies " 
L13:                    ∃! $vd in ViolationDecision | $vd.value == $y[i] ==> $vd.violation.name
L14:           ")"
L15:       )
L16:   "}"
: 
Figure 8.12: Violation Model to Alloy Transformation Rules
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Valuation Statements and Decision Statement
Before we explain what the second helper function, named IfElseJoin(), does, let us first give
some definitions. First we define Valuation Statements, then Decision Statements. A Valuation
Statement is extracted from the violation valuation, i.e., the set of connections linking a set of
controls to a violation value. We define and exemplify it underneath:
Definition 8.3.2 (Valuation Statement).
This statement is a boolean conjunction of boolean conditions on the truth value of a control’s
rule: (boolean_condition_1 and ... and boolean_condition_k).
Each of these conditions is called Valuation Condition. They have the form: controli.holds or
not controli.holds.
Example 8.3.1 (Valuation Statement - From Figure 8.13).
Code 8.3.2. (control1⋅holds and control2⋅holds)
Figure 8.13: Excerpt of a Violation Model
Then we define a Decision Statement underneath, and show how it is generated from the
example violation model in Figure 8.13.
Definition 8.3.3 (Decision Statements).
A Decision Statement is of the form:
DecisionStatement : V aluationStatement implies V iolationα.
By expanding the V aluationStatement we can write it like this:
(boolean_condition_1 and ... boolean_condition_k) implies Violationα
Example 8.3.3 (Decision Statement).
Code 8.3.4. (control1⋅holds and control2⋅holds) implies Violation1
We allow for types of evaluationFormulae to be carried by Violation Valuation connections.
The first type is the set of two values: {"does hold"; "does not hold"}. The second type
is an equivalent set of strings with the identical semantics: {"Eval(this.rule)==True";
"Eval(this.rule)==False"}. We need to transform such evaluationFormulae into valid Valuation
Conditions in Alloy.
Serialize Helper Function
For this purpose, we define another helper function named serialize() defined in 8.3.4. This
function simply maps the evaluationFormula property of the Violation Valuation connection
(i.e.. "does hold" or "does not hold") to a valid Alloy boolean Valuation Condition (i.e.,
Controlα.holds or not Controlα.holds); Controlα being the source of the Violation Valuation
connection.
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Definition 8.3.4 (Serialize Helper Function).
”doeshold” or ”Eval(this.rule) == True”↦ Controlα.holds
”doesnothold”or”Eval(this.rule) == False”↦ not Controlα.holds
The reader might be puzzled at the redundant ways of expressing Valuation Conditions in
violation models. We see strings of the form ”does hold/does not hold” as generic and natural
enough to be understood by a large audience of non-computer scientists. The reason why we also
allow to include strings of the type ”Eval(this.rule) == True” and ”Eval(this.rule) == False”
is that it might be preferred by modelers preferring explicit statement of logical conditions. The
reader will most probably have intuitively incepted that the this in the latter string refers to the
Controlα, the source of the Violation Valuation connection.
Initially the ”Eval(this.rule) == True” and ”Eval(this.rule) == False” statements
were defined in order to allow to write to complex Valuation Conditions using several
rules in a control, by referring to rules in a sequence of control rules (e.g., written as:
”Eval(this.rule[0]) == True”). As we simplified our language for ease of understanding, we
removed that option from the current version of the CoReL tooling.
IfThenElse Helper Function
The third helper function is named IfElseJoin() and is used on line 4 of the pattern rule 3. It
creates a syntactically valid Alloy Alternative Choice (i.e., IF THEN ELSE) statement out of
several sub-statements. This helper function is fed as input a list of violation decision statements.
The first part of the violation decision mapping statement is the result of applying the helper
function LogicalAndJoin on a set of Valuation Conditions.
Each one of these Valuation Conditions is actually carried by the Violation Valuation
connection (between a control and a violation value) in the violation diagram. The second part
in the violation decision mapping statement is the name of the violation that a Violation Value
maps to.
Definition 8.3.5 (IfElseJoin() Helper Function).
Let i be the number of DecisionStatement in the violation decision statements.
i = 1: IfElseJoin(DecisionStatement1) ↦ V iolationDecisionStatement1”
i > 1: IfElseJoin(DecisionStatement1), ...,DecisionStatementk) ↦
DecisionStatement1 else (
DecisionStatement2 else
... DecisionStatementk else none)
Violation Function
We must now define the last aspect in generating the right implementation of the computeViolation
function. In effect, the violation diagram does not define a complete function over the cartesian
product of Violation Valuations. We only generate decision statements which include the
conditions explicitly modelled by the user. However, to have an unambiguous and complete
mapping, we must complete the information extracted from the violation model. In order to
illustrate this problem, let us have a look at the Alloy code generated from the example in Figure
8.14.
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Figure 8.14: Excerpt of a Violation Model
Code 8.3.5 (Excerpt of a Violation Model - Incomplete Mappings).
 fun policy::computeViolation : set Violation{
 (not Control1⋅holds and not Control2⋅holds) implies ViolationLevel2
 else (
 (not Control1⋅holds) implies ViolationLevel1
 else none
 )
 }
Finally, the last pattern rule just generates the right violation name to put in the implies
part of every decision statement. It finds the only ViolationDecision connection which starts
from the ViolationValue and traverses its violation relation to retrieve the right Violation name
(see CoReL metamodel in Figure 5.5).

Chapter 9
Validation: Case Studies
In God we trust; all others must bring data.
William Edwards Deming.
In this chapter, we will have a look at some of the modeling features made possible by the
ASE, SBP and CoReL formal models. Through the study of some small size examples, we will
illustrate the range of modeling capacities made possible by CoReL.
We will also dive a little deeper into the intricacies of our system and CoReL formalization,
which are relevant for full grasping of the examples. More concretely, we will see how we
model application-specific contexts and controls using rules, as well as recovery modeling
and the mathematical description in Alloy of the semantics of violations. Our opinion is
that these aspects of the semantics of CoReL are more easily introduced together with an example.
Section 9.1 discusses the range of CRs which are modelled with CoReL. The following
sections 9.2, 9.3 et 9.4 present three examples for which we use CoReL to model regulatory
compliance requirements.
9.1
Compliance Requirements Dimensions
It is worth saying that, a part of the examples show the decision modeling capacities embedded
into CoReL, particularly of flexible decision and violation management. The other part shows
the range of rules (i.e., constraints) which can be expressed using our underlying formal model or
integrated enterprise (i.e., System as the combination of SBP workflows and ASEs) and decision
(i.e., CoReL) modeling.
In our examples, we will cover several types of constraints. We project the constraints along
3 dimensions: (i) static vs. dynamic constraints, (ii) structural vs. temporal constraints and
finally (iii) constraints reasoning on violations and meta-policies (relations among policies).
We include an explanation of these three dimensions as part of the examples in this chapter.
Also, the relevant Alloy code implementing the formal description of the rules is included where
needed for better understanding.
We give here a first concise description of these constraints. Static constraints can be
checked without executing the process, a classical example being static Segregation of Duties
(SoD). These express a standard requirement on executing sensitive tasks by requiring a set of
mutually exclusive entities to carry out an action. Dynamic constraints can only be checked
when executing the process as they require access to run-time information (e.g., the concrete role
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Figure 9.1: The Three Dimensions of Compliance Requirements Modeling in CoReL
of the subject carrying out a given action).
Structural constraints are expressed on the enterprise model elements, i.e., actions and
objects, while temporal ones are expressed on the temporal ordering of ASEs in execution traces.
Meta-policies describe constraints on the policies themselves, such as conflicting policies (i.e.,
segregation of policies). Reasoning on violations is also possible, which makes it possible to take
policy decisions based on violations which occurred in the past.
The chapter is organized in two separate process examples, each with a set of compliance
requirements. After that show how to use CoReL for modeling a process-independent regulation
from the healthcare domain.
An important aspect of this work must be clearly grasped by the reader. In this chapter, our
method of validation uses examples we refer to as case studies. These are self-defined examples,
and therefore obviously biased.
In this regard, our validation method is not perfect. It would greatly profit from field studies
and carefully designed experiments for validating any claims made about the set of qualities of
the artifacts produced in this thesis (i.e., approach, formal model, language). This could be
completed by a comparison with other approaches against the same set of qualities. The main
claim made in this thesis and which is validated is the feasibility of using CoReL to model an
extensive set of compliance requirements. However, this is certainly a highly interesting future
track of research on CoReL. Additionally, the examples in this chapter were beneficial to grasp
some of the inherent challenges and limitations linked to using CoReL for modeling compliance.
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9.2
The Printer Access Control Case
9.2.1 The Compliance Case
This case handles the same simple printer management process we used throughout the thesis to
illustrate our research. The process example is shown again in Figure 9.2. We complete the
process with a set of compliance requirements shown in Table 9.1 which we explain in detail
later in this chapter.
Figure 9.2: The printer Example
First, we propose to carefully study the business process in Figure 9.2. This process has
two pools executing concurrently. We have both message exchanges and datastore accesses.
These are actions which may be executed by subjects on entities representing classical business
process resources. However, our underlying Alloy model for systems does not support tasks
sending and receiving messages at the same time. The reason for this is that it is very hard to
know from the process design which of the message sending and reception should be executed first.
The same thing goes for datastore access. We do not allow for modeling a task
sending/receiving a message while accessing a datastore. An explicit ordering must be
specified by the modeler. Our underlying ASE model does require explicit separation of
normal process tasks from tasks representing operations on artifacts (i.e., used to model resources).
Therefore, we must transform the process in Figure 9.2 into the process model shown in
Figure 9.3. In this process, we show the intended ordering of the process tasks sending or
receiving messages, or accessing tasks. The generated Alloy representation is illustrated in
Figure 9.4.
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Figure 9.3: The printer Example - Expanded Complex Tasks
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Figure 9.4: The printer Example - Conceptual Illustration of the Corresponding Alloy System
Model
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For simplification purposes, we do not show the Alloy code, but limit ourselves to the
illustration shown in 9.4. The understanding of this Figure should be possible without great
effort after reading of the chapter on system modeling 4.3. For ensuring complete understanding,
we refer the reader to Section 4.4.1. Rounded rectangles represent actions, pentagons represent
subjects, and ovals represent entities. Note that some entities are shared among ASEs.
Also, because of the concurrent execution of branches of AndBlocks, we must explicitly
constrain the possible executions of the process model, in order to enforce the ASE execution
order implied by the messaging. For instance, we must say that the ASE (ConnectUser, Printer,
Conreq) must be preceded by the execution of the ASE (ConnectToprinter, User, ConReq). This
is done declaraitively in our Alloy formalization by defining a relation precedes amongst ASEs.
Code 9.2.1 (Snippet).
 abstract one sig SBP{
 flow: Node →Node,
 precedes: ASE→ ASE
 }
After defining this relation, we need to weave its semantics into the execution semantics of
SBPs. We do this by adding the following declarative statement to the previously introduced
system execution semantics (cf. Section 4.4). We must extend the declarative specification of
valid system execution traces accepted by our model. The following Alloy code snippet only
shows the added part to the signature fact of a Trace (not to confuse with ComplianceTrace).
This statement forces all ASE nodes a in a relation precedes(Trace, a, b) with another ASE b to
occur (be into the set activeSets) first in the trace before the ASE b.
Code 9.2.2 (Snippet).
 one sig Trace {
 states: seq ProcessState,
 activeSets: Int →Node
 }{
 all a,b: ASE| a→b in SBP⋅precedes implies (all j: Int| all n2: AseNode| n2 in activeSets[j] &&
 n2⋅se =b ⇒ some i: Int| some n1: AseNode| i< =j && n1 in activeSets[i] && n1⋅se = a)
 }
9.2.2 The Compliance Requirements
Table 9.1 shows a list of 6 compliance requirements we model in this first example. Each of these
CRs is modelled separately in the rest of this section.
9.2.3 CoReL Engineering of the Compliance Requirements
9.2.3.1 CR1
In this first example, the policy decision is about whether or not granting or denying the
execution of printer access. The ASE is when a user prints a file. The chosen modality
is a permission. The context of the policy is set to hold for students executing the ASE.
This means that non-students are not under the jurisdiction of the policy, and another
policy is needed if we want to control their access to the printer. We need two controls, one
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Table 9.1: Compliance Requirements - Printer Example
CR Definition
CR1 The file can only be printed by internal students who have sufficient printing
credit.
CR2 For the previous CR (CR1), in case the printing credit of the internal student
is less than 10% of his monthly (maximal) credit, he must be notified of this
situation.
CR3 In case a student does not possess sufficient credit for printing, a message with
the explanation of the reason for the refused access to the printer is sent to the
user and to the system administrator, and the printing must be denied.
CR4 If the printer is a laser Poster color printer then access is granted only if the user
additionally has temporary high-rank clearance.
CR5 If the user has a negative printing credit, then he cannot connect to the printer
before he pays a minimum fee of 15$.
CR6 When the User connects to the printer, if the user has only printed less than 50%
of his credit for the past month, then an additional 20 pages are added to his
credit.
Figure 9.5: CR1 - Policy Model
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holding for internal students, and the other holding for a student who has sufficient printing credit.
A small clarification of the semantics is needed here. According to CoReL semantics, when a
policy governs a given ASE, it must take an execution decision when this ASE is active during
the execution of a system. This decision may be a permission (when all controls hold). However,
when there is no policy governing an ASE, that means that no decision needs be made by CoReL
about the execution of that ASE, which is equivalent to a permission.
Figure 9.6: CR1 - Alternative Policy Model - Prohibition
In Figure 9.6, we show the alternative way of modeling the CR1. Instead of modeling a
permission, we can model a prohibition, by negating one of the control rules and not the other,
and leaving the context rule as they are. The reason is that CoReL authorization semantics
enforce a modality when all the controls hold. And the desired outcome we would like here is for
printing to be denied in case the student is internal but has no sufficient credit. Note that the
policy says nothing about what to do when the student is not an internal one.
9.2.3.2 On Application-Specific Rule Implementation & Evaluation
The implementation of the rules we write inside contexts and controls will only be shown in case
of non trivial rules (e.g., temporal rules). Otherwise, we only explain the meaning of the rules
informally. In order to show how the evaluation of rules of contexts and controls is done in the
general case, let us have a look at the Alloy formalization 9.2.4.
This first code snippet shows how we extend the signature of a rule in the separate Rule module
to include a boolean field eval. This way, we can define application-specific implementation of a
rule declaratively. The predicate holds defined on the rule signature returns True if and only if
the boolean eval returns True.
Code 9.2.3 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Rule{
 eval: Bool
 }
 pred Rule::holds{
 this⋅eval⋅isTrue
 }
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The following code snippet shows one context pac_context resp. one control pac_control.
Each is implemented using a single rule T1_USC_rule resp. T1_SCC_rule. The user and file
signatures used here (e.g., u:user in T1_SCC_rule) are just for illustration purposes in order to
be able to evaluate whether rules hold or not. In the normal case we have signatures defining the
parameters taken in by a rule (i.e., the predicates used in a rule).
Code 9.2.4 (Snippet).
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗the 1st control ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
 one sig T1_USC extends Constraint{}{
 this⋅@rules = (0→T1_USC_rule)
 }
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗the 2nd control ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
 one sig T1_SCC extends Constraint{}{
 this⋅@rules = (0→T1_SCC_rule)
 }
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗the 1st rule ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
 one sig T1_SCC_rule extends Rule{
 }{
 eval⋅isTrue iff (integer/gte[user⋅credit_pages,file⋅num_pages])
 }
 −− ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗the 2nd rule ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
 one sig T1_USC_rule extends Rule{
 }{
 eval⋅isTrue iff (user⋅type in internal_student))
 }
 one sig user extends Subject{
 credit_pages: Int,
 type : user_type
 }{
 credit_pages = Int[3]
 type = internal_student
 }
 one sig file extends Entity{
 num_pages : one Int
 }{
 num_pages = Int[2]
 }
We see that a rule is defined to hold if and only if a given predicate holds (returns True).
But this will be implemented differently from application to application and also will depend on
the checking formalism, which does not need to be Alloy. Therefore we won’t further discuss the
implementation details of trivial rules. In the rest of this chapter, we will not implement each
rule separately. Instead, we will simulate if a rule holds or does not hold by using an Alloy trick
shown in the code snippet 9.2.5.
Code 9.2.5 (Snippet).
 one sig dummy_rule_holds extends Rule{}{
 eval⋅isTrue iff (no none)
 }
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
 one sig dummy_rule_does_not_hold extends Rule{}{
 eval⋅isTrue iff (no univ)
 }
The rule dummy_rule_holds is always evaluated to True using a tautology trivially holding
(i.e., the empty set none is empty). On the opposite, the rule dummy_rule_does_not_hold
never holds as we use a trivially never holding constraint, namely, that the set univ, which is the
set of all Alloy atoms (the highest super signature in the graph of signatures) is empty.
9.2.3.3 CR2
CR2 extends CR1 by introducing one violation, as shown in Figure 9.7. This violation can only
be interpreted when the policy model is accompanied by a violation model. This is shown in
Figure 9.8.
Figure 9.7: CR2 - Policy Model
The violation in Figure 9.8 is only fired when both controls T1_USC and T2_SCC
hold. The violation value which is computed in this case is Gray, and this fires violation
V2_Low_Printing_Credit. In this case, the rule embedded in the violation is evaluated and in
case the rule holds, the recovery (compensation) PCN prescribed by the violation is enforced.
This means that the user will only get a warning message about his low credit in case he was
allowed to print.
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Figure 9.8: CR2 - Violation Model
9.2.3.4 On Application-Specific Violation & Execution Decision
The reader might be wondering about how the policy interpretation engine (as described by
CoReL semantics) is able to decide which violations to trigger. We know that this is done using
an Alloy function called computeViolation. Such a function must be defined for every policy and
is generated from the violation model. The function generated for the violation model in Figure
9.8 is given here:
Code 9.2.6 (Snippet).
 fun printer_policy::computeViolation : set Violation{
 (this⋅control[0]⋅holds and this⋅control[1]⋅holds) implies this⋅violation[0]
 else none)
 }
In the following in snippet 9.2.7, we show how to model recoveries for a violation. We do not
distinguish between the different (three) types of recovery in CoReL and show how the generic
case of recovery is treated. Let us model the case in CR2, with a single violation and a single
recovery, which we name Violation1 and Recov1 for more simplicity. First, we must extend the
signature Violation with a recoveryRule, so that we can evaluate violation rules.
Code 9.2.7 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Recovery{
 rase: ASE
 }
 abstract sig Violation{
 recoveryRule: Constraint,
 recovery : lone Recovery
 }{
 some p:Policy | some i: Int | this in p⋅violation[i]
 }

 one sig Recov1 extends Recovery {}

 one sig Violation1 extends Violation{}{
 recoveryRule = Violation1_rule
 recovery = Recov1
 }

 one sig Violation1_rule extends rule{}{
 eval⋅isTrue iff ((PrintCredit[Subject] − NbPages[Entity])< (MaxMonthlyCredittenPercent(Subject) ) )
 }
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At this stage of explaining the example, the only missing element is how the execution
decision of the policy is computed in case of a violation. In CoReL, an execution decision takes
either one of two possible values: {Abort, Resume}. Resume means that the process execution
must be continued, while abort halts the process execution definitely. The execution decision is
enforced only after the violation recovery has been enforced.
Execution decision-making is implemented in CoReL using a combination of extensions to
our model. First, we add a boolean relation to the signature Policy named abort.
Code 9.2.8 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Policy{
 modality: one Deon,
 governs: ASE,
 context: Constraint,
 control: seq Constraint,
 violation: seq Violation,
 abort: Bool
 }
The following step in defining execution decision semantics is to define in which case does
the abort field become False. In order to achieve this, we must add a fact specifying the latter
condition. The condition is based on which violation has been computed by the policy. These
are obtained from the violation model.
We have defined the usage principles of ViolationValues in order to allow for automatic
generation of such statements, and this is where ViolationValues come to use. The ViolationValues
are divided into two subtypes defined by a subset: The Abort and the Resume subsets. In our
proposal of using the Lights Violation Model as a Violation Type, we have implemented the
two subsets as follows: Abort={Red, Orange, Yellow} and Resume={Green, Blue, Gray}. This
design implies that wherever the violation computed is linked to a ViolationValue belonging to
the Abort subtype the decision to Abort is taken.
Code 9.2.9 (Snippet).
 fact{
 isTrue[PAC_CR1⋅abort] iff (computeViolation = Violation1)
 }
In the code snippet above, we show how the execution is taken for a hypothetical Violation
Violation1 which is linked to one of the Abort ViolationValues for the Policy PAC_CR1. For the
case where we have more than one violation leading to an Abort execution decision, we can model
it by exploiting the fact that the computeViolation Alloy function returns a set of violations like
this:
Code 9.2.10 (Snippet).
 fact{
 isTrue[PAC_CR1⋅abort] iff (computeViolation in {Violation1 + Violation2})
 }
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9.2.3.5 CR3
CR3 (cf. Figure 9.9) adds another violation to the policy and an accompanying violation model
(cf. cf. Figure 9.10). The new violation only fires when T1_USC holds and T2_SCC does
not hold. In this case the decision to abort the process will be taken. Before that the violation
recovery is executed as the violation carries a trivially true rule.
Figure 9.9: CR3 - Policy Model
Figure 9.10: CR3 - Violation Model
9.2.3.6 A Violation Model for CR1, CR2 & CR3
We must now group the two separately modelled violation models into a single model for easier
visualization (cf. Figure 9.11).
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Figure 9.11: Violation Model for CR1, CR2 & CR3
9.2.3.7 Prohibition Version - CoReL Models - CR1, CR2 & CR3
Figure 9.12 shows the equivalent policy model to the one in Figure 9.9. The difference is that
the opposite modality to a permission is used, and some of the control rules are negated (only
T1_SCC in our case). CoReL modelers may in consequence use the modality that they feel
corresponds best to their understanding of the CR, knowing that the obtained model will lead to
the same enforcement, but modelers must be very careful with the control rules they will use.
Figure 9.12: CR1/CR2/CR3 - Alternative Policy Model - Prohibition
Also, we show in Figure 9.13 that the violation model that must come with the policy model
in Figure 9.12 that the mappings that lead to the two possible ViolationValues we consider, Gray
and Yellow are switched. When changing the modality of the CoReL authorization, modelers
must carefully construct the corresponding Violation Models.
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Figure 9.13: CR1/CR2/CR3 - Alternative Violation Model - Prohibition
9.2.3.8 CR4
CR4 is a very interesting compliance requirement, as we find no elegant way to natively model it
using the current version of CoReL. The reason for this is that we cannot write rules on ASEs
which can access the target of an action. In CR4, we can first try to use one of two ASEs tagged
1 or 2 in Figure 9.4: (ConnectToPrinter, User, ConReq) or (ConnectUser, Printer, ConReq).
However, none of these ASEs contains information on both the source (i.e., User) and target
(i.e., Printer) of the interaction.
As our ASE model only covers ASEs, we would need to extend it to model action
targets. If we replace our ASE triples with quadruples of the form (Action, Subject, Entity,
Target), with Target being the target of an Action, our model will be able to express CRs like CR4.
One could try to model CR4 by using a workaround. We see at least two possible solutions.
We could enrich the action signature with an additional field called target. But that is not a
satisfying solution since the same action may have several targets, depending on the process it
is involved in. Another tentative solution might be to enrich the qualifiers (signatures related
to objects carrying additional properties, e.g., role qualifier for subjects) of messages with a
destination. But that is not a generic solution and is in fact just hiding the information about
an action’s target into the message for the specific case where the action is indeed sending a
message.
9.2.3.9 CR5
In CR5, modeled through Figures 9.14 and 9.15, we see how to use a new kind of predicate
made possible by our underlying formal model. The predicate used in the violation Provi-
sion_Violation_CR5 is one example of how a provision, i.e., an obligation which must be fulfilled
punctually before execution is resumed or aborted, can be modeled.
The violation Provision_Violation_CR5 is decided upon very simply in the case where the
single control does not hold. However, the rule of that violation is explained by showing the
corresponding Alloy specification:
Code 9.2.11 (Snippet).
 pred Trace::precedes[a,b: ASE] {
 all j: Int| all n2: AseNode| n2 in this⋅activeSets[j] &&
 n2⋅se =b ⇒ some i: Int| some n1: AseNode | i< =j && n1 in this⋅activeSets[i] && n1⋅se = a
 }

 pred precedesAlways[a,b: ASE] {
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Figure 9.14: CR5 - Policy Model
Figure 9.15: CR5 - Violation Model
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 all t:Trace | t⋅precedes[a,b]
 }

 pred precedesPossibly[a,b: ASE] {
 some t:Trace | t⋅precedes[a,b]
 }
The predicate precedes models a temporal ordering relation between two ASEs in any trace.
It does so by expressing this constraint on the order of occurrence of the two ASEs in a given
SBP trace. PrecedesAlways tells whether the precedence relation holds in all or in some (at least
one) of the execution traces.
In order to visualize what this concretely means for the execution of SBP, we can represent
this by having an imaginary third pool, outside of the boundaries of our system, where ASEs are
concurrently executed and can be found in the global execution trace. In Figure 9.16 we drew
such a pool which represents a hypothetical User X.
Figure 9.16: The printer Example - Illusrative Enrichment with a Reparation Pool
9.2.3.10 CR6
The last example of CR for the printer example shows in Figures 9.17 and 9.18 how to model
a simple reward policy. This policy decides whether or not to allow connections to the printer
and admit two kinds of violations. Violation V3_CR6 shows how to implement the reward and
violation V3_Default_CR6 shows how to implement Resume execution decisions by default.
Both allowed violations will decide to resume the process in any case.
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Figure 9.17: CR6 - Policy Model
Figure 9.18: CR - Violation Model
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9.3
The Expense Refund Case
In this section, we use a different business process model as a support for modeling a new
category of CRs. We will target here on the modeling of examples of CRs studied in the literature
around compliance, security or organizational control modeling. In this section, we will focus on
the expression of controls, rather than additional description of violations and recoveries.
9.3.1 The Process Case
We model CRs for the process model shown in Figure 9.19. This process is composed of three
pools, one for an employee requesting a refund, a financial clerk who will process the employee’s
request, and a manager involved in the validation of the refund request. In this section we use
the following abbreviations: RR for Refund Request and RO for Refund Order.
Figure 9.19: Expense Refund Process - in xBPMN
9.3.2 The Compliance Requirements
The CRs for the case are given in Table 9.2. The first CR is a standard static role-based
Segregation of Duty (SoD) constraint. The second CR is a location-contextualized and violation-
based dynamic SoD. The third and fourth CRs are respectively object- and action-based dynamic
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SoD constraints. The last constraint in this set of CRs exemplifies a constraint-based meta-policy
constraint.
Table 9.2: Compliance Requirements - Expense Refund Example
CR Definition
CR7 Static SoD: The Employee requesting the standard refund order cannot be concur-
rently a Manager.
CR8 Contextual Violation- and Subject-Based SoD: This CR must be complied with
throughout our subsidiaries in North America. The constraint of the CR is: If a
manager is a staff member and has committed a violation in the past, then he
cannot acquire the role of a financial clerk.
CR9 Dynamic Object-based SoD: If an ASE is executed in the past where the ASE’s
entity is some given object s, and the ASE’s subject is another system object e
(e.g., some employee) with a role rx, then this subject cannot have another role ry.
CR10 Dynamic Action-based SoD: If an ASE is executed in the past where the ASE’s
action is a and the ASE’s subject holds a given role rx, then this same subject
cannot hold another role ry.
CR11 Static Meta-Policy Constraint (A-/S- or E-based): The policy P states that its
ASE is prohibited from execution if this ASE is also governed by another policy P’
which is a permission and is in conflict with policy P.
CR12 Dynamic Meta-Policy Constraint (A-/S- or E-based): The policy P states that its
ASE is prohibited from execution if this ASE has among its permissions a specific
permission P1 in conflict with the current policy and policy P1 was enforced
previously in the process.
9.3.3 Engineering the CoReL Models
9.3.3.1 CR7
The static SoD is modelled in Figures 9.20 and 9.21. There are two things to notice about CR7’s
policy diagram. It has two controls. The first control checks if the role of the ASE’s subject holds
the role Manager. The second control checks if the originator of the RefundOrder (the person
having requested it) is the same one executing the ASE (its subject). If these two conditions are
both true, we know the subject is an employee, since he the RefundOrder originated from him,
but also that he is a Manager.
The violation model of CR7 is basic and is needed to express what should happen when
the decision of the policy is not to prohibit the ASE. In case the two controls do not hold,
we wish to resume execution. This is why we link this control valuation to a Green violation
value, itself linked to a Default_Positive_Violation. The Green violation value carries a resume
policy decision, while the Default_Positive_Violation has no recovery and a trivially holding rule.
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Figure 9.20: CR7 - Policy Model
Figure 9.21: CR7 - Violation Model
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9.3.3.2 CR8
This CR policy model shows how to use a location based context. The location is a predicate
defined for a process instance, and returns the cumulated set of countries where all the tasks of
the process take place. The location is a qualifier attached to the action signature, as we show in
the following Alloy code.
Code 9.3.1 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Action{
 location: one Location
 }
 abstract sig qualifier{}
 abstract sig Location extends qualifier{}
 one sig usa extends Location{}
 one sig canada extends Location{}
Figure 9.22: CR8 - Policy Model
The key to modeling CR8 is to model the right ASE. Here we are concerned about ASEs
occurring outside the boundaries of the Expense Refund process, which is a role assignment ASE,
assigning the FinancialClerk role to a person already carrying the role Manager. Such ASEs
may happen at any time and can be modeled as ASE events logged in the CoReL ComplianceTrace.
Once the right ASE is modelled, we model a context for North America. We Assume every
Action in the system has a qualifier which carries its location (i.e., geographical location where
the action is performed). This predicate returns true if at least one of the actions in the system
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Figure 9.23: CR8 - Violation Model
model takes place in North America.
Another useful predicate used in the modeling of this policy is given by subjectCommitted-
PriorViolation(Subject, ASE). This Alloy predicate holds when the subject committed a prior
violation, i.e., when the subject belongs to an ASE governed by a policy, which was in a violated
state previously in the trace. The pattern we are looking for in the trace is represented in Figure
9.24.
Code 9.3.2 (Snippet).
 pred ComplianceTrace::subjectCommittedPriorViolation[sub:Subject, se:ASE] {
 some i : this⋅states⋅inds | some p:Policy |
 this⋅states[i]⋅policyState[p] in violated and (sub = p⋅governs⋅s) and precedesAlways[p⋅governs,se]
 }

 pred subjectCommittedPriorViolation[sub:Subject, se:ASE] {
 all t:ComplianceTrace | some i : t⋅states⋅inds |
 (all an:AseNode | t⋅states[i]⋅nodeState[an] in active) ⇒ t⋅subjectCommittedPriorViolation[sub,se]
 }
...
___
___
Manager
AssignRole(Entity, 'FinancialClerk')
Manager
___
Figure 9.24: CR8 - Illustration of the subjectCommittedPriorViolation(Subject, ASE) predicate
9.3.3.3 CR9 & CR10
For these CRs we only show the Policy model. The interesting part are the Alloy predicates
required to model the control part of CR9 and CR10.
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Figure 9.25: CR11 - Policy Model
Before we can introduce the predicates key to modeling the controls in Figure 9.25, we must
first show how how we can enrich the ASE model with information about roles. We explained
this in Sections 5.4.1.2 and 8.2.1. All that is needed is a new relation between the signature
subject and the role signature.
Code 9.3.3 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Subject extends Object{
 roles: set Role
 }
 abstract sig Role extends qualifier{}
 one sig r1 extends Role{}
 one sig r2 extends Role{}

 pred Trace::precedesASEWithRole[a,b: ASE, r:Role] {
 all j: Int| all n2: AseNode| n2 in this⋅activeSets[j] && n2⋅se =b ⇒
 some i: Int| some n1: AseNode |
 i< =j && n1 in this⋅activeSets[i] && n1⋅se = a && (r in (n1⋅se)⋅s⋅roles)
 }

 pred precedesASEWithRoleAlways[a,b: ASE, r:Role] {
 all t:Trace | t⋅precedesASEWithRole[a,b,r]
 }

 pred Trace::precedesASEWithRoleAndAction[ase1,ase2: ASE, r:Role, ay:Action] {
 all j: Int| all n2: AseNode| n2 in this⋅activeSets[j] && n2⋅se =ase2 ⇒
 some i: Int| some n1: AseNode |
 i< =j && n1 in this⋅activeSets[i] && n1⋅se = ase1 && (r in n1⋅se⋅s⋅roles) && (ay = (n1⋅se)⋅a)
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 }

 pred precedesASEWithRoleAndActionAlways[a,b: ASE, r:Role, ay:Action] {
 all t:Trace | t⋅precedesASEWithRoleAndAction[a,b,r,ay]
 }
Four different predicates are shown in code snippet 9.3.3. The first predicate precedesASE-
WithRole(ASE1, ASE2, Role) holds when ASE2 is preceded in the trace with the execution of an
ASE1 whose subject has a role Role. The third predicate precedesASEWithRoleAndAction(ASE1,
ASE2, Role, Action) holds whenever ASE2 is preceded by the execution of an ASE1 where the
action is equal to Action and the subject carries a role Role. Predicate number 2 resp. 4 is the
generalization of predicate number 1 resp. 3 to all the possible traces.
9.3.3.4 CR11 & CR12
CR11 resp. CR12 are referred to as static resp. dynamic conflict-based meta-policies. These
requirements basically allow to reason on relations amongst policies. For instance, in some
regulations, a given policy may be designed as being mutually exclusive with a set of other
policies, i.e., in conflict with them.
By conflict, we do not mean that while reasoning on both policies, we might have situations
where we arrive to a conflict in terms of decisions by the policies (e.g., policy P1 decided to
permit an ASE while policy P2 decides the opposite). We mean conflicts modelled by the user,
who does not want that both policies apply to a set of ASEs during the same execution. For
example, we may have a generous extra holiday policy applying to employees of a company in
conflict with another policy applying generous financial compensation to employees having shown
great commitment in terms of extra hours spent at work during hot project phases. The reason
is that the company may not want its employees to have to choose between money and free time.
In order to be able to model the controls in Figure 9.26, we must first extend the definition
of the policy signature. We add an non-reflexive relation conflicts from a policy to a set of other
policies.
Code 9.3.4 (Snippet).
 abstract sig Policy{
 modality: one Deon,
 governs: ASE,
 context: Constraint,
 control: seq Constraint,
 violation: seq Violation,
 abort: Bool,
 conflicts : set Policy
 }{
 not (this in this⋅conflicts)
 }
Then we can model the desired predicates used in Figure 9.26 for policies CR11 (named
CR_MetaPolicyConflict) and CR12 (named CR_MetaPolicyConflict_Past) by reusing the
precedes and follows predicates. The predicate hasConflictingPermission(ASE, Policy) statically
checks the existence of a permission policy P2 governing the same ASE as a given policy P1.
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Figure 9.26: CR11 & CR12 - Policy Models
This information is accessible without executing the system, ans is retrieved using the conflicts
relation previously modeled for policies.
The more complex variant is predicate ComplianceTrace::aseConflictingPermission(ASE, Policy),
which implements the dynamic checking in the prior segment of the ComplianceTrace for an
activated permission policy. If this policy P1 is in conflict with a policy P2 and applies to the
same ASE, then the predicate holds.
Code 9.3.5 (Snippet).
 pred aseConflictingPermission[ax:ASE, px:Policy]{
 some p:Policy | (ax in p⋅governs) && (p⋅modality = Permission) && (p in px⋅conflicts)
 }

 pred ComplianceTrace::aseConflictingPermission[ax:ASE, px:Policy]{
 some i : this⋅states⋅inds | some p:Policy | this⋅states[i]⋅policyState[p] in active &&
 (ax in p⋅governs) && (p⋅modality = Permission) && (p in px⋅conflicts)
 }

 pred aseConflictingPermissionAlways[ax:ASE, px:Policy]{
 all t:ComplianceTrace | t⋅aseConflictingPermission[ax,px]
 }

 pred aseConflictingPermissionPossibly[ax:ASE, px:Policy]{
 some t:ComplianceTrace | t⋅aseConflictingPermission[ax,px]
 }
180 Chapter 9. Validation: Case Studies
9.4
Modeling an Article of the HIPAA Regulation
As a last part of this chapter, we aim at getting an approximate idea of the remaining challenges
of modeling real-world regulations using CoReL. We do this by applying CoReL to a real-world
regulation. The following text is a small excerpt from a regulation from the healthcare domain
on privacy rules called HIPAA. The HIPAA (US health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") - Privacy and Security Rule) is a regulation that protects the privacy of
an individual’s health information and govern the way certain health care providers and benefits
plans collect, maintain, use and disclose protected health information in the United States1.
The difference between this regulation and the previous two examples we used, is that it
is more abstract and does not refer to any concrete process steps or known enterprise model
elements. This regulation deals with specifying which information on individuals that cov-
ered entities possess (i.e., health insurance entities) might be disclosed and under which conditions.
In this section, we will evaluate the degree to which the modeling constructs of CoReL
allow to cover elements of a real-life regulation. For this, we will not include predicates in the
modeling, and content ourselves with informal textual modeling to lead the discussion.
Example 9.4.1 (HIPAA Regulation2).
§ 164.512 Uses and disclosures for which an authorization or opportunity to agree
or object is not required.
A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information without the written authorization
of the individual, as described in §164.508, or the opportunity for the individual to agree or
object as described in §164.510, in the situations covered by this section, subject to the applicable
requirements of this section. When the covered entity is required by this section to inform the
individual of, or when the individual may agree to, a use or disclosure permitted by this section,
the covered entity’s information and the individual’s agreement may be given orally.
(f)Standard: Disclosures for law enforcement purposes. A covered entity may disclose protected
health information for a law enforcement purpose to a law enforcement official if the
conditions in paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(6) of this section are met, as applicable.
(f)(1) Permitted disclosures: Pursuant to process and as otherwise required by law. A
covered entity may disclose protected health information:
(f)(1)(i) : As required by law including laws that require the reporting of certain
types of wounds or other physical injuries, except for laws subject to paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) or (c)(1)(i) of this section; or
(f)(1)(ii) : In compliance with and as limited by the relevant requirements of:
(A) A court order or court-ordered warrant, or a subpoena or summons issued
by a judicial officer;
(B) A grand jury subpoena; or
1http://hipaa.stanford.edu/
2See http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/, http://hipaa.stanford.edu/, and http://
privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/.
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(B) An administrative request, including an administrative subpoena or summons,
a civil or an authorized investigative demand, or similar process authorized
under law, provided that:
(1) The information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry;
(2) The request is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably
practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and
(3) De-identified information could not reasonably be used.
When attempting to model such a regulation one may be tempted to start looking at each of
the nested statements and try to represent them using logic or our formal model. Using CoReL
we know we must start by looking at what kinds of ASEs are concerned by each statement.
Then we can look at how statements in the regulation applying to this ASE may be grouped in a
way that makes sense. We need to do this even though we have no business process to check
compliance of for the moment. This is one of the advantages of using ASEs.
If we start with the CR §164.512, we understand that the context of the regulation are all
covered entities in the United States. Moreover, we deal with several ASEs here. The first ASE
is the covered entity disclosing information about the individual to a third party: (Disclose,
Covered Entity, Information about the Individual). The second ASE is the notification of the
individual of this disclosure: (Notify of Disclosure, Covered Entity, Individual). The third ASE
is whether or not the individual agrees or objects to this disclosure: (Agree/Object, Individual,
Disclosure). We may add these two ASEs to the list: (DiscloseOrally, Covered Entity, Individual
Information) and (AgreeOrally/ObjectOrally, individual, Disclosure).
Figure 9.27: Informal Proposal to Model Article §164.512(f) of HIPAA
When attempting to collect and organize the elements of the regulatory text that might
help us formally model the compliance requirements included in the regulation, we encounter
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many problems. First, we notice that some metadata about the Action is needed, particularly
about the Target of the Action, and its Purpose. Also, more information about the execution
environment in which information about individuals is requested and disclosed is required. For
instance, questions have to be answered such as:
• What types of wounds and physical injuries are meant?
• How to judge if the information is relevant to law enforcement? What information is critical
to the health and security of the individual?
• What types of information is there and how is it organized? How does the covered entity
possess about the individual? Where and in which form is this information stored?
Moreover, the regulation refers to exceptions to the rules (CoReL controls) which are specified
in separate articles of the law. CoReL does not support exceptions to a rule. Such an exception
must be processed by a knowledgeable legal expert by hand. Additionally, several elements of
the regulation must be interpreted and concretized for a particular execution environment (e.g.,
a company, a hospital, a dentist office, a health insurer, etc.). All of these make formalizing the
regulation at this level of abstraction for the sake of automated checking a hard task.
In summary, these challenging aspects are some of the research topics that need to be studied
in future work on CoReL.
Part IV
Finale

Chapter 10
Conclusion
A master and his disciple were travelling through the desert. One evening
they came to an oasis were they bedded down for the night. When they awoke
in the morning, their camels were gone. Since thethering the camels every
night was the disciple’s responsibility, the master asked him whether he had
secured them for the night. The disciple replied: "No master, you always
teach me that we should trust in Allah. I was trusting that Allah would take
care of the camels for us". To this his master replied: "Yes, trust in Allah,
but you must also tether the camels".
Ancient Arab wisdom story. From "When working on
yourself doesn’t work". By Ariel and Shya Kane. 2009.
This chapter starts with Section 10.1, where we first summarize the research work in Section
10.1.1, followed by an elaboration on the research results in Section 10.1.2. Then, we present
the contributions of the dissertation in Section 10.2. Section 10.3 groups three separate items,
as we describe lessons learned in Section 10.3.1, limitations of the work in Section 10.3.2 and
give a comparison to existing research in Section 10.3.3. Potential future work and interesting
challenges are discussed in 10.4 and Section 10.5 closes this thesis.
10.1
Research Summary
10.1.1 Synopsis
In the context of business process-centered enterprise models, ensuring compliance to various
regulations is a very critical property. Much of the research on RCM focuses on developing
rule modeling languages and verification approaches for implementing RCM. Our analysis of
regulations and the needs in business process-centered enterprise modeling has shown that one of
the untackled needs of RCM is the adequacy of the approach for use by business users.
Also, the ability to simplify the CR modeling process and reduce the required effort to create
CR models are additional criteria which might help increase the acceptance of RCM among
business users. This is even more important if we consider the environment in which enterprises
evolve. We have also argued that there is a semantic divide between the compliance requirements
domain and the constraint/rule domain. Also, we have expressed the need for support of various
enterprise artifacts concerned by RCM.
Both regulations as well as enterprise models are subject to regular change. We have argued
the benefits of a visual DSL for representing CRs which allows to create models by building on
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reusable components. The CoReL language allows us to reason on multiple violations and comes
equipped with formal semantics for both verification and enforcement. We have shown how the
latter two functionalities can be integrated within business process-centered enterprise modeling.
Finally, the contributions of the thesis have been showcased in case studies and using developed
tool support, thereby showing the feasability of the approach and its applicability to RCM for
BPM.
10.1.2 Results
This section recapitulates the research questions identified in Chapter1, and arguments why and
how the work performed in this thesis answers these research questions.
RQ 1: How to make RCM Modeling more amenable to Business Users? The main
challenge that business users have to deal with is to possess appropriate means to express
their understanding of CRs. We tackle this challenge by proposing to abstract from the
rules in CoReL policies. We assume that business users are able to select appropriate rules
based on their description.
RQ 2: How to exploit the power of logical formalisms for compliance management?
Our proposition to answer RQ2 is to embed rules into carrier concepts (contexts, controls,
violations). Thereby, we can theoretically make use of any appropriate formalism to check
a rule. Our answer to RQ2 is limited, as we only showed this for Alloy, but not for other
formalisms, which would have given CoReL support for multiple formalisms.
RQ 3: How to cover several types of enterprise business artifacts? We tackled RQ3
by defining ASEs as the core paradigm to model actions happening in the system. Together
with business modeling extensions using Qualifiers and ASEs, we can represent rich business
model properties of targets of policies. We showed this in examples which required to
model policies on roles or on sending messages in Chapter 9.
RQ 4: How to decouple compliance modeling from BPM notations? RQ4 was also
tackled through ASEs together with SBPs to yield a formalism for system modeling.
The ASE triple is independent of any specific BP modeling language and our work hypoth-
esis was that it is possible to extract ASE triples from a BP modeling language. This is
how CoReL is decoupled from BP notations. We illustrated this point for a prototypical
BP modeling language strongly inspired from BPMN in Section 8.1 where we allowed for
including additional non-workflow artifacts into modelled policy rules.
RQ 5: How to realize ’verification’ using compliance models? The formal semantics of
CoReL models is given in Chapter 6. These operational semantics are defined declaratively
in Alloy over a logic theoretical model based on system (SBP & ASE) and policy execution
traces. The interesting property of these semantics is that they allow to reason on ASEs as
well as on policy states. This allows us, for example, to reason on violations.
RQ 6: How to realize ’enforcement’ using compliance models? This RQ is strongly
tied to RQ5, since the formal semantics of CoReL defined in Chapter 6 also defines
a policy execution machine (operational semantics). This means the semantics describes
enforcement by simulation, as it acts as a formal specification of an interpretation machine
that merges the execution of CoReL policy models together with system models.
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RQ 7: How far can the Model-Driven Engineering discipline support our endeavour?
We used metamodeling and model transformations to equip the CoReL DSL with an
abstract syntax and formal semantics. We used the ECORE [Riv10] framework on the
Eclipse platform with its EMF/GMF tooling to define the concrete syntax and the diagram
editors we contribute within this thesis.
10.2
Contributions
In [HMPR04], the objective of design science research is said to be: "to develop technology-based
solutions to important and relevant business problems". [HMPR04] also states that "design
science research must produce a viable artifact in the form of a construct, a model, a method,
or an instantiation". Aligned with the previous requirements from design research theory, we
have contributed three design artifacts: a modeling language, a verification approach, and a
supporting tool.
In this thesis, we have tackled the study of regulatory compliance management RCM from
the perspective of business users. Business users are legal or business model/process experts. We
have analyzed a comprehensive set of existing approaches to RCM and have elicited a conceptual
framework for RCM in BPM which allows to have an overview of research to structure and
compare research in this field. This framework contains a list of 33 different criteria organized in
8 categories.
We have designed and formalized a core formal model for business process-centered enterprise
modeling in Chapter 4, referred to as system modeling, also following an MDE approach to
define a prototypical language we call xBPMN (see Chapter 8). We have contributed the
model-driven CoReL approach. This approach follows the MDE paradigm in engineering the
CoReL modeling language (see Chapters 5 and 6) and designing its semantics and tooling (visual
editors) as reported in Chapter 7. Based on that, we have shown how to integrate the CoReL
language both syntactically and semantically with the system modeling language in Chapter 6.
Finally, a tool suite built using state of the art model driven engineering technologies has been
implemented1 as described in Chapter 7.1.
10.3
Discussion
10.3.1 Challenges Faced & Lessons Learned
In this section, we discuss some of the most important lessons learned from our research on
the CoReL approach for model-driven regulatory compliance modeling and verification. While
the objective of the research was well-defined and confined to research on the feasability and
user-friendliness of a formal MDE-driven and policy based solution, the problem we tackle led us
1The implemented tool is the result of team effort, in the scope of the FNR MaRCo project, and not the effort
of the thesis author only.
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to be confronted with several related problems pertaining to DSL engineering and usage of the
developed framework.
Designing a DSL or designing a semantic bridge?
A critical mind might say about this work that we designed a DSL for a domain we are not
experts in. It is true because we propose a DSL for legal and business domain experts to
use . But CoReL is not the only DSL that legal/business experts are going to use, as CoReL has
a specific purpose of modeling compliance decision-making.
CoReL’s use is not solely for knowledge representation (e.g., documentation or refinement),
or knowledge retrieval (e.g., using Ontologies as we published here [EKP09]). CoReL maps the
modeled decision-making into the formal methods/logics domain where the actual automated
reasoning on regulations is conducted. Thus, it is a semantic bridge DSL.
Regulation / Business Domain CoReL
Regulatory Compliance 
RequirementRegulatory Compliance 
RequirementRegulatory Compliance 
RequirementRegulatory Compliance 
Requirement
Rules & ConstraintsRules & ConstraintsRules & ConstraintsRules & Constraints
Legal / Business Domain Experts Rule / Logic Domain Experts
Logic / Rule Domain
Figure 10.1: CoReL: A DSL or a Semantic Bridge?
Keeping it Small
One objective was to keep the number of concepts in CoReL as small as possible. The more
concepts there the higher the conceptual complexity and the risk for redundancy and ambiguity.
Also, the time required to learn the language increases. We limited ourselves to the bare minimum
of useful and semantically distinct concepts. For example, we have contexts and controls, although
both are constraints in the target semantic domain (Alloy). The same reason led us to make
rewards and penalties into two different concrete syntax occurrences of the same metamodel and
semantic domain concept: handling.
Designing a Suitable Visual Concrete Syntax
Second, designing a visual language involves a whole range of skills around cognitive, ergonomic
and technical aspects of language design that was not the core set of skills we possess. Moody
has studied extensively this complex problem and approaches to deal with it in a set of works
named ’physics of notations’ [MvH09, Moo09, Moo03].
However, we learned that usage of discriminating shapes and explicit icons helps in quickly
distinguishing symbols from one another. We also learned that the notation commonly used in
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software engineering modeling languages of compartments inside shapes to visualize properties
(e.g., in UML or ECORE) is very useful for embedding much information into a visual shape.
We also experimented with using colours for the shapes as well as icons on the associations
between concepts. We found that this can lead to an overload of the diagram, due to the number
of various concepts in the CoReL language. In the final versions of our tool, we reverted back to
simple black and white colors and straight lines, as we found it to be easier on the eye.
Dealing with Great Numbers of Policies and Policy Diagrams
First of all, modeling CRs as business policies leaves room for some interpretation, even when
the CRs are very concretely described. Depending on the preferred modeling style of the user,
there could be more than one way of representing one CR. Next to the fact that visual policy
and violation diagrams can get very big and complicated, there is the phenomenon that for a
regulation with n compliance requirements we will have at least 2 ∗ n + 1 models (+1 because of
at least one regulation model).
This might be quite overwhelming to the modeler and a sense of being ’lost in a sea of models’
can result from this. We need to tackle this issue by studying further means of semantically
organizing policies into a repository. The possibilities are many, e.g., by type of ASE the policy
governs, by process that should comply with it, by person accountable for it, by number of
activations or violations, or by type of constraint it expresses, etc. There is a rich set of possible
approaches to this problem, ultimately leading to extending the enterprise model with a business
policy architecture in the enterprise.
Using Rules in CoReL Shapes
Our experience with CoReL has shown us that it is somewhat hard to foresee the reaction of
business users to using strings carrying rules in control/context/violation shapes. We have
conducted a limited number of informal interviews with legal experts and their feedback to the
language concepts was positive, whereas they complained that the rules embedded in CoReL
symbols look too complex. They felt they could express the same more easily in text, thereby
letting go of the promise of automated checking.
We speculated that the legal experts might feel uncomfortable holding responsibility for
creating policy models in which they have to rely on textual description of the rules to know
which rule to choose. This is the reason why we advise in the introduction of CoReL to let legal
experts choose the rules they want to embed in policy shapes together with logic or computer
science experts. However, languages such as SBVR [Gro13], which is a textual business rule
language in structured natural language designed specifically for business users might help. A
language like SBVR could help replace the first order logic rules we use in this thesis with SBVR
statements which can be later translated into a logic (like Alloy).
10.3.2 Limitations of the Work
10.3.2.1 Limitations related to the Research Questions
Policy management does not only mean checking policies.
The other challenge related to RQ1 (cf. Section 10.1.2) is the daunting task of creating, testing
and managing policies. This is not a trivial task because of several factors: (i) size of regulations
and number of various policies, (ii) effort in creating models from scratch, (iii) organizing policies,
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keeping an overview and structuring them to relate them to the regulatory text in order to ensure
traceability. We partly tackle this issue by designing CoReL to be a modular language. This
allows to create policy models by reusing components (such as controls, violations). We proposed
regulation diagrams to tackle the latter three success factors. However, we did not validate this
aspect of the work, by for instance, modeling a regulation great in size and introducing changes.
Using multiple rule formalisms.
There is also a limitation related to RQ2 (cf. Section 10.1.2). In theory, nothing limits us to
using Alloy for checking a rule, as long as there is an engine capable of evaluating this rule to
either True or False. In order to check rules in various languages, the system model must be
transformed into the required formalism for the rule to be checked, and provided there is an
interface (API) between Alloy and the rule engine in question, so that evaluating a rule in a
foreign formalism to Alloy could be implemented. But this would require us to have access to
the Alloy implementation itself and to extend it.
On rules impact on the usability of CoReL.
Another direct limitation of the work is also related to the rules in CoReL. Although this is not
a central limitation as it was not one of the objectives of the research, it still has a considerable
influence on the usability of the approach. We applied CoReL to our examples while abstracting
from the complexity of the task of selecting and understanding rules embedded in CoReL
elements such as context and control. We think this limits the usability of CoReL at this stage.
Our intended direction of research for solving this problem is developing a visual pattern-based
language of rules expressing constraints on ASEs and their attached qualifiers. These rules
can be interpreted by each policy differently depending on the ASE it governs and which is
active at the current state of process execution. The work by Awad in [Awa10] is the one
which is also going the same direction, although the approach used is different. In this work,
BPMN artifacts used by (as input or output) process tasks are annotated with states. These
states must be considered in the formulation of the rules to be checked and allow to express
rules. In [Ama12], the main contribution of the thesis is a pattern-based visual rule language
of formulas translated into LTL. A similar idea is pursued in [XLW08]. This research is one
of the group of works which build on the property specification patterns [YMH+06, MGJ98, GL06].
10.3.2.2 Limitations related to the Research
CoReL’s support of interleaving in branches’ execution.
One limitation is that we did not consider arbitrary interleaving in the execution order of
tasks belonging to separate branches in the system (enriched process) model. For example, two
tasks defined after an AndSplit are always executed concurrently by our Alloy engine. This is
obviously not always the case in reality. In fact, research has shown that this interleaving in
execution order in branches is the main reason for the explosion in complexity of the checking
problem ([CTGKvdT12, CTEKG+13], where the problem is shown to be hard). Therefore, it
would be interesting for us, when investigating the complexity of the compliance checking in BPs
problem, to evaluate the performance of the Alloy tool with this regard.
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CoReL’s validation.
It is certainly a limitation of the contributions around CoReL that we didn’t conduct field studies
answering questions about the complexity and usability of the language. Another objective of
a comprehensive and robust validation would have been evaluating the practicability of using
CoReL for real-world compliance modeling and checking, in terms of performance. Also of value
would be defining the parameters of the case (size of the process, complexity of the workflow,
number of artiacts used, complexity of the rules in contexts, controls and violations) to find the
limits of using Alloy as a lightweight formal method. In other words, we want to answer the
question: starting from which threshold does using the Alloy analyzer become impractical since
it involves a time duration for the checking unbearable in practice?
Using Alloy for formalizing CoReL.
We have made extensive use of the Alloy analyzer, both for validating the semantics as these
were still under development, but also for simulating system and policy executions. We have
come to conclude that the interface of the tool and the concrete syntax it uses to represent
atoms are not very helpful when developing a complex semantics. What we would have needed
were counter-examples and generated instances to be directly visualized as process flows and
policies, using a similar concrete syntax to the one we have used to introduce SBPs.
This is why the group where this thesis was conducted started a new thread of research which
seeks to declaratively assign concrete syntaxes to generated Alloy instances [GK14]. This way,
the work of the software language engineer developing semantics for her language will be easier,
as she will be able to interact with Alloy instances using a syntax related to her problem and
which she understands more readily.
10.3.3 Comparison with other Approaches
In Chapter 3, we surveyed existing approaches to RCM. Here we elaborate on what distinguishes
our work from these approaches. Each of these approaches has many strengths. CoReL however,
focuses on the semantic divide between the domain language use in the regulatory and business
domain on the one side, and the logics/rule language on the other (cf. Figure10.2).
Figure 10.2: Resolving the RCM Semantic Divide
Compliance elements as first-class citizens of the language.
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None of the language-based approaches we surveyed deals with elements of compliance
as separate first class citizens. By first class citizens of a language, we means concepts that
the language natively allows to represent and reason about. An example of this is the abil-
ity of reasoning on violations, both statically and dynamically, as shown in the case study chapter.
What does business user-friendliness really mean?
Most of the approaches which also recognize the problem of adequacy of the solution to business
users propose a visual and/or pattern-based rule language. Although this is certainly a helpful
thing to simplify and speed up expressing rich business rules, it still is at one semantic level too
deep. Doing so misses the point of enabling business users to model and document the CRs
using domain concepts which appeal to them and directly relate to their conceptualization of
RCM. However, we see such approaches as a promising extension of CoReL as using visual and
pattern-based business rules for expressing constraints embedded into CRs would probably ease
the modeling by business users. We mention this aspect in the limitations of the thesis.
Modularity.
Another difference between CoReL and existing RCM research is the strong modularity that is
enabled because of the decomposition of the language in separate reusable constructs. Modularity
is a well-established strategy to reduce complexity. This helps make building visual policy
models an easier task. Of course, this would be more strongly supported by a repository of these
constructs, i.e., a repository of rules and recoveries for example. This is for example not the case
in the other approaches, to the best of our knowledge. Even the pattern-based rule languages do
not specify how far rules can be composed with each other and what semantics would be defined
for this.
Using CoReL with other notations for process modeling.
Because it uses ASE as the most fundamental element to represent system actions, CoReL can
abstract from the concrete enterprise modeling or the business process modeling language it is
used with. This is achieved because CoReL only models the concepts it needs for its inference,
Actions, Subjects and Entities, and no concepts or property from external semantic domains,
such as role, resource, message or database. Concretely, that means that the same CoReL model
can be used identically with two distinct BP modeling languages, provided that a semantics
in terms of ASEs and SBPs is given to the languages. This is why we claim that the modeled
policies in CoReL may be used in conjunction with various process modeling languages (module
the limitation to SBP-like workflows).
For many of the surveyed approaches, either a specific language is used, or it is unclear
from the publications whether they depend on a BP modeling language or not, while for some
others, this is not a requirement. The work in [Awa10, LSG07] represent two other ways of
ensuring orthogonality with regard to the process language. In [Awa10], semantics to a subset of
BPMN is given in terms of P/T Petri Nets, and a model checker for Petri Nets is used to check
temporal formula in CTL generated from the visual rule notation Awad proposes. In [LSG07],
the approach is very different, as the key to rule interpretation are mostly manual annotations of
process tasks with propositions. These annotations are used by the checking algorithm which
traverses the process model to verify compliance. Theoretically, it is our understanding that the
algorithm used is not dependent on a single process notation.
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10.4
Perspectives for Future Research
We organize the discussion along five dimensions: (i) policy, (ii) decision, (iii) rules & verification,
(iv) business process and (v) language engineering.
• Policy Dimension:
Obligations are an immediate extension to our work, and we see obligation policies
as the most interesting exension. Obligations are a core element of compliance
requirements which we do not tackle in the thesis. We see the stream of work realized
by Governatori [GM05] (resp. Governatori et al.) as the most promising starting
point for this research.
Policy Algebra Next to this, we initiated work on modeling complex policies, by defining
algebraic operators and their semantics, as well as temporal policies. Also, we initiated
research on the semantics of these policy composition operators, thereby defining an
algebra on policies.
Decision Flows We also initiated research on the semantics of so-called decision flows,
which are workflows of policies. We estimate that this further development of the
modeling capacities of CoReL would make the language more useful.
• Decision Dimension:
Policy Activating Violations: An interesting feature worth investigating is enabling
violations to request the enforcement of policies. This makes the CoReL language
more expressive and allows to cover more complex decision-making patterns.
Context/Control Algebra: Being able to model complex contexts and controls by using
specifically defined algebraic operators will allow policy modelers to represent more
complex activation and constraints of policies. A possible start is the work in [ECCB11]
which presents an interesting logic for defining expressive contexts by using event-based
semantics also supporting activation and deactivation of contexts.
Value Theory-Based Valuation: There are works discussing valuations for policies
applied to the problem of trading goods and services and service valuation, but
not, to the best of our knowledge, in the domain of compliance. [EK07], building
on [LAS+06, SL05, LS06], reports on a method for valuating policies using several
alternative valuation models including discrete and continuous functions, piece-wise
linear functions, and pattern-based functions.
• Rules & Verification Dimension:
Visual Pattern-Based Business Rules: Using a business vocabulary for the business
domain would allow users to model rules which are semantically closer to their
domain of expertise. We think that combining a rich business vocabulary with rule
patterns (temporal and structural), as in [Ama12, XLW08, YMH+06] which build on
the property specification patterns in [MGJ98, GL06] is a very promising perspective.
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Temporal Logic Language: Although we support temporal specifications in a limited
way, it is worthwhile exploring using a pure temporal logic language for rule modeling
such as CTL/LTL [BK08]. This will require us to use a different target semantic
domain than Alloy, e.g., labelled transition systems or petri nets.
• Process Dimension:
Rich Process State Model: Up to this stage, we restricted ourselves to only two basic
states of a process task. It is our intuition that a more complete process state model
description would increase the applicability of our approach by increasing the scope of
process executions it can deal with, e.g., by considering task states such as assigning,
delegating or cancelling process tasks [Gaa10].
• Language Dimension:
Concrete Syntax Layer on the Alloy Analyzer: As stated in the limitations of our
approach, using the raw output produced by the analyzer for debugging our Alloy
formalization was a time-consuming and arduous task. The reason is that the output
of the analyzer is always a set of atoms and relations, which obviously does not help
to reason on domain concepts, such as policy and process. This is why we propose to
develop a flexible mechanism allowing to define a concrete syntax for Alloy instance
models.
10.5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have contributed the CoReL method and stack of languages for modeling
and enforcing compliance. Our vision was to provide a full-blown model-driven framework for
modeling compliance requirements of various kinds to accurately represent the decision-making
requirements defined by a regulation.
The framework we have built is based on a formalization of decision-making based on the
policy paradigm. Whether this paradigm is the most adequate for the purpose of RCM is not
a proven fact, although we argued for its inception from observing the nature of the RCM problem.
The visual concrete syntax of the CoReL language may be open for discussion. This is
because it is motivated by the research objective of making it easier for business users to create
policy representations of existing regulations. However, no empirical evidence, large-scale or
not, has yet shown us that this is indeed the case. We can also say that empirical validation is
required to test the following hypotheses: (i) graphical notation for policy modeling is useful, (ii)
the ontological model underlying our language is adequate to the problem and the user (as a
conceptual bridge), (iii) the notation defined for CoReL is intuitive to the business user.
Moreover, the formal verification techniques applied here each show some strengths and
weaknesses. The Alloy model checking is bounded to reasonable sizes of state spaces, and uses
the small-scope hypothesis. The other forms we mentioned such as model checking (e.g. Alpina
[BHMR10, smc10], Lola [Awa10], NuSMV [CCG+02], Spin [Hol03]) present the major strength of
high expressiveness but suffer from the problem pertaining to model-checking, i.e., state explosion.
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The CoReL framework still needs much work in order to fulfill all the requirements elicited in
the state of the art chapter. For example the way CoReL deals with Violations is still very basic.
We do support neither violation localization nor explanation. Some extension points of CoReL,
in particular the Compensation and Reparation constructs in CoReL, have not been illustrated in
the implementation. As such, the full strength of CoReL’s modeling elements has not been shown.
Another element is the rule modeling languages supported by CoReL, which are core to the
evaluation of policy models. We have refrained from designing a new rule language since this is
not where the challenge we identified lies. However, reusing the designed enterprise modeling
language for defining a rich and expressive rule language, which is more accessible to business users
would be an undeniable positive factor in the usability of CoReL. This is all the more true, since
one of the non-trivial steps identified in using CoReL is the search and retrieval of rules in policies.
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